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Abstract 
 
 
In this mini-dissertation I investigate ways in which the accountability of child soldiers, 
themselves the victims of internal wars, has been addressed for atrocities they committed 
or in which they have been complicit. In the context of transitional justice this raises 
opposite and even contradictory concerns: as victims of human rights violations child 
soldiers require protection, but as perpetrators of human rights violations the same child 
soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions. More specifically I look at the 
application of transitional justice mechanisms to this dilemma of child soldier accountability 
in Sierra Leone and Uganda. In Sierra Leone between 5,000 and 10,000 children were 
recruited for use in combat by both state and rebel forces.1 In Uganda an estimated 
25,000 children were forcibly abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army alone.2 As punitive 
judicial processes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) were put in place to try individuals with “the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations” or those deemed guilty of “the most serious crimes,” the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) and traditional justice mechanisms in 
Uganda were elected to address the plight of child soldiers in light of their status as both 
victims and perpetrators. My primary research question therefore is, how and to what 
extent was child soldier accountability, along with recognition of the need of child soldiers 
to be protected as victims of human rights violations, addressed in the transitional justice 
applications of the SLTRC in Sierra Leone and traditional justice in Uganda? Recognizing 
the possibility that the needs of child soldiers for protections might preclude effectively 
holding them accountable for their actions my secondary research question is, how could 
a coherent and effective approach in principle be devised to address both of these 
concerns? In setting up my investigation I provide a rigorous overview of the development 
of the emerging international consensus against child soldiering that has come to conceive 
child soldiers primarily as victims. I note the achievements that have been made in regards 
to provisions for the protection of child soldiers but also the important issues these have 
raised with regard to holding them accountable. The implications of the requirement for the 
voluntary participation of child soldiers in truth-seeking and reconciliation mechanisms is 
discussed. My investigation into the application of transitional justice mechanisms for child 
soldiers thus takes the form of country case studies of both Sierra Leone and Uganda. As 
a literature-based endeavor, my project consists of primary and secondary accounts 
relevant to the pursuit of accountability for child soldiers through transitional justice 
mechanisms. I conclude that in effect accountability for child soldiers was not pursued in 
these cases, at least not in any systematic way. Given the voluntary nature of the 
respective applications of transitional justice in Sierra Leone and Uganda it proved not 
possible to ensure that children responsible for, or complicit in, serious human rights 
abuse would participate in these processes, much less assume responsibility for the 
crimes they committed. Furthermore I conclude that the new voluntary standard precludes 
holding child soldiers accountable and therefore actually serves to foster and sustain the 
prevailing culture of impunity in their regard.  
 
                                                 
1 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Sierra Leone,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 14th September 2008 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone. 
2 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Uganda,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. Accessed 
16th March 2009 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/uganda. 
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Chapter 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1     The Problem of Child Soldiers 
 
The military involvement of children is not new. Historical accounts trace the use of child 
soldiers as far back as the 8th century BC3 while the practice was referenced in Biblical 
accounts, Egyptian art, and Greek texts. Among the most prominent historical instances 
of child soldiering are the Children’s Crusade of 1212 and the Hitler Jugend (Hitler 
Youth) of Germany’s Third Reich.4 As Singer notes however, “[i]n absolutely no cases 
were traditional tribes or ancient civilizations reliant on fighting forces made up of young 
boys and girls.”5 Until recently, children around the world were excluded from directly 
participating in conflict as “a general rule” with only “isolated instances” in which this was 
not the case.6 In the modern era, conversely, a dramatic shift in the nature of warfare – 
to what has been termed “total war”7 – has challenged the rule of children’s exclusion 
from combat. Similarly threatened is the long-held “law of the innocents” of jus in bello 
(laws in war) that prioritized the protection of civilians, foremost women and children, 
from the effects of war.8 Twum-Danso writes, 
 “The post-Cold War period has been marked by a dramatic change in the 
nature of armed conflict globally as most wars are now intra-state rather 
than inter-state. This has resulted in the blurring of the distinction 
between combatants and civilians as communities are now at the heart of 
warfare. Furthermore, these conflicts tend to linger with escalations and 
de-escalations thereby prolonging violence and instability, and this, in 
turn, leads to an increased casualty in adult men. This factor encourages 
warring factions to turn to children to fill these vacant military roles.”9 
 
The increasing prevalence and evolving nature of child soldiering has become a notable 
feature of the contemporary world. By the end of 2007 the military recruitment and 
deployment of children (under age 18) into conflict situations was taking place in at least 
                                                 
3 Disarmament Committee. 2007. “Child Disarmament,” accessed 11th December 2008 at 
http://www.semmuna.org/Background%20Papers/2007disec.doc.  
4 Kennell, N. 1995. The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta. Chapel Hill, NC: 
UNC Press, 5; Twum-Danso, A. 2003. Africa’s Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood. Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, 17. 
5 Singer, P. 2005. Children at War. New York: Pantheon Books, 10.  
6 Ibid, 11, 15. 
7 Kemper, Y. 2005. “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations.” Berlin: 
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 12.  
8 Singer, P. 2005. Children at War. New York: Pantheon Books, 4-5. 
9 Twum-Danso, A. 2003. Africa’s Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood. Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 13. 
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86 countries or territories worldwide.10 Of around 300,000 children directly involved in 30 
conflicts globally in 2001, approximately 80% were below the age of 15, many as young 
as seven or eight.11 As of 2003 at least 120,000 child soldiers – over a third of the 
international total – were found in Africa alone.12 To date the countries most affected by 
the child soldiering problem and where children have been recruited and used are 
Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Moçambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and 
Uganda.13 Moreover this is the case despite the adoption of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child in 1999, the only regional agreement in the world 
prohibiting the use of under-18s in either active or supporting roles in armed combat.14 In 
this study I will focus on the phenomenon of child soldiers in two prominent African 
cases, Sierra Leone and Uganda. 
 
There are multiple causes for the high levels of child soldiering in Africa, most linked to 
the changing nature of modern warfare although intensified by much of the continent’s 
political, economic, and health circumstances not to mention factors specific to African 
children themselves. While the number of civil wars around the world had doubled since 
the end of the Cold War by 200315, armed conflict was occurring in almost half of African 
countries: 24 of 53.16 Collier argues that politics in mineral-rich African nations focus 
largely on the control of mineral revenues often resulting in corruption and violent 
governance and are a main contributing factor to Africa’s steady increase in civil war.17 
Poverty, lack of opportunity, high orphan rates and displacement have also been cited 
                                                 
10 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. Introduction to “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008,” 
accessed 1st December 2009 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/introduction.  
11 McKay, S. and D. Mazurana. 2001. Girls in Militaries, Paramilitaries, and Armed Opposition Groups, cited 
in A. Veale and A. Stavrou. 2003. Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord’s 
Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 7. 
12 Twum-Danso, A. 2003. Africa’s Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood. Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, 9.  
13 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2002. “The Use of Children as Soldiers in Africa: A Country 
Analysis of Child Recruitment and Participation in Armed Conflict,” accessed 1st December 2009 at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/chilsold.htm; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. 
Introduction to “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008,” accessed 1st December 2009 at 
http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/introduction. 
14 Integrated Regional Information Network(IRIN). 2003. “Too small to be fighting anyone’s war,” accessed 
12th December 2008 at http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?IndepthId=24&ReportId=66280.  
15 Singer, P. 2005. Children at War. New York: Pantheon Books, 43. 
16 International Crisis Group. 2003. “CrisisWatch,” November. 
17 Collier, P. 2004. “Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa,” accessed 10th December 2008 at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_04_collier.html.   
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as main causes for the proliferation of child soldiers in Africa.18 Other relevant factors 
include crises of governance. Coincidentally or not, half of African governments are 
autocratic and most of those govern in mineral-rich nations.19 Nathan posits that 
authoritarian rule is but one root cause of the increase in intra-state war in Africa – 
alternatively he cites “the exclusion of minorities from governance, socio-economic 
deprivation combined with inequity, and weak states that lack the institutional capacity to 
manage normal political and social conflict.”20  
 
No matter the causes however, increasing African armed conflict has provided ample 
occasions for children to become involved as soldiers. Entering service either through 
voluntary or forced recruitment, child soldiers commonly act as porters, guards, 
messengers, spies, in laying and clearing landmines, and when they are deemed 
capable, often around age ten, in active combat roles. Girl soldiers have also frequently 
been made to provide sexual services for older soldiers.21 The post-Cold War influx of 
“small arms” – including “rifles, grenades, light machine guns, light mortars, land mines, 
and other weapons that are ‘man-portable’”22 – has made it possible for children to 
participate in what has until recently been mainly an adult domain.23 As of 2006, an 
estimated 100 million small arms were in circulation in Africa.24 One of the more readily 
available and deadly assault rifles used by child soldiers, AK-47s are available for as 
little as US$6 or can be traded for a chicken, a goat, or a sack of grain.25 Due to the 
simplicity of the AK-47, 10 year-old recruits can learn to strip and reassemble them.26  
 
What is evident, though, are the disastrous effects of child soldiering, and not only on 
those directly involved. Children born in war zones, besides being exposed to fighting 
and related atrocities, usually lack basic necessities such as schools, health care, 
                                                 
18 Landau, D. No date. “The Use of Child Soldiers.” Zürich: International Relations and Security Network, 2.  
19 Amosu, A. 2007. Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends and Transition. Accessed 14th July 2008 at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/news/amosu_20070717/amosu_20070717.pdf.  
20 Nathan, L. 2001. “The Four Horseman of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in 
Africa,” in Track Two, 10(2), 4.   
21 Twum-Danso, A. 2003. Africa’s Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood. Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, 29. 
22 Singer, P. 2005. Children at War. New York: Pantheon Books, 45.   
23 Machel, G. 2001. The Impact of War on Children. New York: Palgrave, 2. 
24 Amoa, B. 2006. “The Role of Small Arms in African Civil Wars.” Global Policy Forum, accessed 14th July 
2008 at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/2006/0921roleinafrica.htm.  
25 Fleshman, M. 2001. “Small Arms in Africa: Counting the Cost of Gun Violence,” in Africa Recovery. 
Accessed 20th July 2008 at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol15no4/154arms.htm.  
26 UNICEF. 1996. “Children as Soldiers,” accessed 12th November 2009 at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm.  
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adequate shelter, water, and food while experiencing disrupted family relationships often 
with high levels of family violence. Many war-affected children, as they learn to accept 
violent behavior as a normal part of life, have been noted to frequently develop 
pessimistic and disempowered outlooks that communities with lessened abilities to 
support healthy cognitive and social development have trouble counterbalancing.27 
Similarly adding to their vulnerability, civil war has also left many African children without 
parents. In Angola alone, almost a million children lost one parent and 300,000 lost both 
parents to war.28 The traumatic effects of AIDS have likewise orphaned some 11 million 
children in sub-Saharan Africa, considered the epicenter of the child soldier problem.29 
Singer writes of orphans, “malnourished, stigmatized, and vulnerable to physical and 
sexual abuse, this mass of disconnected and disaffected children is particularly at risk of 
being exploited as child soldiers.”30 Lastly, forced displacement caused by war produced 
almost 1.5 million African child refugees as of 2000.31 By 2008 there were an additional 
11.6 million internally displaced persons, notably the lowest level of the decade, of which 
80% were women and children.32  
 
At the crux of these developments are widely prevalent practices of the forced 
recruitment of child soldiers. While forced recruitment by armed groups has long 
targeted refugees, it has also become one of the main threats facing internally displaced 
communities in Africa in particular through the forced recruitment of children.33 
Capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of African children, armed groups and state forces 
alike have turned to the use of child soldiers as they have run out of adult soldiers during 
oft-prolonged civil conflict.34 Commanders have noted that children are “easier to 
                                                 
27 Smith, D. 2001. “Children in the Heat of War,” Monitor on Psychology, 32(8), 29. 
28 IRIN. 2001. “Children of War,” 21 June.  
29 UN. No date. “AIDS Orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Looming Threat to Future Generations,” accessed 
12th November 2009 at http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=400#; Singer, P. 2002. 
“AIDS and International Security,” Survival, 44(1), 145-58. 
30 Singer, P. 2005. Children at War. New York: Pantheon Books, 42. 
31 UNHCR. 2001. “Refugee Children in Africa: Trends and Patterns in the Refugee Population in Africa 
Below the Age of 18 Years, 2000,” 3.  
32 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2009. “Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and 
Developments in 2008,” 9; UN. 2009. “Special Concerns,” accessed 12th November 2009 at 
http://www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm.  
33 UNHCR. 1994. “Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care,” 79; Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre. 2009. “Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2008,” 
35. 
34 Kemper, Y. 2005. “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations.” Berlin: 
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 12. 
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condition into fearless killing and unthinking obedience.”35 Landau adds, “[T]here are few 
incentives that might cause children to refrain from joining armed groups, such as 
alternative educational or economic opportunities and intact families and communities.”36 
This said, forcible methods of recruitment are on the increase as evidenced in 
abductions by both the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) of northern Uganda, the two cases that I will deal with in depth. 
McIntyre writes that in fact the notion of “voluntary” service within these two groups 
among others is questionable owing to the external circumstances facing targeted 
children: 
 “The idea of voluntarism among children, particularly in the context of the 
highly publicized forced recruitment methods of groups such as Uganda’s 
Lord’s Resistance Army and Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front, 
has come into question. Armed coercive methods aside, the decisions of 
children and youth joining armed groups are subject to social, political 
and economic pressures that cast doubt on the degree of free choice 
exercised.”37 
 
 
Regardless of the nature of their entry into armed service, however, child soldiers have 
been responsible for some of the worst crimes in African wars. In Sierra Leone, they 
were found to be involved in killing, amputation, mutilation, extortion, looting and 
destruction, rape and sexual violence, abduction and forced recruitment, forced 
displacement, forced detention, assault, torture, beating and forced labor.38 In Uganda, 
as the overwhelming majority of the LRA’s forces, they have been complicit in “a pattern 
of brutalization of civilians by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, 
mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements.”39 In 
addition to the destruction that child soldiers have contributed through their service, 
recent studies have highlighted the negative consequences of child soldiering on the 
children themselves as “a human capital loss due to time away from schooling and 
employment, and psychological distress concentrated in those that experience the most 
                                                 
35 McIntyre, A. and T. Weiss. 2003. “Exploring Small Arms Demand: A Youth Perspective.” Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies, 16.   
36 Landau, D. No date. “The Use of Child Soldiers.” Zürich: International Relations and Security Network, 1.   
37 McIntyre, A. 2003. “Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The Youth Factor in Africa’s Armed Conflict,” 
in African Security Review, 12(2), 4. 
38 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
Paragraph 228. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml.   
39 International Criminal Court(ICC). 2005. “Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders,” 
press release accessed 19th March 2009 at www.icc.cpi.int.  
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violence.”40 Dodge and Raundalen highlight the effect on child soldiers of  “psychological 
reaction patterns ranging from aggression and revenge (an aspect which we think is 
exaggerated) to anxiety, fear, grief and depression.”41 They add that this trauma “may 
affect the individual child and, as a consequence, the society for decades.”42 Regarding 
the dramatic challenge presented by child soldiering in Africa, both for local communities 
and for child soldiers themselves, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu writes, 
“Today’s warfare in Africa, especially the exploitation, abuse and use of 
children, is nothing short of a process of self-destruction...This isn’t a 
small matter. This goes to the very heart of whether or not in large 
portions of Africa there is promise of a future in those societies.”43  
 
 
 
1.2   Child Soldiers as both Victims and Perpetrators in the Development of      
        International and Regional Law  
 
Child soldiering in Africa has continued to proliferate despite attempts to confront it by 
developments in international and regional law. Addressing the child soldier problem is 
especially complicated by the fact that child soldiers have been recognized as both 
victims and perpetrators in armed conflict. Focusing on the rights of child soldiers as 
victims, many international organizations including the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), have pursued the 
development of protections for child soldiers – against their recruitment, towards a child-
rights framework should prosecutions occur, and with an emphasis on their reintegration 
and rehabilitation needs in the interest of peace. On the other hand many victimized 
communities, recognizing that child soldiers are responsible for, or at least complicit in, 
some of the most serious crimes committed against them, rather prioritize the need for 
justice regardless of the fact that the accused are children.44 Most national legal systems 
allow for the prosecution of juvenile perpetrators of crime if it is found “necessary and 
                                                 
40 Blattman, C. and J. Annan. 2007. “The Consequences of Child Soldiering.” Sussex: Households in 
Conflict Network, 23.  
41 Dodge, C. and M. Raundalen. 1991. Reaching Children in War: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique. 
Dhaka: Sigma Forlag, 28. 
42 Ibid, 21.  
43 Otunnu, O. 2001. “The Road from Soldier Back to Child,” in Africa Recovery, 15(3), 10. 
44 Popovski, V. 2007. Quoted in S. Leahy. 2007. “Prosecuting Child Soldiers For Their Own Safety,” 
accessed 3rd January 2010 at http://stephenleahy.net/non-environmental-journalism/prosecuting-child-
soldiers-for-their-own-safety/.   
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opportune.”45 While there has been substantial advancement made in the development 
of international and regional protections for children affected by war, finding an approach 
to hold child soldiers accountable for their crimes has been much more problematic. 
Even defining child soldiers within international law has been unsuccessful. Fox writes,     
 “[A]lthough [it] has become quite clear in regard to who is a child, as well 
as what constitutes a combatant or soldier, there is no such clear 
understanding of or category for someone who is both a child and a 
soldier. The very concept of child-soldier or child-combatant does not 
exist within law, with the exception of provisions made for captured, 
armed minors.”46 
 
Within the traditional international laws of war, the position had been clear-cut: should 
children participate in armed conflict,  
  “they lose their inviolability as non-combatants; indeed, they become 
‘legitimate’ military targets, individuals whose death or disablement result 
in that weakening of the armed forces of the enemy which is the only 
legitimate aim in war.”47  
 
But in that case they could hardly be recognized as victims of these internal wars as the 
growing international consensus had come to regard them. 
 
At a theoretical level what is at stake is the problem of recognizing the agency of child 
soldiers as both victims and perpetrators of crimes against humanity. To the extent that 
they are accorded a victim status, and in pursuing the protections this status requires, it 
seems that this must imply a denial of their agency. However, this is not the assumption 
of victimized communities who face the brunt of child soldier attacks and call for justice, 
while anthropological and social work literature also suggest that children may have 
more agency than international human rights and criminal law assumes.48  
 
In more practical terms the issue of defining the threshold of agency tends to become 
the vexed question of setting an appropriate age limit. If child soldiers are deemed more 
victims than perpetrators, then work in international and regional law to raise the 
                                                 
45 Popovski, V. and K. Arts. 2006. “International Criminal Accountability and Children’s Rights,” United 
Nations University, Policy Brief 4, 6. 
46 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” in 
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 30. 
47 Cohn, I. and G. Goodwin. 1993. “Child Soldiers.” Geneva: Henry Durant Institute, 45. 
48 Drumbl, A. 2009. “Child Soldiers, Individual Agency, and International Criminal Law,” accessed 5th 
January 2009 at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/5/7/pages310573/p310573-1.php.   
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minimum age limit for the acceptable recruitment and use of children is simultaneously a 
pursuit to determine the age of criminal accountability for child soldiers. As such, it has 
implications for accountability processes that might be applied in their regard. 
Presumably child soldiers below the acceptable age of recruitment and use are entitled 
to protections that respect their victim status. At what age the duty to prosecute applies 
to crimes committed by children remains unresolved.49 In Sierra Leone for example, 
while children are defined as anyone under age 18, the age of criminal responsibility is 
set at age 14.50 In Uganda the definition of a child is likewise 18 however age 12 is the 
age of criminal responsibility.51 As a result of these discrepancies that exist throughout 
the African continent and around the world, the legal advancements made with regard to 
child soldiering have been largely confined to the recruitment of children for armed 
service, both in extending the age of protection of children and in holding recruiters 
accountable. Nonetheless, establishing an international consensus on the limit of child 
recruitment and use, first set at 15 in the Convention on the Rights of the Child(CRC)52, 
implies that child perpetrators who are beneath the limit at the time of the alleged 
offense are above all victims due to a lack of mental maturity and agency: 
  “[T]he prohibition on both forced recruitment and use of children under 
age fifteen in direct hostilities suggests that the States Party to these 
treaties believed children under fifteen do not possess the mental maturity 
to express valid consent to join an armed group. If children under fifteen 
are not sufficiently mature to consent to engage directly in armed conflict 
and must be protected from the dangers of war under the CRC, they 
arguably are more like victims of armed conflicts than its perpetrators.”53 
 
It is this issue, the extent to which child soldiers are either victims or perpetrators, 
and the related challenge of balancing their needs for protection and 
accountability, which will be the basis for my present inquiry. 
 
 
1.3 Problem Statement and Guiding Questions 
 
In this mini-dissertation I will investigate ways in which the accountability of child 
soldiers, themselves the victims of internal wars, have been addressed for atrocities they 
                                                 
49 Grossman, N. 2007. “Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights Violations,” 
in Georgetown Journal of International Law. 38(2), 340-2. 
50 Sierra Leone. 2007. “The Child Right Act,” Articles 2, 70.   
51 Uganda. 2000. “The Children Act,” Articles 2, 88. 
52 Grossman, N. 2007. “Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights Violations,” 
in Georgetown Journal of International Law. 38(2), 332. 
53 Ibid, 343. 
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committed or in which they have been complicit. In the context of transitional justice this 
raises opposite and even contradictory concerns: as victims of human rights violations 
child soldiers require protection, but as perpetrators of human rights violations the same 
child soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions. More specifically I will look at 
the application of transitional justice mechanisms to this dilemma of child soldier 
accountability in Sierra Leone and Uganda. It should be noted that due to the ongoing 
nature of conflict in Uganda, how to address the situation of child soldiers by means of 
transitional justice tools to date remains only in the planning phase. In Sierra Leone 
between 5,000 and 10,000 children were recruited for use in combat by both state and 
rebel forces.54 In Uganda an estimated 25,000 children were forcibly abducted by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army alone.55 In both of these cases various mechanisms of 
transitional justice were chosen of which some were more suited to securing the 
protection of child soldiers as victims and others with the objective of holding them 
accountable for the atrocities in which they had been involved.  
 
According to 2004’s UN “Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” transitional justice  
“comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with  
a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none  
at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.”56  
 
UNICEF adds that the processes of transitional justice “are based on a human rights 
approach and rely on international human rights and humanitarian law in demanding that 
states halt, investigate, punish, repair, and prevent abuses.”57 In his preface to the Kritz 
volumes on Transitional Justice Nelson Mandela alludes to how transitional justice 
mechanisms can be employed to address accountability while attending to the needs of 
victims. Citing their application after the end of apartheid in South Africa Mandela posits, 
                                                 
54 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Sierra Leone,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 14th September 2008 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone. 
55 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Uganda,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 16th March 2009 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/uganda. 
56 UN. 2004. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies.” Report S/2004/616, Article 3(8). 
57 UNICEF. 2008. “Expert Discussion on Children and Transitional Justice.” Florence: UNICEF Innocenti 
Reseach Centre, 4. 
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“They have all had to devise mechanisms not only for handling past human rights 
violations, but also to ensure that the dignity of victims, survivors, and relatives is 
restored.”58 As such the victim-focused tools of transitional justice are intended to 
address the local context and political realities of societies in transition that call for new 
legal and political norms to be established. The question is how such alternative justice 
tools can also be utilized to aid in achieving accountability keeping in mind the final aim 
of statewide reconciliation. Punitive justice mechanisms are considered to be 
problematic in that they do not take into consideration the political and social dynamics 
of conflict, nor the process of building peace after conflict has ended.59 
 
At the same time it is far from clear, certainly in the case of child soldiers as both victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations, to what extent transitional justice processes 
are capable of addressing the accountability of these children. What is not in dispute is 
the prioritization of child soldiers as victims in need of reintegration. As Lumsden writes, 
“[t]he challenge facing the international community is how to rehabilitate the survivors of 
war and other trauma, and in particular how to reach the fraction who are potentially 
violent.”60 This further implies an emphasis on protections for child soldiers rather than 
an intention to pursue their accountability. It is important then to ask how transitional 
justice mechanisms are meant to address the issue of holding child soldiers responsible 
for the serious crimes they committed.  
 
In Sierra Leone, the transitional justice mechanisms employed to address accountability 
were the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC). With the assistance of the United Nations the 
SCSL was established in 2003 “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law.”61 Its initial mandate included prosecution of child soldiers between the ages of 15 
and 18 within a juvenile justice framework with the goal of rehabilitation and 
                                                 
58 Mandela, N. 1995. In Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. N. 
Kritz(ed). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, vi. 
59 Mawson, A. 2004. “Children, Impunity and Justice: Some Dilemmas from Northern Uganda,” in J. Boyden 
and J. de Berry(eds). 2004. Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and 
Displacement. Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 130.  
60 Lumsden, M. 1997. “Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” in Journal of Peace Research, 34(4), 377. 
61 Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” Article 1(1). 
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reintegration.62 In the end however the Special Court chose not to fulfill this mandate. 
Responsibility for dealing with child soldiers and their accountability was transferred to 
the SLTRC that provided “an alternative to judicial prosecution for atrocities.”63 The 
SLTRC was established according to the Abuja Accord between the government of 
Sierra Leone and the RUF “to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a 
forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, 
[and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation.”64  
 
In the process of setting up the SLTRC, its specific role in pursuing accountability for 
abuses committed by child soldiers was not illuminated. As a non-prosecutorial and 
quasi-judicial mechanism it could not function to achieve retributive justice. At best it 
could pursue accountability for abuses at the level of a truth process. A question then is 
whether the SLTRC was in fact conceived as a truth process linked to establishing 
accountability. Its approach to child soldiers puts this into question from the outset: in the 
founding “Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000” the only mention of child 
perpetrators places them on par with other war-affected children and victims of sexual 
abuse whose interests the SLTRC was to take into account.65 This is further complicated 
by the fact that a general amnesty, including child soldiers, had previously been granted 
according to the Abuja Peace Accord.  
 
In Uganda, the transitional justice processes I will highlight are the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and traditional justice mechanisms. Requested by the Ugandan government, 
the ICC began its work in Uganda in 2004 in accordance with the Rome Statute, “to 
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern.”66 As such its focus was on holding top LRA leaders accountable for their 
serious crimes. Unlike the SCSL, the ICC in Uganda as accorded by the Rome Statute 
did not have jurisdiction “over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the 
alleged commission of a crime.”67 By implication it therefore would not try child soldiers. 
                                                 
62 Ibid, Article 7(1).  
63 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. 2004. “Volume 1, Introduction,” Article 3.1. 
64 Sierra Leone. 1999. “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone,” Article 26. 
65 Sierra Leone. 2000. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000,” Article 7(4). 
66 ICC. 1998. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Article 1.  
67 Ibid, Article 26.  
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The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (AAR) signed between the 
Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 2007 stated that 
accountability for lower-level perpetrators, which in practice included child soldiers, 
would be pursued through alternative means. As a framework agreement, the AAR was 
meant to provide guidance for more detailed subsequent legislation. Traditional justice 
mechanisms were prioritized for application in this regard “as a central part of the 
framework for accountability and reconciliation.”68 Again however the role of these 
transitional justice mechanisms specifically in addressing child soldier accountability was 
not mentioned. Furthermore, as child soldiers had previously been granted political 
amnesty along with other rank-and-file perpetrators under the Amnesty Act of 2000, the 
question arises to what extent their accountability was to be pursued in the subsequent 
transitional justice processes.   
 
While the scenarios involved in the application of transitional justice mechanisms in 
Sierra Leone and Uganda were dramatically different, the respective approaches to the 
issue of child soldier accountability were nonetheless to be quite similar. As punitive 
judicial processes of the SCSL and the ICC were put in place to try individuals with “the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations” or those deemed guilty of “the most serious 
crimes,” in both cases non-judicial restorative processes were elected to address child 
soldiers in light of their status as both victims and perpetrators.  
 
With a growing international consensus around child soldiers being more victims than 
perpetrators while prioritizing prosecution for the crime of their recruitment and use, it is 
unsurprising that child soldier accountability was not to be pursued as vigorously as that 
of top military leaders. In line with this view, the accountability of child soldiers must 
certainly take lower priority than that of their recruiters and the organizers of mass 
atrocities. This was particularly poignant in the case of the ongoing conflict in Uganda 
where prosecuting top leaders was held by some as a way to end conflict with the LRA.  
 
That both the SCSL and the ICC in Uganda did not try child soldiers thus reflects the 
international consensus that, although child soldier accountability is not to be ignored, it 
must be pursued while still observing child rights, but without unnecessarily resorting to 
                                                 
68 Uganda. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan,” Article 3.1. 
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judicial proceedings, and with the goal of reintegration and rehabilitation as stated first in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Locally, despite the push of some 
communities for accountability regardless of the perpetrator’s age, there is recognition 
that the end goal regarding child soldiers, most of whom come from those same 
communities, must be their reintegration and rehabilitation.  
 
Given the realities facing post-conflict societies who themselves must rebuild both 
socially and economically after prolonged periods of violence and devastation, the 
importance of respecting the rights of child soldiers as victims is understandable. At the 
same time however, demands for justice by those communities highlight that indeed 
their own rights must be addressed as victims of child soldiers’ committed atrocities. A 
further question then is how and to what extent child soldier accountability can be 
addressed in ways that respect both the rights of child soldiers and those of the 
communities they victimized.            
 
Brought to bear on the case studies of the present investigation, my general problem 
statement can be formulated in terms of more specific research questions: How and to 
what extent was child soldier accountability, along with recognition of the need of child 
soldiers to be protected as victims of human rights violations, addressed in the 
transitional justice applications of the SLTRC in Sierra Leone and traditional justice in 
Uganda? While the SLTRC and Ugandan traditional justice mechanisms were given 
overall responsibility for balancing the needs for both accountability and protections in 
the case of child soldiers, it was not specified how this was to be achieved in practice. 
Rather, the SLTRC merely states that child soldiers were to be approached like other 
victims of conflict including arguably the worst-affected. The AAR in its turn posits that 
child soldiers were to undergo the same accountability processes as other rank-and-file 
soldiers who, like them, had been granted amnesty already.  
 
An obvious subsidiary question seems appropriate: not how and to what extent was 
accountability for child soldiers to be addressed but rather, with the opposing 
considerations of providing child soldiers necessary protections while pursuing their 
accountability, could a coherent and effective approach be devised that in fact 
addresses both of these concerns? By studying the processes that led to the use of the 
SLTRC in Sierra Leone and traditional justice mechanisms in Uganda as well as those 
 13
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
transitional justice processes themselves, I hope to shed light on what promises to be a 
continuing challenge to the international community and local communities alike in 
establishing the relationship between the rights of child soldiers for protections and the 
need for their accountability while determining how these tensions and possible 
contradictions can be reconciled in theory and in practice.  
 
The answers to these questions have significant theoretical and political implications 
some of which are quite contentious. At a theoretical level, the degree that child soldier 
accountability was to be pursued in Sierra Leone and Uganda reflects the extent to 
which the rights of child soldiers have been established internationally, regionally, and 
nationally. Regarding the international sphere it should be noted that this is not only a 
question of international human rights law but also of the broader “international 
consensus” expressed by human rights organizations and representatives of civil 
society. At a political level, it in turn also reflects the extent of the duties imposed on 
states in regards both to providing protections for child soldiers as victims and to holding 
them accountable as perpetrators. As the Sierra Leonean and Ugandan case studies 
represent the first attempts to apply transitional justice to address this aforementioned 
challenge, they have the potential to be precedent-setting regarding future dealings in 
the case of child soldiers. For the field of transitional justice this raises the question of 
how its related mechanisms can in fact be applied to effectively address the dilemma of 
child soldier accountability.  
 
 
1.3.1 Research Design and Limitations 
My investigation into the application of transitional justice mechanisms for child soldiers 
takes the form of country case studies of both Sierra Leone and Uganda. It occurs within 
a framework of transitional justice relevant to truth commissions and traditional justice 
processes in post-conflict societies. Each case study includes a literature review that 
contextualizes the respective transitional justice approach applied in each setting. While 
previous work exists which notes the appropriateness of transitional justice to the 
situation of child soldiers, much of this literature is quite generalized and makes no 
reference to practical cases. On the other hand, specific applications of traditional justice 
mechanisms are well-noted. However, this literature focuses overwhelmingly on the 
goals of rehabilitation, reintegration, and social reconciliation rather than on 
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accountability. As such, my proposed enquiry into the specific applications of transitional 
justice mechanisms towards the accountability of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and 
Uganda may be able to contribute to this literature.  
 
As a literature-based endeavor, my project consists of primary and secondary accounts 
relevant to the pursuit of accountability for child soldiers through transitional justice 
mechanisms. I utilize secondary sources to discuss the relevant histories as well as the 
emergence and extent of the phenomenon of child soldiering in each case. I likewise use 
secondary sources to investigate some high-profile challenges to the pursuit of 
accountability for child soldiers including the peace-versus-justice debate in the Uganda 
case study. Due to the recent nature of the culmination of both the SLTRC and the 
signing of the AAR in Uganda however there is little secondary literature available that 
provides critical analysis, particularly with application to the child soldier issue. Therefore 
in both these cases I rely largely on primary sources and descriptive reports as a basis 
for investigation. While this is a limitation to my study it is also a significant strength in 
that this account and its analysis are pioneering. 
 
 
1.3.2 Project Overview 
My project begins with an overview of the development of the international consensus 
against child soldiering. This serves as the context within which my subsequent 
investigation of the case studies of Sierra Leone and Uganda takes place. In each case 
study I begin by looking at the root causes and dynamics of the respective internal 
conflict highlighting the development of the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In the 
case of Uganda I turn to a discussion of the peace-versus-justice debate that has not 
only hindered the resolution of conflict but has notably influenced the pursuit of 
accountability for child soldiers. Subsequently I look specifically at the phenomenon of 
child soldiering in both countries noting the role of child soldiers as both victims and 
perpetrators of serious crimes. In the Sierra Leonean case study I move on to a 
discussion of the war-ending Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of 2000 that, along with 
granting amnesty to all perpetrators, set up the SLTRC that was to be used to address 
the situation of child soldiers. I next discuss the creation of the SCSL in 2002 and 
investigate its relationship to the SLTRC in pursuing accountability for atrocities 
committed during wartime. Thereafter I focus on the SLTRC’s work and the findings of 
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its Final Report for my analysis of its attempt to address the accountability of child 
soldiers. In the Ugandan case study I turn to the official and unofficial approaches to 
addressing child soldiers throughout the conflict there. I highlight the work of two non-
governmental organizations, GUSCO and World Vision, which were involved in providing 
rehabilitation and reintegration services to child soldiers since 1994. I note the fluctuating 
stance of President Museveni and the GoU that for most of its tenure utilized child 
soldiers itself in a largely military approach to the LRA. I then highlight the GoU’s 
community-influenced attempt to achieve peace with the LRA in its offer of amnesty to 
all combatants in the Amnesty Act of 2000. Thereafter I turn to the GoU’s signing of the 
Optional Protocol to the CRC in 2002 in which they finally agreed to end the use of 
under-18s in Uganda. Subsequently I discuss the requested involvement of the ICC 
beginning in 2004 in pursuit of accountability for wartime atrocities. Lastly I move on to 
an investigation of the 2007 Agreement on Accountability and its subsequent Annexure 
that stipulated that all lower-level perpetrators including child soldiers were to be held 
accountable by traditional justice mechanisms on a voluntary basis. In both cases, I 
conclude by discussing how and to what extent the particular application of transitional 
justice mechanisms managed to address the issue of child soldier accountability. 
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Chapter 2.      THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST CHILD   
SOLDIERING: ADDRESSING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHILD 
SOLDIERS AS BOTH VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS IN CONFLICT 
 
Dealing with the dilemma of child soldier accountability has been significantly affected by 
the development of an international consensus against child soldiering that has come to 
conceive child soldiers primarily as victims. This chapter will serve as an overview of that 
development, noting the achievements that have been made in regards to provisions for 
the protection of child soldiers but also the important issues these have raised with 
regard to holding them accountable. I highlight the legal developments both at the 
international and at the regional level. However I also investigate the non-legal and non-
binding developments that have come to shape approaches to child soldiers globally. 
This chapter thus situates the issue of child soldiers within the developing framework of 
international and regional law. Secondly, and more significantly for my purposes, it 
provides the background necessary to understand the issues that have come to affect 
the pursuit of child soldier accountability.   
 
 
2.1  The Development of International and Regional Law 
 
The more specific issues and recent developments regarding the position of child 
soldiers need to be located within the historical background and context of international 
humanitarian law (IHL).   IHL is “a set of international rules, established by treaty or 
custom [intended to protect] persons and property that are, or may be, affected by 
armed conflict and limits the rights of parties to a conflict to use methods and means of 
warfare of their choice.” 69 The main treaty source of international humanitarian law is 
the Geneva Conventions. The Conventions were based on general principles of “just 
war” in place since medieval times that restricted how warfare could be carried out – 
limiting the means utilized to the most humane, permitting only minimal force to be used, 
stipulating that only military targets could be attacked, and protecting vulnerable civilian 
groups including children.70 Pushed by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) the Geneva Conventions were created shortly after the end of World War II in 
                                                 
69 ICRC. 2003. “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law,” 1. 
70 Bennett, T. 1998. “Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition?” Pretoria: Institute fo
Security Studies, 4. 
r 
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1949.71 The Conventions were intended to address humanitarian problems related to 
both international and non-international armed conflict.72 As such they apply in times of 
war to governments that ratify their terms. As of 2009 they have been ratified by 194 
countries making them in effect universally applicable.73 The Geneva Conventions did 
not directly address the problem of child soldiers as child participation to that point had 
only been exceptional. Nonetheless they protected children “as members of the civilian 
population and therefore, by definition, as non-participants in the armed conflict.”74  Thus
the Fourth Convention prohibits the recruitment of all “protected persons,” which 
included children, into “armed or auxiliary forces.”
 
 
le under 
he Geneva 
d, for example “preferential treatment” for those 
nder 15 instead of those under 18.76 
 the 
 
en in 
ge 
                                                
75 Despite the multiple mentions of 
“children” in its protections, the Geneva Conventions did not clearly define who was to
fall within this category. It was however largely implied that children were peop
age 18 who were entitled to special considerations and protections. Notably, t
Conventions indirectly created different classes of children based on special 
considerations that were to be extende
u
 
With the waning of inter-state wars and the rise of wars related to independence 
movements and new post-colonial states, the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference on
Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict 
recognized that the Geneva Conventions were insufficiently comprehensive to address
contemporary armed conflict.77 Furthermore, the increasing participation of childr
international and non-international wars was now recognized as a humanitarian 
problem.78 In 1977 the first and second Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 henceforth prohibited the recruitment and participation of children under the a
of fifteen into armed combat in international conflicts, internal conflicts for the right of 
self-determination (Protocol I), or high-intensity conflicts between a government and 
 
71 Rosen. D. 2007. “Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood,” in 
American Anthropologist, 109(2), 1; International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC). 2003. “International 
w,” 1. 
ed 12th 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law,” 1. 
72 ICRC. 2003. “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights La
73 ICRC. 2005. “State Parties/Signatories to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,” access
December 2009 at http://www.icrc.org/ihlsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P.   
74 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 1.  
 
05. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” in 
75 UN. 1949. “Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12
August 1949,” Article 51.  
76 Fox, M. 20
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 31. 
77 Ibid, 33.  
78 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 2.   
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organized armed groups (Protocol II).79 This was the first time that an age restriction was 
placed on individuals taking part in war.80 Regarding the military recruitment of 15
year-olds, Article 77(2)(c) of the first Protocol emphasizes that “the Parties shall 
endeavor to give priority to those who are the oldest.”
 to 18 
as 
f 
lso 
8, 
e 
 countries and Protocol II by 
65 countries, both including Sierra Leone and Uganda.86 
f 
                                                
81 Despite this effort to avoid the 
use of the youngest minors first in the recruitment of children, the cut-off at age 15 h
since posed a problem in attempts of international law to prevent the recruitment o
under-18s.82 Moreover, the Protocols only covered direct participation – therefore 
auxiliary service was still not outlawed. The voluntary participation of under-15s was a
not prohibited.83 The ICRC attempted to strengthen the provisions of the Protocol by 
toughening states’ obligations to protect children and by prohibiting indirect participation 
in hostilities.84 Although some states also petitioned to raise the age of protection to 1
as well as to ban children’s indirect participation in armed conflict, these points wer
rejected “as unrealistic at the time, having regard to the nature of wars of national 
liberation.”85 As of 2009, Protocol I has been ratified by 169
1
 
 
In 1989, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) updated 
protections previously extended to children in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights o
the Child of 1924 and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly in 1959, also recognizing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 1977,” Article 77(2)(c); UN. 1977. “Protocol 
on-
ne 1977,” Article 4(3)(c).  
n 
79UN. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of N
International Armed Conflicts, 8 Ju
80 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” i
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 34. 
81UN. 1977. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977,” Article 77(2)(c).  
” in 82 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 34.  
83 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 2.    
l Debates,” in 84 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptua
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 35. 
85 Cohn, I. and G. Goodwin. 1993. “Child Soldiers.” Geneva: Henry Durant Institute, 42. 
86 ICRC. 2009. “State Parties to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict(Protocol I), 8 June 1977,” accesse
 and 
d 12th 
December 2009 at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P; ICRC. 2009. “Stat
Parties to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and R
e 
elating to the 
09 at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts(Protocol II), 8 June 1977,” accessed 12th 
December 20 .      
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among other international covenants.87 At an earlier stage, and prior to the increasing 
war-related involvement of children with the rise of intra-state armed conflict, the rights of 
children had primarily been identified within the context of international labor law in 
protections against exploitation. The 1948 non-binding Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights for the first time situated child rights within the broader field of human rights law.88
Differing from IHL in that its legal obligations apply equally both in times of peace a
war, international human rights law  (IHRL) “is a set of international rules, established b
treaty or custom, on the basis of which individuals and groups can expect and/or claim
certain behavior and benefits from government.”
 
nd of 
y 
 
90 
epend on the nationality of the 
hild and its parents or their relationship to one of the parties to a conflict.”91 IHRL 
ey are innocent; and 
at their welfare lies in the interest of all.”93 This notion of children as innocent has 
With the newly defined child-rights-based approach and given the rising involvement of 
children in global wars, the inclusion of a provision addressing the rights of children in 
                                                
89 According to IHRL “all children, 
regardless of differences in circumstance or social status, deserve equal protection.”
According to IHL on the other hand, “protection may d
c
therefore assumes “that children can claim certain individual rights even in adverse 
situations, transcending border and conflict lines.”92  
 
With the safety of children as its main concern, the rights-based approach has since 
defined the work of international organizations with regards to youth under age 18 
including child soldiers. Kemper explains that “[t]he moral obligation to protect them 
derives from a ubiquitous belief that children suffer the most; that th
th
nonetheless presented a conceptual challenge in the pursuit of international protections 
for child soldiers as a result of their dual victim/perpetrator status.  
 
 
87 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 1989. “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” 
d International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” in 
Preamble.   
88 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers an
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 36. 
89 ICRC. 2003. “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law,” 1. 
90 Bennett, T. 1998. “Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition?” Pretoria: Institute for 
 Studies, 7. 
ply, 4 
 
rnational Organizations.” Berlin: Berghof 
of International Organizations.” Berlin: 
Security
91 Ibid. 
92 Oyat, G. 2004. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers; Save the Children, Uganda. Email re
June 2004, in Kemper, Y. 2005. “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International 
Organizations.” Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 14; Kemper, Y.
2005. “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of Inte
Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 14.  
93 Kemper, Y. 2005. “Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches 
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 14. 
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armed conflict was considered essential as the UN began drafting the CRC.94 This 
document entered into force with record speed – within less than a year95 – and is 
considered groundbreaking for its specific focus on children’s rights and the wide rang
of issues it addresses.
e 
 
 
 do 
he 
 
ternational law on the question of age 
nd types of recruitment and participation.101  
f 
e a 
t 
                                                
96 Furthermore, it has been ratified by all but two of the world’s
countries, the United States and Somalia, making it an almost universally accepted 
human rights treaty.97 Perhaps the biggest noted weakness of the CRC, however, is that 
as a human rights document it is limited to addressing states and not any other parties to
a conflict.98 This is particularly poignant given the rise of non-state armed groups within 
the proliferation of intra-state conflicts. As opposed to IHL, “human rights instruments
not bind non-government entities such as opposition armed forces.”99 This poses an 
obvious challenge to the pursuit of protections for child soldiers through IHRL, and t
CRC specifically, as the majority of child soldiers are recruited by non-state armed 
groups.100 Nonetheless, some states and non-governmental organizations saw it as an
ideal opportunity to improve the provisions of in
a
 
Article 1 of the CRC starts by defining a child as “every human being below the age o
18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”102 
While respecting the differences among states’ legal systems, this also reflects the lack 
of international consensus on the age of criminal responsibility.103 Notably Article 3 then 
posits that “[i]n all actions concerning children…the best interests of the child shall b
primary consideration.”104 (This important point will shortly be further highlighted in 
discussion of the accountability provisions of the CRC). Article 19 amplifies the “bes
 
94 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 2. 
95 Arts, K. 2006. “General Introduction: A Child Rights-Based Approach to International Criminal 
Accountability,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of 
Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 4. 
96 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” in 
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 37. 
97UN. 1989. “Parties/Signatories to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” accessed 12th December 
2009 at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en.  
98 Fox, M. 2005. “Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates,” in 
Human Rights Review, 27(4), 38.  
99 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 3. 
100 Withers, L. 2007. “Child Soldiers: How to Engage in Dialogue with Non-State Armed Groups,” in C. 
Bellamy and J. Zermatten(eds). 2007. Realizing the Rights of the Child: Swiss Human Rights Book Vol. 2. 
Berne: Rüffer and Rub, 227. 
101 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 2.     
102UN. 1989. “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Article 1.  
103 Grossman, N. 2007. “Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights 
Violations,” in Georgetown Journal of International Law. 38(2), 342. 
104 Ibid, Article 3(1).   
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interests” clause by giving states the responsibility to protect the rights of children. 
States are to take “all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or 
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation.”105 Turning to the 
issue of age restrictions for the recruitment and use of child soldiers, Article 38 merely 
reiterates the existing standards of the first Geneva Protocol including the age 15 cut-o
for governments in the recruitment and direct use of children in hostilities.
ff 
 age-
ent 
IHL along with the need to 
chieve consensus among conflicting states’ views.107  
tion of child 
 , 
il s reintegration and the child’s assuming 
er 
 
ts to 
                                                
106 Although 
significant attempts were made by the ICRC, Sweden, and Switzerland to retain the
18 limit for child soldier recruitment and participation, several delegations wanted it 
changed to 15 in line with IHL and their own national legal systems. In the end efforts to 
lower the age of protection against child soldiering were defeated by a strong argum
by the United States against using the CRC to redefine 
a
 
Coming to the important issue of addressing accountability for child soldiers as both 
victims and perpetrators in armed conflict, the CRC for the first time in international law 
turned from the provision of protections against recruitment for child soldiers to their 
potential prosecution. Article 40(1) of the CRC iterates that although prosecu
soldiers is acceptable it must take place within a juvenile justice framework: 
“States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of
or recognized as having infringed penal law to be treated in a manner 
consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, 
which reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s age and 
desirability of promoting the ch d’
a constructive role in society.”108 
 
The contents of this precedent were later copied almost verbatim by the African Chart
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. While recognizing the obligation to hold child
soldiers accountable for any war crimes, article 40(1) also affirms the importance of 
protections for child soldiers during accountability processes. Together with the “best 
interests” clause of Article 3 that extended specifically to courts of law, this attemp
provide a balance between accountability and protection of child soldiers as both 
 
105 Ibid, Article 19(1). 
106UN. 1989. “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Article 38(1-3).   
107 Bennett, T. 1998. “Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition?” Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies, 8.  
108 UN. 1989. “Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Article 40(1).  
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perpetrators and victims. Furthermore, reference to the goal of reintegration indic
that in pursuing their accountability, the status of child soldiers as victims will be 
ates 
empha tates Parties 
s providing that human rights and 
 
ill 15, protections extended by the CRC only applied to child soldiers 
nder age 15.  
the 
N 
n 
ing 
l, 
 
health, physical, mental, moral and social development, and requires legal protection in 
                                                
sized. Towards this end, Article 40(3) and 40(3)(b) together call for S
“to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or 
recognized as having infringed penal law, and, in particular: Whenever 
appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children 
without resorting to judicial proceeding , 
legal safeguards are fully respected.”109 
 
While the CRC does not determine what would be considered “appropriate and 
desirable” conditions for its application, it nonetheless introduces the notion that child 
soldiers should be addressed through the use of alternative means of accountability. It
should be noted that as the age of acceptable recruitment and use of child soldiers at 
this point was st
u
 
Recognizing that African interests were being inadequately represented during the 
drafting of the CRC, a regional meeting was convened by the African Network for 
Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect  (ANPPCAN) with support of the U
Children Fund  (UNICEF). In this meeting it was recommended that a charter 
complementing the CRC be developed to address issues facing Africa. As a result, 
ANPPCAN and the Organization for African Unity  (OAU) drafted the African Charter o
the Rights and Welfare of the Child  (ACRWC) that was adopted in 1990 and entered 
into force in 1999.110 To date it has been ratified by 45 of 53 African countries, includ
Sierra Leone and Uganda.111 The ACRWC takes note of the critical situation facing 
“most African children…due to the unique factors of their socio-economic, cultura
traditional and developmental circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts, 
exploitation and hunger.”112 Significantly, it is based on the notion that the child, “due to 
the needs of his physical and mental development requires particular care with regard to
 
109 Ibid, Article 40(3) and 40(3)(b).  
110 Ankut, P. No date. “The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: Linking Principles with 
Practice.” Dakar: Open Society Initiative for West Africa(OSIWA), 2-3; African Union. 1999. “African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.” 
111 African Union. 2009. “List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child,” accessed 14th December 2009 at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20the%20Rights%20and%20Welfare
%20of%20the%20Child.pdf.   
112 African Union. 1999. “African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,” Preamble. 
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conditions of freedom, dignity and security.”113 The mention of the need for “particular 
care” and “legal protection” are notable. The ACRWC begins by defining “children” as 
“every human being below the age of 18 years.”114 Significantly, this determination is set 
firmly and not left up to states as it had been in the CRC.115 Furthermore Article 22(2) 
condemns the recruitment and direct use of children in war.116 As discussed earlier, this 
implies that the age of criminal responsibility of child soldiers is 18. Nonetheless this age 
definition remained a contentious issue. Then, strengthening the rights provisions of the 
CRC, Article 4(1) states that “[i]n all actions concerning the child undertaken by any 
person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.”117 
Specifically regarding accountability processes, Article 17(1) reiterates the juvenile 
justice standards of the CRC118 while Article 17(3) establishes the intended goal of those 
processes:   
  “The essential aim of treatment of every child during the trial and also if 
found guilty of infringing the penal law shall be his or her reformation, re-
integration into his or her family and social rehabilitation.”119 
 
The ACRWC makes no mention of avoiding judicial proceedings as did the CRC. 
Nevertheless, due to its prioritization of the “best interests” of all children along with child 
rights standards in accountability processes with the goal of reintegration it suggests that 
child soldiers up to age 18 are to be treated foremost as victims of armed conflict. 
 
 
2.2   The Emergent International Consensus against Child Soldiering 
 
Increasing global awareness of the problem of child soldiering has resulted in a series of 
international declarations and regional measures at various levels. These have enabled 
both a clearer definition of child soldiers themselves and a better understanding of the 
problem of child soldiering. They also went some way towards criminalizing the 
recruitment and use of children as soldiers while stressing the importance of holding 
those responsible to account. Although many of these measures have no standing in 
                                                 
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid, Article 2. 
115 No author. 2001. “The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Comes into Force,” in 
Journal of African Law, 45(1), 136.  
116 African Union. 1999. “African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,” Article 22(2). 
117 Ibid, Article 4(1). My emphasis. 
118 Ibid, Article 17(1). 
119 Ibid, Article 17(3).  
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international law they nonetheless indicate a growing global consensus in approaches to 
the child soldier problem.  
 
In 1997 the NGO Working Group on the Convention of the Rights of the Child and 
UNICEF conducted a symposium that produced the Cape Town Principles. Reflecting 
the push of international non-governmental organizations working on the issue of child 
soldiers, the Principles were an attempt “to develop strategies for preventing the 
recruitment of children – in particular for establishing 18 as the minimum age of 
recruitment – and for demobilizing child soldiers and helping them to reintegrate into 
society.”120 They amounted to a set of recommended actions “to be taken by 
governments and communities in affected countries to end this violation of children’s 
rights.”121 For one they produced a more progressive definition of child soldiers that 
raises the bar significantly on previous international standards:  
“Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or 
irregular armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, 
porters, messengers and those accompanying such groups, other than 
purely as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes 
and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is 
carrying or has carried arms.”122 
 
In addition to this “straight-18” approach, the Cape Town Principles thus also advocated 
an extension of the definition of child soldiers to include even those indirectly involved in 
conflict. While recommending the formation of an international court, the Principles 
notably also proposed that that court’s jurisdiction should cover the illegal recruitment of 
children.123 Furthermore they emphasized the importance of respecting the special 
protection needs of all child soldiers while making sure that the child rights of illegally 
recruited child soldiers are protected.124 Although the Cape Town Principles were non-
binding they nonetheless indicated a set of goals that were subsequently pursued 
regarding child soldiers.    
 
                                                 
120 UNICEF. 1997. “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children 
into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa.” 27-30 
April 1997: Cape Town, South Africa, 1. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid, “Definitions.”  
123 Ibid, 2. 
124 Ibid, 7. 
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) was formally established in 1998 based on the 
Rome Statute.125 It was the result of a decades-long effort to create a permanent 
international court with the jurisdiction to try individuals for the commission of crimes 
against humanity.126 As an independent treaty-based court the ICC, in accordance with 
the Rome Statute, was to “have power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the 
most serious crimes of international concern…and shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.”127 The principle of “complementarity” means that national courts 
would retain jurisdiction over relevant crimes unless the government of a country itself 
referred a matter to the ICC for investigation. Of the major crimes the ICC seeks to 
punish, the one most pertinent here is “[c}onscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”128 Like the CRC the ICC’s definition of child soldiers extends only to children 
under age 15 and those involved in active combat. As mentioned previously the ICC 
thus does not have jurisdiction to try individuals over 15 but under the age of 18. 
Currently the Rome Statute has 139 signatories and 110 ratifications; these include 
Sierra Leone and Uganda.129 The Court came into being in 2002 when the Rome Statute 
entered into force after ratification by 60 countries.130 The involvement of the ICC will be 
highlighted in the forthcoming Uganda case study. 
 
Historically it had been the international labor movement that first sought more protection 
for children though primarily in the context of industrial relations. Eventually the problem 
of child soldiering was also taken up by this movement.  In 1999 the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) adopted ILO Convention 182 that, among other things, recognized 
the “forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as one of “the 
worst forms of child labour.”131 The ILO’s definition of child soldiers extended to all 
children under the age of 18.132 As the specialized agency of the UN with regards to 
labor, the ILO is the global body responsible for creating and regulating international 
                                                 
125ICC. 1998. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Preamble.  
126 Elsea, J. 2002. “International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal Issues,” Report for Congress, 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 4. 
127ICC. 1998. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Article 1.  
128ICC. 1998. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Article 8(2)(b)(26). 
129 Coalition for the International Criminal Court. 2010. “World Signatures and Ratifications,” accessed 20th 
January 2010 at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures.   
130 ICC. 2010. “About the Court,” accessed 20th January 2010 at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/. 
131 Ibid, Article 3(a).  
132 International Labour Organization. 1999. “Convention 182,” Article 2. 
 26
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
labor standards.133 It has 183 member countries including Sierra Leone and Uganda.134 
According to ILO Convention 182 all member countries agreed to take the necessary 
measures to “prevent engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour.”135 
Additionally they are to  “provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the 
removal of children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation and 
social integration.”136 
 
Due to proliferation of child soldiering and growing attention to the problem, it 
increasingly became recognized as a matter of international peace and security. In 1999 
UN Security Council Resolution 1261 formally established that “safe-guarding the 
protection, rights and welfare of war-affected children everywhere is a crucial peace-
and-security concern that legitimately belongs on the highest agendas.”137 As such the 
Security Council expressed “its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of 
armed conflict on children and the long-term consequences this has for durable peace, 
security and development.”138 Furthermore it “[u]rges States and the United Nations 
system to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of 
children used as soldiers in violation of international law.”139 Otunnu notes that in 
Resolution 1261 the UN Security Council significantly diverges from its usual practice of 
addressing breaches of peace and security in a specific national or regional context.140 
Resolution 1261 did not, however, address the issue of the age limit applying to child 
soldiers. 
 
Since the adoption of the CRC that defined children as persons under the age of 18 but 
only extended protections to child soldiers under 15, it was felt by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, among others, that the document needed to be harmonized. The 
goal was to produce a legal document that reflected equal protections for all children 
                                                 
133 International Labour Organization. 2010. “About the ILO,” accessed 20th January 2010 at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm.  
134 International Labour Organization. 2010. “List of Member Countries,” accessed 20th January 2010 at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm.  
135 International Labour Organization. 1999. “Convention 182,” Article 7(2)(a). 
136 Ibid, Article 7(2)(b). 
137 Otunnu, O. No date. “Placing Children on the World’s Peace and Security Agenda,” accessed 20th 
January 2010 at www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000079.doc.   
138 UN Security Council. 1999. “Resolution 1261,” Operative clause 1. 
139 Ibid, Operative clause 15. 
140 Otunnu, O. No date. “Placing Children on the World’s Peace and Security Agenda,” accessed 20th 
January 2010 at www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000079.doc. 
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under the age of 18, including child soldiers. This was based in part on the rationale that 
those under 18 had been granted protections due to their immaturity. Due to their own 
immaturity, then, child soldiers were seen to deserve the same protections.141  
 
In 2000, the UN introduced the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict to its previous Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The Optional 
Protocol declares that States Parties must take all possible measures to make sure any 
under-18s currently within their ranks are not directly involved in combat.142 Secondly it 
commits signatories to stop the forced recruitment of children under age 18.143 Next, in 
an attempt to transcend the state-only application of IHRL, it extends the ban on under-
18 recruitment to non-state armed groups.144 Governments are further obligated to take 
“all feasible measures” to prevent such recruitment including nationally criminalizing it.145 
Lastly, as an indication of a growing consensus that holds child soldiers under age 18 to 
be more victims than perpetrators, the Optional Protocol calls for the demobilization of 
under-18s and, when necessary, the provision of “all appropriate assistance for their 
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”146 The Optional 
Protocol entered into force in 2002 and currently has 125 signatories and 131 Parties 
including both Sierra Leone and Uganda.147 
 
Ongoing statements by the UN indicated an increasing commitment to the notion that 
child soldiers were indeed more victims than perpetrators in armed conflict. Following 
the introduction of the Optional Protocol in 2000 the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1314 that amounted to a plan of action regarding the necessity for protecting 
all children including child soldiers.148 Relevant to the cases of Uganda, in which top 
leaders were eventually to be tried by the ICC after first having been granted amnesty, it 
called on countries to end impunity by excluding those responsible for serious crimes 
                                                 
141 Fontana, B. 1997. “Child Soldiers and International Law,” in African Security Review, 6(3), 4. 
142 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2000. “Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict,” Article 1. 
143 Ibid, Article 2. 
144 Ibid, Article 4(1). 
145 Ibid, Article 4(2).  
146 Ibid, Article 6(3). 
147 UN Treaty Collection. 2010. “Signatories/Parties of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,” accessed 20th January 2010 at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&chapter=4&lang=en.   
148 Otunnu, O. No date. “Placing Children on the World’s Peace and Security Agenda,” accessed 20th 
January 2010 at www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000079.doc. 
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from any future amnesty arrangements.149 Most importantly for my purposes, Resolution 
1314 emphasized that in peace processes, the post-conflict needs of child soldiers were 
to be a priority. It requested “parties to armed conflict to include, where appropriate, 
provisions for the protection of children, including disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of child combatants, in peace negotiations and in peace agreements and 
the involvement of children, where possible, in these processes.”150 
 
Increasingly the focus of international concern with child soldiers shifted to the 
protections they should be offered in the event that they were to be held accountable for 
their actions. In 2001 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1379 that, like the 
CRC, called for alternatives to judicial proceedings. States were to “ensure that post-
conflict truth-and-reconciliation processes address serious abuses involving children.”151 
In line with this stipulation, the SLTRC began its work the following year.  
 
In 2002, the UN convened the most significant international conference on children in 
more than a decade, the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Children, 
which was the first such session devoted exclusively to children. About 70 government 
heads and high-ranking government delegations along with leaders from civil society 
including non-governmental organizations, cultural, academic, business and religious 
groups put forward an agenda committing themselves to broad goals to improve the 
situation of children and young people.152 The Special Session produced a Plan of 
Action, “A World Fit for Children,” which was adopted by some 180 nations.153 With 
regard to child soldiers the document committed the UN, the international community, 
and affected states to “promote the establishment of prevention, support and caring 
services as well as justice systems specifically applicable to children, taking into account 
the principles of restorative justice and fully safeguard children’s rights and provide 
specially trained staff that promotes children’s reintegration into society.”154 This new 
emphasis on restorative justice for child soldiers would later be reiterated in the Paris 
Principles. 
                                                 
149 UN Security Council. 2000. “Resolution 1314,” Operative clause 2. 
150 Ibid, Operative clause 11. 
151 UN Security Council. 2001. “Resolution 1379,” Operative clause 9(a). 
152 UNICEF. 2002. “World Leaders ‘Say Yes’ for Children,” accessed 21st January 2010 at 
http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/index.html.  
153 UNICEF. 2002. “’A World Fit for Children’: An Agenda Both Visionary and Concrete,” accessed 20th 
December 2008 at http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/wffc/.  
154 UN. 2002. “A World Fit for Children,” UN General Assembly Resolution S-27/2. Operative clause 44(7). 
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 In 2004 the Commission of the African Union (AU), the executive/administrative branch 
of what was formerly the OAU, began developing what is considered its most ambitious 
strategy for institutional reforms.155 Although the Commission did not directly address 
the issue of child soldiers it nonetheless established the overarching priority of protecting 
the rights and needs of African youth. This was based on the AU’s recognition that you
form a major part of its development agenda.
th 
                                                
156 The resulting African Youth Charter that 
was adopted in 2006 began by defining “youth” as “every person between the ages of 15 
and 35.”157 Pertinent to the case of child soldiers, the Charter calls on States Parties to 
“[t]ake appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social 
reintegration of young victims of armed conflict and war by providing access to education 
and skills development such as vocational training to resume social and economic 
life.”158 Notably, however, the Charter does not indicate whether child soldiers should be 
considered foremost as victims of conflict and thus as the intended beneficiaries of these 
special considerations. In addition all youth are given the responsibility to “defend 
democracy, the rule of law and all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”159 In this 
context youth are offered protections in exchange for a responsibility to respect those 
same legal frameworks that protect them. The African Youth Charter entered into force 
in July 2009160 and as of October 2009 it had been signed by 32 African countries 
including Sierra Leone and Uganda. It has been ratified by Uganda but not Sierra 
Leone.161 
 
In 2007, representatives of 58 countries, including those affected by the use of child 
soldiers and donor nations, were hosted by the Government of France and UNICEF to 
further address the child soldier problem.162 The Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (“the Paris Principles”) and their 
 
155 Mac-Ikemenjima, D. 2006. “The Long Road to Banjul and Beyond: Process of the African Youth Charter 
and the Role of Youth in its Popularisation and Ratification,” Fifth African Development Forum, United 
Nations Conference Centre, Addis Ababa, 16-18 November 2006, 2. 
156 Ibid, 5.  
157 African Union. 2006. “African Youth Charter,” Definitions. 
158 African Union. 2006. “African Youth Charter,” Article 17(1)(g). 
159 Ibid, Article 26(j). 
160 African Union. 2009. “Press Release No. 142/2009: African Youth Charter to Enter into Force,” 1. 
161 African Union. 2009. “List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Youth 
Charter,” accessed 12th December 2009 at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/list/Youth%20Charter.pdf.   
162 UNICEF. 2007. “Paris Conference on Child Soldiers Concludes with Commitment to Stop the 
Recruitment of Children,” accessed 20th March 2009 at http://www.unicef.org/media/media_38231.html.  
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consolidated version, the Paris Commitments, were formulated towards directly 
addressing the needs of child soldiers, emphasizing “the informal ways in which boys 
and girls become associated with and leave armed forces or armed groups.”163 While 
the Principles are not a formal international treaty nor legally-binding, they were 
nonetheless signed by 84 nations by September 2009, including both Sierra Leone and
Uganda.
 
f 
”165 
s framework.166  
                                                
164 Signatories pledged their commitment to “preventing the recruitment o
children, demobilizing child soldiers and [helping] them to reintegrate into society.
The Principles declare that states have a “primary responsibility for the protection of 
children in their jurisdiction” and that this should be pursued using a child-rights 
approach, within a human right
 
While seeking the protection of child soldiers but also recognizing the need for their 
accountability, the Paris Principles note that child soldiers are foremost victims but have 
also been perpetrators of grave violations of international law: 
“Children who are accused of crimes under international law allegedly 
committed while they were associated with armed forces or armed groups 
should be considered primarily as victims of offences against international 
law; not only as perpetrators. They must be treated in accordance with 
international law in a framework of restorative justice and social 
rehabilitation, consistent with international law which offers children 
special protection through numerous agreements and principles.”167 
 
In addition to offering restorative justice processes as a proper means to address the 
accountability of child soldiers, the Paris Principles offer further protections with the goal 
of reintegration and rehabilitation in mind:  
 
 “Where truth-seeking and reconciliation mechanisms are established, 
children’s involvement should be promoted and supported and their rights 
protected throughout the process. Their participation must be voluntary 
and by informed consent by both the child and her or his parent or 
 
163 UNICEF. 2007. “The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed 
Forces or Armed Groups,” Article 1.5. 
164 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. 2009. 
“List of 84 States which have endorsed the Paris Commitments,” 1. 
165 Tramble, R. 2007. “Child Soldiers: More Talk, Little Action,” accessed 18th December 2008 at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-
E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=53294.  
166 UNICEF. 2007. “The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed 
Forces or Armed Groups,” Article 3.0. 
167 Ibid, Article 3.6. 
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guardian where appropriate and possible. Special procedures should be 
permitted to minimize greater susceptibility to distress.”168 
 
These two passages, respectively from article 3.6 and 3.8 of the Paris Principles, are 
significant for my focus on addressing the dilemma of child soldier accountability as they 
establish two distinct standards that are potentially contradictory. First, article 3.6 in 
recognizing child soldiers as both victims and perpetrators in armed conflict, implies that 
child soldier accountability is to be pursued to the extent that child soldiers have been 
perpetrators of war crimes. At the same time, however, the notion of voluntary 
participation in post-conflict processes proposed in article 3.8 seems to negate the very 
prospect of achieving accountability in practice. The transitional justice processes 
employed in Sierra Leone and Uganda based on this principle of voluntary participation 
provide poignant case studies as to how this functions in practice. 
                                                 
168 Ibid, Article 3.8. 
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 Chapter 3.      THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE: THE SPECIAL COURT AND TRUTH   
                       AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE 
 
This chapter will provide an exposition of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the subsequent 
application of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) to 
address the case of child soldiers. Accordingly, I begin by reviewing the Sierra Leonean 
civil war and its effect on society and politics before turning to the specific impact on 
child soldiers. I then discuss the political pursuit of ending conflict including the various 
agreements that set up both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the SLTRC to deal 
with issues of accountability and reconciliation. My main focus in this chapter is the work 
and findings of the SLTRC from which I draw conclusions as to how and to what extent it 
addressed the accountability of child soldiers.    
 
 
3.1 The State of Sierra Leone: Before, During, and After Conflict 
Sierra Leone has been ranked last of 177 nations in more than half of the studies 
procured annually for the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) since its inception. In 1990, one year before the outbreak of civil war, the study 
found that 81.6% of the population was living in poverty, characterized not only by lack 
of income but also by a lack of access to health, education and other services; 
powerlessness; isolation; vulnerability and social exclusion.169 According to Lord, even 
before the civil war Sierra Leone was already “economically and politically on the verge 
of collapse.”170 He describes the previous 24-year period under Siaka Stevens and his 
chosen successor Joseph Saidu Momoh as marked by “manipulation and 
misrule…mismanagement and corruption” where “[t]he merging of politics, violence and 
personal business interests secured access to resources for redistribution only to 
supporters and so undermined any attempts to satisfy broader national needs.”171  
 
                                                 
169 Department of National Development and Economic Planning. 1989/1990. “Poverty Profile for Sierra 
Leone,” Freetown, Sierra Leone. In UN. 2004. “Poverty Measurement in a Post-Conflict Scenario: Evidence 
from the Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2003/4,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:1l0CyR7qkJIJ:unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/poverty/AbujaWS-
SierraLeone.pdf+poverty+measurement+in+a+post-
conflict+scenario&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a.  
170 Lord, D. 2000. “Introduction: The Struggle for Power and Peace in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 
2008 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/introduction.php. 
171 Ibid. 
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A rift had developed between supporters of the incumbent All People’s Party (APC) and 
their political and business rivals: profits from the potentially lucrative industries of rural 
Sierra Leone – agriculture, diamond and gold mining, and fisheries – were accumulated 
mainly by business owners and their supporters while government became more and 
more dependent on foreign aid, engaging in “clientelism” while neglecting the majority of 
its population.172 The collapse of state structures and the suppression of civilian 
opposition resulted in increased arms-trafficking with dramatic increases in crime that 
added to both national and regional instability.173 The APC was known to employ youth 
alongside older supporters to “settle political scores and intimidate opponents” during 
this time.174 At this point, over half of the population was comprised of children under 
age 15 with few opportunities for education or employment.175  
                                                
 
The mobilization of youth by both sides in Sierra Leone would become the most notable 
feature of the conflict during the civil war. The failure of the state to provide positive 
alternatives to youth in the post-independence period has been considered an important 
factor in the escalating conflicts in Sierra Leone, accounting for the involvement of so 
many young people. As youth worker Dennis Bright remarked,  
“the long years of neglect of youths in development programmes of 
successive governments in Sierra Leone has been widely acknowledged 
as a major cause of war. Indeed, during the dictatorial rule of the APC, 
youths were groomed in violence and used as hired thugs in election 
campaigns but abandoned afterwards and left to sink into drugs, crime 
and other vices on the margin of society. By the time of the outbreak of 
war, the conditions were favourable for manipulation and mass 
mobilization of such marginalized members of society into organized 
crime and violence. The massive looting, rape, use of drugs and arson is 
partly due to the background of the young recruits.”176 
 
 
Sierra Leone’s civil wars began in March of 1991 when Liberian rebel leader Charles 
Taylor backed Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and first invaded 
 
172 Ibid. 
173 AFROL. “The Civil War in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://www.afrol.com/News/sil007_civil_war.htm. 
174 Lord, D. 2000. “Introduction: The Struggle for Power and Peace in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 
2009 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/introduction.php. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
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border villages of the country.177 Taylor himself sought to exact revenge for Sierra 
Leone’s efforts to stop his 1990 bid to overthrow the Liberian government after his 1989 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia invasion which led to the Liberian civil war.178 The 
RUF’s declared goal was to remove “the corrupt APC government, revive multi-party 
democracy and end exploitation [of rural people in Sierra Leone].”179 At the same time, 
they hoped to spark a radical pan-African revolution.180 They laid out their aims in a 
document entitled “Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone”: 
“We are therefore fighting for democratic empowerment to enable us to 
reclaim our sense of ourselves as enterprising and industrious Africans, 
using the history of our glorious past to create a modern society 
contributing to world peace and stability through advancement in 
agriculture, architecture, medicine, science and technology, industry, free 
trade and commerce…[W]e are tired of poverty, bad drinking water, poor 
housing, second hand clothing and footwear, and our state of self-
imposed backwardness…we are crying out against hunger disease and 
deprivation…We are tired of state-sponsored poverty and degradation. 
We are tired of our children dying of preventable diseases…We are tired 
of rural folks being exploited.”181 
 
Declaring that its objective was to reclaim Sierra Leone for the neglected rural 
populations, the RUF called on the people 
“to take up arms in order to take back their power and use this power to 
create wealth for themselves and generations to come by reconstructing 
a new African society in Sierra Leone consistent with the highest ideals of 
our glorious past and the challenges of the modern world we live in.”182 
 
When these revolutionary goals did not receive much popular support the RUF began its 
attack on local populations.183 From the outset, the RUF characteristically pursued its 
goals through the looting of food, drugs, and other supplies to support its forces; the 
                                                 
177International Crisis Group. 2007. “Conflict History: Sierra Leone,” accessed 10th September 2008 at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96.  
178 Ibid. 
179 Lord, D. 2000. “Introduction: The Struggle for Power and Peace in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 
2009 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/introduction.php. 
180 International Crisis Group. 2007. “Conflict History: Sierra Leone,” accessed 10th September 2008 at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96. 
181 RUF. 1995. “Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone,” 1 RUF/SL, 20-35, in A. Zack-
Williams. 2001. “Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone,” Review of African Political Economy, 28 
(87), 22. 
182 Ibid, 24. 
183 University of Ottawa. “Synthesis Report: Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone,” accessed 5th January 2008 at 
http://www.uottawa.ca/childprotection/sierraleone.pdf.  
 35
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
killing of local authority figures such as government officials and traditional healers; and 
the use of force in the recruitment of young people.184  
 
The RUF was not alone in exploiting Sierra Leone’s neglected youth and children. In 
1991 the UN’s IRIN news agency reported that President Momoh doubled the size of his 
army by conscripting the same alienated youth from urban ghettoes in order to counter 
the mounting RUF threat. As he was unable to pay or supply his troops, Momoh was 
overthrown in 1992 by Captain Valentine Strasser who brought the National Provisional 
Ruling Council (NPRC) to power. The NPRC was likewise known to recruit children into 
its ranks in order to bolster its similarly “badly-equipped and poorly trained army.”185 
Because of the government’s inability to protect local communities from the RUF, 
traditional hunting militias known as Kamajours developed which again utilized child 
soldiers.186 By 1994, Sierra Leonean rural areas were besieged by violent young people, 
either RUF or renegade state soldiers, the so-called “Sobels” (soldier-rebels) who were 
soldiers by day and rebels by night. The country’s diamond-producing areas were 
overtaken by the RUF beginning in 1995187 and would become the source of major 
funding for ongoing conflict in Sierra Leone.188  
 
In 1996, after local and international pressure had resulted in presidential elections, 
former UN official Ahmad Kabbah was elected to head the state. In November of that 
year, Kabbah signed the Abidjan Agreement with the RUF’s Sankoh.189 In addition to 
committing both sides to peace, the Abidjan Agreement called for the disarmament of all 
RUF combatants in exchange for their amnesty and the transformation of the RUF into a 
political party.190 Despite the signing of the Abidjan Agreement, fighting continued along 
with massive human rights abuses and the further pillaging of Sierra Leone’s resources. 
                                                 
184 Lord, D. 2000. “Introduction: The Struggle for Power and Peace in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 
2009 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/introduction.php. 
185 IRIN. 2000. “Sierra Leone: IRIN Briefing on the Civil War,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/a908b07653c82d37852568f1004fbce6.  
186 AFROL. “The Civil War in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://www.afrol.com/News/sil007_civil_war.htm. 
187 IRIN. 2000. “Sierra Leone: IRIN Briefing on the Civil War,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/a908b07653c82d37852568f1004fbce6. 
188 Smille, I., L. Gberie, R. Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human 
Security. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Partnership Africa Canada, 1. 
189 International Crisis Group. 2007. “Conflict History: Sierra Leone,” accessed 10th September 2008 at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96. 
190 Sierra Leone. 1996. “Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and 
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone(RUF/SL),” Articles 1, 5, 13, 14.  
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In July of 1999 Kabbah and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Accord that was largely a 
rewriting of the earlier Abidjan Agreement. The RUF’s Sankoh was installed as vice-
president although Charles Taylor soon broke the Accord by taking 500 UN 
peacekeeping forces hostage. Sankoh was arrested.191  
 
In November of 2000 the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the RUF and the 
government of Sierra Leone.192 In addition to once again committing both sides to 
peace, the new Agreement recognized the Lomé Accords as “the framework for the 
restoration of genuine and lasting peace to the country.”193 By January 2002 Sierra 
Leone’s 11-year civil war was pronounced over.194 At least 20,000 Sierra Leoneans had 
been killed while half the population, about 2 million people, was displaced. Furtherm
agricultural production had declined dramatically, government revenues from mining 
were severely cut, and much of public infrastructure – schools, health clinics, and 
administrative facilities – had been
ore, 
 destroyed.195 
                                                
 
 
3.2  Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone 
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone is notorious for the recruitment of between 5,000 and 
10,000 children (depending on the age-criteria used) for use in combat by state and 
rebel forces alike.196 The government military and pro-government militias recruited 
children to bolster their ranks mostly by using proper voluntary recruitment procedures 
and within national law which until 2006 allowed children above age 17.5 to serve in the 
armed forces197 However, the RUF systematically raided villages, abducting children 
from their homes, and utilized them as combatants against their will.198 Over 50% of 
abducted children were enlisted at age 15 or younger and over 28% at age 12 or 
 
191 International Crisis Group. 2007. “Conflict History: Sierra Leone,” accessed 10th September 2008 at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96. 
192 Malan, M., P. Rakate, A. McIntyre. 2002. “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,” Monograph 68, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, 1.  
193 Sierra Leone. 2000 “Abuja Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,” Preamble. 
194 International Crisis Group. 2007. “Conflict History: Sierra Leone,” accessed 10th September 2008 at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=96. 
195 AFROL. “The Civil War in Sierra Leone,” accessed 6th January 2009 at 
http://www.afrol.com/News/sil007_civil_war.htm. 
196 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Sierra Leone,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 14th September 2008 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Human Rights Watch. 2000. “Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers: RUF Targets 
Children for Fighting, Forced Labor, and Sexual Exploitation,” accessed 14th September 2008 at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/05/30/sierra-leone-rebels-forcefully-recruit-child-soldiers.  
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younger.199 Reports by Amnesty International show that the RUF threatened the lives of 
both children and their families in the process of abduction: thereafter children were 
indoctrinated into a “culture of violence.”200 In many cases, child abductees were first 
forced to kill their own parents, relatives, and village members to deter them from 
escaping and returning home. Other children were forced to watch the torture or murder 
of parents to “toughen them up.”201 Thus isolated from their families and communities, 
abducted children underwent indoctrination into the RUF’s ideology along with intense 
military training. In many cases they were forced to consume alcohol and illicit drugs as 
they were brought to perceive violence and force as a legitimate means to gain authority 
and prestige.202 The threat of physical punishment and death was also used to make 
child soldiers adhere to the violent norms of the RUF. One RUF abductee recalled, 
“We were sent to the forest for training. At first I refused but they 
threatened to kill me, so I had no choice. When the time came for an 
attack they injected us with cocaine. When they give these drugs you 
become fearless – you believe nothing can harm you. We were sent in 
front, but we did not care.”203 
 
Many abductees were mutilated and tattooed with the name of the armed group that had 
captured them to prevent escaping, the scars of which have compounded the children’s 
fear of stigmatization during reintegration processes both during and after war.204 Sexual 
violence and “slavery” were likewise practiced by the RUF and colluding Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) within their own ranks: young girl abductees were forced 
to be available for sex as “bush wives”. Approximately fifty percent of these girls were 
age 15 or under.205   
 
Demobilized former child soldiers living in demobilization camps were re-abducted back 
into service of the RUF. One such child said the RUF threatened demobilized children 
that they would be sold after leaving the camp or that everyone in the camp would be 
                                                 
199 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Sierra Leone,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 14th September 2008 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone.  
200 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm.  
201 Zack-Williams, A. 2001. “Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone,” Review of African Political 
Economy, 28 (87), 80.  
202 University of Ottawa. “Synthesis Report: Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone,” accessed 5th January 2008 at 
http://www.uottawa.ca/childprotection/sierraleone.pdf. 
203 Moszynski, P. 1999. “’To the small ones, these atrocities are a game’,” accessed 7th January 2009 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/apr/20/sierraleone.   
204 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2008. “Sierra Leone,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. 
Accessed 14th September 2008 at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone. 
205 Ibid. 
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killed if they refused to rejoin. On occasion, the RUF also promised to unite children with 
their families only to put them on the frontlines in battle.206 The rationales of child 
soldiers who “voluntarily” enlisted included seeking revenge for lost parents or family 
members and a commitment to defend their country after the destruction of communities 
and of ‘normal life’ as well as the lost educational opportunities resulting from war. 
Enlisting also provided opportunities for empowerment and relative stability compared to 
the conditions of  ‘street life’ that many Sierra Leonean youth had been engaged in.207  
 
In cases of abducted and “voluntary” child soldiers alike, armed forces became a 
surrogate family replacing traditional family and community structures which had largely 
been eroded along with the collapse of the state.208 The newfound social support they 
found there amidst the social, economic, and educational devastation caused by civil 
war may to an extent explain the commitment of child soldiers to the aims of arms 
groups. Child soldiers were accordingly known to be “brave and loyal fighters”209 and 
“ideal soldiers…[as t]hey have no responsibilities and obey orders.”210 As such, child 
soldiers perpetrated grave crimes against local and international law; they were 
responsible for some of the war’s worst atrocities according to Sierra Leone’s 
government and its allies pointing to the actions of RUF recruits.211 One woman captive, 
still nursing her five-month-old baby, was raped in front of her husband almost 
immediately after their capture by 7 RUF soldiers, some as young as 14.212 Child 
soldiers also routinely engaged in killing and purposefully maiming their victims 
throughout the war.213 The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see 
below), recorded a litany of heinous crimes committed by child soldiers in the course of 
their involvement in the war’s worst atrocities: killing, amputation, mutilation, extortion, 
                                                 
206 Human Rights Watch. 2000. “Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers: RUF Targets 
Children for Fighting, Forced Labor, and Sexual Exploitation,” accessed 14th September 2008 at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/05/30/sierra-leone-rebels-forcefully-recruit-child-soldiers.  
207 Zack-Williams, A. 2001. “Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone,” Review of African Political 
Economy, 28 (87), 78-9. 
208 Ibid, 79. 
209 Peters, K. and P. Richards. 1998. “Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone,” Africa: 
Journal of the International Africa Institute, 68 (2), 210. 
210 Maier, K. 1995. “Boys in Arms find Peace a Trial,” The Independent, 28 September 1995. 
211 Zack-Williams, A. 2001. “Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone,” Review of African Political 
Economy, 28 (87), 80. 
212 Human Rights Watch. 2000. “Sierra Leone Rebels Forcefully Recruit Child Soldiers: RUF Targets 
Children for Fighting, Forced Labor, and Sexual Exploitation,” accessed 14th September 2008 at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/05/30/sierra-leone-rebels-forcefully-recruit-child-soldiers. 
213 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm. 
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looting and destruction, rape and sexual violence, abduction and forced recruitment, 
forced displacement, forced detention, assault, torture, beating and forced labor.214 In 
short the child soldiers became both perpetrators as well as victims of gross violations of 
human rights in the context of the civil war. This extensive list of the crimes of child 
soldiers raises major questions regarding their accountability as well as their needs for 
post-conflict justice and reconciliation processes. 
 
3.3  The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and the Lomé Peace Accord:  
            Implications for Child Soldiers 
 
On the 10th of November 2000, the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed at Abuja, 
Nigeria between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF leaders re-committing the 
parties to the principles laid out in the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. In the Ceasefire, the 
Lomé Accord was touted as “the most appropriate framework for the resolution of 
conflict in Sierra Leone.”215 Although fighting continued in one form or another until 
2002, the Abuja Agreement, with its commitment to the Lomé Peace Accord’s framewo
for peace, was considered the terminal document of the long-lasting war in Sierra Leone. 
As outlined in the Accord, the RUF agreed to change into a political party and thus ga
representation in the transitional government.
rk 
in 
                                                
216 At the same time, amnesty was to be 
granted to the head of the RUF, Sankoh, and all other “combatants and collaborators in 
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up until the signing of 
the…Agreement.”217 In Article 21, entitled “Release of Prisoners and Abductees218,” the 
document called for the immediate and unconditional release of “[a]ll political prisoners 
of war as well as non-combatants.”219 According to this formulation, abducted child 
soldiers were considered political prisoners. The Accord also established the 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) that was “to implement a post-conflict 
 
214 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
Paragraph 228. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml.   
215 Sierra Leone. 2000. “Abuja Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,” Preamble. 
216 Sierra Leone. 1999. “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone,” Article 3. 
217 Ibid, Article 9.  
218 My emphasis. 
219 Sierra Leone. 1999. “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone,” Article 21. 
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programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, 
especially the victims of war... [towards the] consolidation of peace.” 220  
 
One of the mechanisms the CCP to oversee was the prospective Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. According to Article 26 of the Accord, the TRC was intended 
“to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear picture of 
the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.”221 The TRC’s role in 
pursuing accountability for the abuses committed by child soldiers was not mentioned 
although the TRC was to “recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of 
victims of human rights violations.”222 Article 30 addressed child combatants directly, 
focusing on their victimhood and not their status as perpetrators:  
“The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child 
soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country 
and from the International Community, and especially through the Office 
of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF 
and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the 
existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.”223 
 
From this it is clear that with regard to child soldiers the focus of the Abuja Agreement 
was on their rehabilitation rather than on the pursuit of accountability for the crimes they 
had committed. Notably this was in accordance with the amnesty provisions central to 
the Lomé Accord and the subsequent Abuja Agreement. As such it reflected the more 
general nature of the Abuja Agreement as a negotiated settlement aimed at the 
cessation of the ongoing civil war. 
 
 
3.4  The Special Court for Sierra Leone, its Relationship to the TRC, and the 
           Potential Prosecution of Child Soldiers 
 
Despite the amnesty agreements involved in the Lomé Accord and the Abuja Ceasefire 
Agreement the issue of accountability for the atrocities in the civil war had not been 
closed. Already in June of 2000, despite the forthcoming Abuja Ceasefire Agreement 
that would grant amnesty to all combatants and collaborators according to the Lomé 
Accord, Sierra Leonean President Kabbah requested the assistance of the UN in 
                                                 
220 Ibid, Article 6.  
221 Ibid, Article 26.  
222 Ibid.  
223 Ibid, Article 30. 
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establishing a court to try those responsible for atrocities during the civil war.224 The 
obvious question is how this could be consistent with the amnesty provisions of the 
Lomé Accord and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement.  
 
On this issue UN Resolution 1315 of August 2000 stated that the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General in signing the Lomé Accord had also appended a statement 
saying the UN understood that the Accord’s amnesty provisions would not apply to 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.225 Then in the Special Court’s Statute of 2002 it was emphasized that 
amnesty would not bar an individual from prosecution by the Court for the above-
mentioned international crimes.226  
 
As Zarifis argues, the Lomé Accord’s amnesty provisions were in fact in conflict with the 
country’s obligations under international humanitarian law to prosecute perpetrators for 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, first according to the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to which Sierra Leone became 
a party in 1977 and now according to UN Resolution 1315 which created the Special 
Court.227 Recognizing the objectives of the Special Court, the UN emphasized that “a 
credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there 
would end impunity and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace.”228 As such, the Court was to be set up to try 
“persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for those atrocities not governed by the 
Lomé Accord’s amnesty provisions as designated by the UN and supported by the 
government of Sierra Leone.229 In January of 2002 the UN and the government of Sierra 
Leone signed the Agreement for the Special Court that officially established Sierra 
Leone’s Special Court.230  
 
                                                 
224 Human Rights First. No date. “The Special Court for Sierra Leone,” accessed 7th January 2009 at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/w_context/w_cont_04.htm.  
225 UN. 2000. “UN Security Council Resolution 1315,” Paragraph 5. 
226 Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.” Article 10. 
227 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm.  
228 UN. 2000. “UN Security Council Resolution 1315,” Paragraph 7.  
229 Ibid, Paragraphs 15-6. 
230 Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Agreement for the Special Court of Sierra Leone,” accessed 12th 
January 2002 at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Agreement.htm.   
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In practice the Special Court, which began work in June of 2004231, had to operate in 
conjunction with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission arising from the Lomé Peace 
Accord.  The TRC, established in June 1999, began work in November of 2002.232 Both 
the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were mandated to 
address the causes and consequences of civil war in Sierra Leone in working towards a 
sustainable peace, but their specific functions were very different.  
 
Fundamentally, the Special Court was meant to punish individual perpetrators of major 
atrocities committed during the war in Sierra Leone, namely the “planners and 
instigators” of organized violence. It was anticipated that the Special Court would try only 
some 20 or fewer individuals and could convict only where there was no doubt as to the 
guilt of the accused. For its part, the TRC was to “investigate the causes, nature, and 
extent of the violence.”233 As such it was to undertake a broader investigation focused 
on uncovering patterns of violence and establishing a complete account of the overa
conflict. Created by international treaty, the Special Court was an international institution 
while the TRC, created by an act of Sierra Leonean Parliament, was a national 
institution. Nevertheless, as both mechanisms would operate simultaneously, there 
would inevitably be some overlap in their functioning. From the outset, the Special Court 
recognized the potential need for “sharing of information; a referral system, where in the 
opinion of each institution any particular instance is better handled by the other 
institution; and the sharing of resources.”
ll 
                                                
234 While these overlapping processes did 
create certain tensions between the two bodies, by and large they did not affect the 
approach to dealing with child soldiers. 
 
Kofi Annan, as UN Secretary General at the time, recognized that the victim/perpetrator 
status of child soldiers would be “a difficult moral dilemma” facing the Special Court.235 
 
231 Global Policy Forum. No date. “Special Court for Sierra Leone,” accessed 20th January 2010 at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/international-criminal-tribunals-and-special-courts/special-
court-for-sierra-leone.html.   
232 International Crisis Group. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Fresh Start?” 
Accessed 12th January 2010 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1801&l=1.  
233 Wierda, M., P. Hayner, and P. van Zyl. 2002. “Exploring the Relationship Between the Special Court and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone.” New York: International Center for Transitional 
Justice, 2-3. 
234  Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Briefing Paper,” Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice, Special 
Court Task Force, 3. 
235 UN. 2000. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 
S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, Paragraph 32. 
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In his ‘Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone’ he stated “tha
although the children of Sierra Leone may be among those who have committed the 
worst crimes, they are to be regarded first and foremost as victims.”
t 
                                                
236 In support of this 
victims-first view he highlighted the dire circumstances faced by child soldiers:   
“More than in any other conflict where children have been used as 
combatants, in Sierra Leone, child combatants were initially abducted, 
forcibly recruited, sexually abused, reduced to slavery of all kinds and 
trained, often under the influence, to kill, maim and burn…Most if not all of 
these children have been subjected to a process of psychological and 
physical abuse and duress which has transformed them from victims to 
perpetrators.”237 
 
Despite this passage and the victims-first perspective on child soldiers it supports, the 
Special Court was given the jurisdiction to try and punish children between ages 15 and 
18 based on “the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they ha[d] allegedly 
committed.”238 Notably therefore, children between the ages of 15 and 18 “were neither 
excluded from nor protected against criminal responsibility for violations of the 
international crimes in the [Court’s] statute.”239 Annan indicated that this was in response 
to the will of both the government of Sierra Leone and representatives of Sierra Leone 
civil society who had sought judicial accountability for child combatants. He noted, “It 
was said that the people of Sierra Leone would not look too kindly upon a court which 
failed to bring to justice children who committed crimes of that nature and spared them 
the judicial process of accountability.”240  
 
Despite this statement there is the question of whether or not the will of the international 
community was an unmentioned motivating force behind the Special Court’s approach to 
child soldiers. Nonetheless, as Clark points out, the potential prosecution of child 
soldiers by the Special Court could be regarded as in line with the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child “that does not prohibit the prosecution of child soldiers, but rather 
sets standards of juvenile justice that take into account particular needs and 
 
236 Ibid, Paragraph 7.  
237 Ibid, Paragraph 32. 
238 Ibid, Paragraph 31. 
239 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm. 
240 UN. 2000. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 
S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, Paragraph 35. 
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vulnerabilities of children.”241 With its jurisdiction to prosecute child soldiers between 
ages 15 and 18, the Court thus also needed to provide for special measures that 
respected their needs as both victims and perpetrators according to juvenile justice 
standards: 
“Should any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of 
crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the Court, he or she 
shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his 
or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation 
into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance 
with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the 
child.”242 
 
 
In the end the Special Court did not make use of its specific jurisdiction to try children 
over the age of 15. Considering the general international consensus that children be 
treated differently than adults in courts of law, the Court focused rather on the statutory 
mandate to prosecute only those “who bear the greatest responsibility.” Because 
children generally had no command responsibility during the war, this interpretation of 
the statute constituted a de facto decision not to prosecute any former child 
combatants.243 By November of 2002, within months of the start of the Special Court, the 
Prosecutor David Crane told Sierra Leoneans that he did not intend to indict any 
children:  
“The children of Sierra Leone have suffered enough both as victims and 
perpetrators. I am not interested in prosecuting children. I want to prosecute the 
people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes.”244 
 
While the Special Court had in the first place been given the jurisdiction to prosecute 
child soldiers, its decision to focus on those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for 
serious crimes – the recruiters of child soldiers rather than the children themselves – 
reflects a significant move away from pursuing child soldier accountability in post-conflict 
justice and reconciliation processes. It would be a sign of things to come.    
   
                                                 
241 Clark, C. 2006.  “Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Challenges, Dilemmas,” in C. 
Greenbaum, P. Veerman, and N. Bacon-Shnoor(eds). 2006. Protection of Children During Armed Political 
Conflict: a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Antwerp: Intersentia, 313. 
242 Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.” Article 7. 
243 Interview with Luc Cote, Chief of Prosecutions, Freetown, 12 October 2005. In K. Sanin and A. 
Stirnemann. 2006. “Child Witnesses at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.” Berkeley: War Crimes Studies 
Center, 7.  
244 Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2002. “Press Release, 2 November 2002: Special Court Prosecutor Says 
He Will Not Prosecute Children,” 1.  
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3.5 The Role of Truth Commissions 
The importance of establishing truth in post-conflict settings was noted in the 2005 UN 
Commission on Human Rights’ “Updated Set of principles for the protection and 
promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity”: 
“Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past 
events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the 
circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic 
violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise 
of the right to truth provides vital safeguard against the recurrence of 
violations.”245 
 
Although this statement was made recently, it reflects a developing consensus that has 
for some time acknowledged the vital significance of establishing truth towards recovery 
from situations of conflict or oppression. In prior recognition of this, the international 
human rights community has recommended the implementation of truth commissions as 
part of peace and healing processes in almost every international or internal conflict 
since the early 1990s.246 Towards uncovering and establishing the truth after serious 
crimes committed against international law, the International Center for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) highlights truth commissions as “non-judicial, independent panels of 
inquiry typically set up to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human 
rights or of international humanitarian law in a country’s past” with the objective “to 
prevent recurrence of crimes.”247  
 
Hayner describes four qualities that characterize all truth commissions: they focus on the 
past; they investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time rather than a specific 
event; they are temporary bodies, normally in operation for six months to two years, that 
are complete following the publication of a final report; and they are officially sanctioned, 
authorized, or empowered by the state (and sometimes also by armed opposition 
groups, as in a peace accord).248 Humphrey notes that the main source of evidence in 
truth commissions is “the stories of victims’ suffering without the necessary burden of 
                                                 
245UN. 2005. “Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity.” Report E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Principle 2. 
246 Braum, E. 2004. “Truth Commissions,” accessed 24th December 2008 at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/truth_commissions/.  
247 International Center for Transitional Justice. 2010. “Truth Commissions,” accessed 15th January 2010 at  
http://ictj.org/en/tj/138.html.  
248 Hayner, P. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York and London: 
Routledge, 14. 
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legal proof or judgements.”249 The United Institute of Peace adds that the accounts of 
perpetrators who were complicit in human rights violations can be an additional 
contribution to the work of truth commissions.250 Following the victim-focused thrust of 
transitional justice however, the ICTJ emphasizes that “[m]ost commissions focus on 
victim’s needs as a path toward reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past.”251 
Hayner posits that in fact truth commissions have five basic aims that are pursued to 
varying degrees in each application: 
“to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to 
specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to 
outline constitutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to 
promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past.”252   
 
For the purposes of this project Hayner’s third goal of truth commissions, that of 
contributing to justice and accountability, is my main concern. As the SLTRC has 
been charged with addressing the accountability of child soldiers in Sierra Leone 
it is important to investigate how truth commissions have been conceptualized to 
carry out this mandate. 
 
The role of truth commissions in addressing issues of accountability has to date been 
quite contentious. In Hayner’s account, for example, she notes that “[r]ather than 
displacing or replacing justice in the courts, a commission may sometimes help to 
contribute to accountability for perpetrators.”253 Part of this uncertainty stems from the 
fact that each application varies in overall design and focus. While some truth 
commissions have been quite legalistic, others have focused purely on reconciliation at 
the expense of both justice and truth.254 Therefore the extent of a truth commission’s 
pursuit of accountability has necessarily been defined on a case-by-case basis.  
 
                                                 
249 Humphrey, M. 2002. The Politics of Atrocity: From Terror to Trauma. New York and London: Routledge, 
106. 
250 United States Institute of Peace. 2005. “Truth Commissions Digital Collection,” accessed 26th December 
2008 at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html.  
251 International Center for Transitional Justice. 2010. “Truth Commissions,” accessed 15th January 2010 at  
http://ictj.org/en/tj/138.html. 
252 Hayner, P. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York and London: 
Routledge, 24. 
253 Ibid, 29. My emphasis. 
254 Valji, N. 2009. “Trials and Truth Commissions: Seeking Accountability in the Aftermath of Violence,” in D. 
Hinze(ed). 2009. Handbook on Human Rights Activities, Edition 2009/2010. Bonn/Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 3.  
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Hayner goes on to list several examples of how accountability might be pursued. Many 
commissions, she says, pass their files to prosecuting authorities and in situations of 
functioning judicial systems, sufficient evidence, and political will, trials may ensue. In 
other cases the names of perpetrators have been published thus at least providing moral 
sanctions. Some commissions have recommended other measures that might be 
enforced without full trial such as removing wrongdoers from posts in security forces 
where they might do further harm.255 On the other hand Kritz posits that while a truth 
commission cannot substitute for prosecutions it can in fact serve many of the same 
purposes. Regarding accountability this is possible, Kritz argues, to the extent that it “in 
some cases, establishes a formal basis for subsequent compensation of victims or 
punishment of perpetrators.”256 Freeman comments that in fact truth commissions 
“infrequently receive their full due in the area of justice.”257 He goes on to highlight their 
value “in assembling, organizing, and preserving evidence for use in ongoing or future 
prosecutions,” adding that “[t]ruth commissions tend to make recommendations in their 
final reports about the need for criminal trials against presumed perpetrators.”258  
 
What is notable about most of the previous characterizations of the role of truth 
commissions in pursuing accountability, with the exception of Hayner, is that 
accountability is defined in terms of criminal prosecution by a judicial body. Truth 
commissions are held as the means by which cases against perpetrators can be 
established. Given the provisions of the CRC that stipulate the application of non-judicial 
measures to the case of child soldiers, not to mention the international consensus that 
holds child solders as victims more than perpetrators, the question is to what extent can 
truth commissions in and of themselves work to achieve accountability.  
 
3.6  The Child Protection Focus of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation    
           Commission 
 
Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission began work in July of 2002 to fulfill 
the aims laid out in the Lomé Peace Accord, i.e. to work towards national reconciliation 
                                                 
255 Hayner, P. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York and London: 
Routledge, 29. 
256 Kritz, N. 1997. “War Crimes and Truth Commissions: Some Thoughts on Accountability Mechanisms for 
Mass Violations of Human Rights.” USAID Conference, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Reintegration in Post-Conflict Societies, 30th-31st October 1997, 14-5. 
257 Freeman, M. 2006. Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness. New York: Cambridge UP, 76. 
258 Ibid, 76-77. 
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by providing a forum for victims and perpetrators of human rights violations.259 According 
to the TRC’s report, the Commission was put in place in an effort to help the people of 
Sierra Leone to “express and acknowledge the suffering that took place…to relate their 
stories and experiences…to begin personal and national healing…[and] to build 
accountability in order to deal with impunity.”260 In view of the amnesty provisions of the 
Lomé Peace Accord, the TRC was to be “an alternative to criminal justice in order to 
establish accountability for the atrocities that had been committed during the conflict.”261  
 
Presumably the TRC would work towards achieving accountability for child soldiers 
through the use of alternative justice means as emphasized in the Paris Principles – in 
this case by facilitating truth-telling and thereby enabling an acknowledgement of the 
crimes they had committed. Zarifis argues that Sierra Leone’s TRC could best facilitate 
child soldier accountability while keeping in mind their social and psychological health 
along with the reconciliation needs of post-conflict Sierra Leone by providing “a form of 
catharsis allowing the victim and perpetrator to heal emotionally and psychologically.” 
Furthermore, Zarifis argued that the non-punitive nature of the TRC “fosters the 
children’s total rehabilitation and social reintegration” while complying with human rights 
standards of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s for child soldiers.262  
 
Yet Zarifis’ formulation does not indicate more specifically how accountability would be 
achieved for child soldiers or indeed if it would be a focus of the TRC, or just an 
assumed byproduct. Nor is Zafiris alone in eliding the TRC’s specific concerns with the 
accountability of child soldiers. On closer investigation it is notable that an emphasis on 
child soldier accountability was similarly absent from the TRC’s establishing document or 
any commentary by the TRC about the intent of its work. Instead the only reference 
made to child soldiers in the TRC documentation was on the special procedures that 
they should be afforded given their special needs: 
“The Commission shall take into account the interests of victims and 
witnesses when inviting them to give statements, including the security 
and other concerns of those who may not wish to recount their stories in 
                                                 
259 Sierra Leone. 1999. “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone,” Article 9. 
260SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 1, Introduction,” paragraph 3, accessed 17th September 2008 at 
http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/intro.shtml.  
261 Ibid, paragraph 26.  
262 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm.  
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public and the Commission may also implement special procedures to 
address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who 
have suffered sexual abuses as well as in working with child perpetrators 
of abuses or violations.”263 
 
From this it will be clear that in the TRC’s view child soldiers were to be treated the same 
as all children affected by war and victims of sexual abuse.  
 
Towards this end, the Parliament of Sierra Leone requested that the TRC develop child-
friendly procedures to be applied to child victims and child perpetrators alike. The TRC 
worked with government, national and international NGOs, UNICEF and other UN 
agencies to develop specific child-friendly procedures. These included training 
statement-takers on the needs for child protection and psychosocial support, creating a 
safe and comfortable environment for interviews, maintaining confidentiality, and 
organizing closed sessions and special hearings for children.264  Children were to be 
interviewed by one TRC statement-taker and supported by a child protection worker.265  
 
The Framework for Cooperation developed by the TRC and child protection agencies 
further outlined the special attention that was to be given to all children before the TRC. 
The Framework set out principles for children’s protection in the TRC process: the 
guiding notion of the best interests of the child, the necessity for their voluntary 
participation, consideration of their psychosocial status to determine if they were in an 
appropriate condition to make statements, and proper psychosocial support so the TRC 
process would not negatively impact on children. The overarching emphasis of the 
Framework was that children affected by war in Sierra Leone, whether they were active 
participants or not, would be treated as witnesses.266  
 
                                                 
263 Sierra Leone. 2000. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000,” Article 7(4). 
264 Siegrist, S. 2006. “Child Participation in International Criminal Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). 2006. International 
Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 60. 
265 O’Flaherty, M. 2007. The Human Rights Field Operation: Law, Theory and Practice. London: Ashgate, 
204.   
266 Siegrist, S. 2006. “Child Participation in International Criminal Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). 2006. International 
Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 60-1. 
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According to the TRC’s Final Report, a witness was “a person who has personal 
knowledge of a particular event and can explain what happened.”267 Child soldiers too 
were to engage in truth-telling in order to “recognize and acknowledge the past.”268 This 
would be achieved through the telling of personal and narrative truth, “a witness’s 
personal truth which he or she tells either in a statement or at a hearing…what he or she 
believes and should be respected.”269 As such, child soldiers were thus not obliged to 
fully disclose the crimes they may have committed. Rather, it was up to them individually 
to determine their “personal truth” and that which they disclosed was to be respected by 
the Commission.  
 
The notion of child soldiers as perpetrators thus came to be used merely as an 
acknowledgement that they had indeed committed serious crimes; it did not imply that 
they would be held accountable for these actions and certainly not that investigation 
would proceed beyond the scope of their involvement in those atrocities which they 
chose to illuminate. Despite its initial avowed aims of addressing the accountability of 
child soldiers, the Commission effectively decided to emphasize understanding the 
phenomenon of child soldiering – their motivations, what child soldiers themselves 
understood of their experiences, and their role as perpetrators – rather than any 
investigation of their culpability: 
“The conflict in Sierra Leone forced children into assuming ‘dual identities’ 
of both victim and perpetrator. While the Commission chose to treat 
children who had been involved in the conflict as neutral witnesses, the 
Commission was also determined to explore the fullness of their 
experiences in order to understand the motivations for what they did and 
whether they had the capacity to understand all of it. Examining their role 
as perpetrators is an important step in this direction. The Commission is 
not seeking to explore guilt; on the contrary, it strives to understand how 
children came to carry out violations as part of an important learning 
curve in preventing future conflicts.”270 
 
While the Sierra Leone TRC ostensibly recognized the dual nature of child soldiers as 
both victims and perpetrators, it simplified matters by approaching all children as neutral 
                                                 
267SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “TRC Children’s Version: Glossary,” document accessed 12th January 2009 
at http://www.trcsierraleone.org/children/glossary.htm.    
268SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 1, Chapter 3: Concepts,” paragraph 8. Document accessed 10th 
January 2009 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v1c3.shtml.  
269 Ibid, paragraph 25.  
270 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
Paragraph 225. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml. 
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witnesses. This emphasis on viewing child soldiers as witnesses begs many questions: 
Did the TRC’s concern to understand the child soldiering phenomenon also involve any 
concern with their accountability for the atrocities they had committed? To what extent 
and through what means were child soldiers to be held accountable for their actions? 
What is entailed in the processes of “examining their role as perpetrators” and “striving 
to understand how children came to carry out violations”? Did the TRC’s approach of 
“not seeking to explore guilt” rather ignore the question of accountability for the atrocities 
of child soldiers?  
 
One view could be that the prioritization of rehabilitation and reintegration of child 
soldiers as victims compromised the TRC’s work towards addressing their accountability 
as perpetrators. However, this view cannot ignore that the Commission’s approach was 
in compliance with the child rights focus of international law, most notably the “best 
interests” clause of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Lomé Accord and the 
TRC’s Framework for Cooperation followed suit and directed the work of the TRC.  
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that, despite the recognition that child perpetrators were 
by definition guilty of violations of human rights, the degree to which this was the case 
still needed to be investigated. Did child soldiers have the required agency in the crimes 
they committed? Put another way, were child soldiers, all factors considered, 
responsible for willfully committing serious crimes? If not, they could not be held fully 
accountable for their actions.  
 
Conceiving child soldiers at the outset as neutral witnesses allowed for an investigation 
into the extent and details of child soldier violations, but again only to the degree that 
child soldiers were willing to acknowledge. Bearing in mind the controversial nature of 
child soldiers – as first victims, then perpetrators – it also left room to examine if they 
indeed had agency in the crimes they committed or perhaps should be held as victims 
above all. This apparent lack of focus on accountability in favor of a more general 
investigation into the child soldiering phenomenon however calls into question the nature 
and purpose of the SLTRC: Should it be assumed that because of the SLTRC’s intent to 
provide a forum for both perpetrators and victims that indeed it ever expressly intended 
to work towards child soldier accountability? Rather, in line with the “primarily victims 
then perpetrators” clause of the Principles, was the TRC’s emphasis on child soldier 
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rehabilitation and reintegration rather than on their accountability? The work and findings 
of the SLTRC must be considered to address these various issues.  
 
 
3.7  Work, Findings, and Recommendations of the SLTRC  
           Regarding Child Soldiers 
 
Between 2002 and 2004, Sierra Leone’s TRC recorded more than 9,000 statements 
related to the civil war in Sierra Leone from all of its target groups including women, 
children, and perpetrators.271 Throughout special attention was given to children as 
noted in the Commission’s Final Report: “In interpreting its mandate the Commission 
wanted to ensure that the voices of children would be heard and taken into account at 
every stage of its proceedings...[while ensuring] that the identity of children who testified 
would remain confidential.”272  
 
In order to encourage the participation of all children given the importance of child 
soldier testimony in pursuing its goals, “[t]he Commission decided as a matter of policy 
that all children would be treated equally as witnesses whose experiences needed to be 
captured by the Commission, irrespective of whether they had perpetrated violations.”273 
The question of how it intended to address the needs of other victims, including those 
victimized by child soldiers, remained.  
 
Despite concerted efforts to include child perpetrators, some children were initially afraid 
that their statements would be shared with the Special Court. When it was explained that 
this would not happen, more came forward to testify.274  
 
In the end, altogether some 200 children were involved in the TRC process around the 
country, giving testimony and participating in thematic hearings on children.275 The exact 
                                                 
271 Hayner, P. 2007. “Negotiating peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the justice challenge.” Geneva: Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue, 27; UN General Assembly. 2003. “Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sierra Leone.” Report A/58/379, 
paragraph 44.   
272SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
paragraph 14. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml?page=1. 
273 Ibid, paragraph 17.  
274 Siegrist, S. 2006. “Child Participation in International Criminal Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). 2006. International 
Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 62. 
275 Ibid, 61. 
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number of child soldiers that testified before the TRC has not been published. However, 
it was reported by UNICEF personnel that more child victims testified than did child 
perpetrators. This said, it was also reported that more children testified as perpetrators 
than did adults.276  
 
It should be noted that between 1998 and the start of the TRC in 2002 6,774 child 
soldiers from all fighting factions had already gone through the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR277) process set up by the government of Sierra 
Leone and supported by UNICEF and their Child Protection Agency partners.278 This 
fact highlights further that bringing reconciliation to Sierra Leone and rehabilitation to 
child soldiers has been the main priority of the parties involved, led by the Sierra 
Leonean government and children’s advocates but supported by a large part of civil
society. Regardless of the exact number of child soldiers who testified before the 
Commission, their participation was important in consolidating a view of child soldiers 
above all victims of atrocities and human rights violations who are in need of 
rehabilitation an
 
as 
d reintegration.  
                                                
 
Through the testimony of child soldiers and others before the Sierra Leone TRC, the 
status of child soldiers as above all victims was laid out methodically from the process of 
recruitment through to their perpetration of serious atrocities and human rights violations. 
The Final Report notably dispels the notion of any “voluntary” enlistment of child soldiers 
into armed service since children are deemed to be incapable of making the choices that 
would be necessary to volunteer. It does not however indicate whether or to what extent 
child soldiers must themselves be held responsible for their actions. The Report instead 
views any use of children in war whatsoever as a breach of those children’s rights, 
something that child soldiers themselves cannot be held accountable for but rather the 
adults who were responsible for their illegal recruitment: 
 
276 Dougherty, B. 2004. “Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in 
African Studies Quarterly, 8(1), 48. 
277 Through removing weapons from combatants, taking them out of military structures, and helping them to 
integrate socially and economically into society, DDR programs attempt to support ex-combatants so they 
can become active participants in peace processes. 
UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre. 2009. “What is DDR?” Accessed 25th 
January 2010 at http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php. 
278SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
paragraph 393-4. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at 
http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-c4.shtml?page=1. 
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“The Commission…finds that the notion of children ‘volunteering’ to join 
the armed groups…completely unacceptable as children do not have the 
ability or capacity to ‘volunteer’. Simply put ‘they have no choice’. The 
Commission finds that the recruitment of children within the armed 
factions as soldiers constitutes a violation of international law for which 
the leadership must be held accountable. In the course of recruiting 
children as child soldiers, the rights of children have been violated.”279 
 
 
Besides negating child soldier agency, this passage indicates the TRC’s focus on 
holding the recruiters of child soldiers accountable also for the atrocities the recruits 
subsequently committed rather than the children themselves. All fighting groups 
including the government-led Sierra Leone Army were found by the Commission to be 
responsible for the illegal recruitment of child soldiers in which they “exploited the 
vulnerability of children and in so doing brutalized them.” 280 The Report notes that, as a 
result of such exploitation, “[c]hildren have entered adulthood deeply scarred by their 
traumatic experiences and their feelings of guilt.”281 The Final Report highlights the 
systematic abuses experienced by child soldiers that preceded their perpetration of 
serious crimes:    
“The conflict in Sierra Leone impacted heavily on children, as their rights 
were systematically violated by all of the armed factions. Children 
suffered abduction, forced recruitment, sexual slavery and rape, 
amputation, mutilation, displacement and torture. They were also forced 
to become perpetrators and carry out aberrations violating the rights of 
other civilians.”282    
 
 
That child soldiers were not only themselves brutalized but also forced to become 
perpetrators demonstrates the ambiguity of their situation: that they were both victims 
and perpetrators of gross human rights violations. How did the TRC address the 
dilemmas of accountability in this ambiguous situation? In general the TRC found it 
difficult to acknowledge the agency of child soldiers in committing serious crimes. Thus 
after describing how child soldiers had their own rights violated by the command 
structures of the armed forces during their initiation into violence, the TRC Report 
                                                 
279 Ibid, paragraph 234.  
280 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 2, Chapter 2: Findings,” paragraphs 468-9. Document accessed 
17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v2c2.shtml?page=45.  
281 Ibid. 
282 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
paragraph 7. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml?page=1. 
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reemphasizes the process wherein these victims of atrocities were first made to commit 
atrocities that then became second nature: 
“Children witnessed the perpetration of violations during the conflict and 
in turn perpetrated gross human rights violations against others. Initially, 
they had to be coerced into committing abuses but soon many of them 
began to initiate heinous atrocities without having to be compelled to do 
so. After being absorbed into an armed faction, children often behaved 
absolutely without inhibition. Living in the violent reality of conflict soon 
deadened their senses...”283 
 
 
The Commission notes this as a normalization of violence that child soldiers experienced 
within armed groups that made their crimes seem acceptable: “In their roles as 
perpetrators, many children have been ‘conditioned’ into accepting violence as the 
norm.”284 Despite the agency implied by the fact that child soldiers initiated serious 
crimes, the Report highlights the setting within which child soldiers had little choice but to 
become perpetrators:   
“The commission of these violations by children needs to be put in 
context against the turmoil of the conflict-ridden world they lived in. They 
were compelled to carry out such violations in order to survive. Refusal to 
carry out an order was simply not countenanced. Death or other violent 
reprisal for refusal to carry out the order was almost instantaneous. Thus 
most children were forced to carry out violations or become the victims of 
violations. Their physical size and their incredible vulnerability made them 
succumb quite easily.”285 
 
 
Besides the intimidation of severe violence and threats of death, the Report found that 
the vulnerability of child soldiers was exploited in multiple other ways. For one, 
commanders of child soldiers used the insecure and impressionable nature of their child 
recruits to motivate them to commit serious crimes: 
“Children…under most circumstances seek to please their elders, for a 
variety of reasons. These include issues of safety, as well as attracting 
affirmation and attention. Their desire to please has often been exploited 
by commanders, who force children into committing the most egregious 
violations.”286 
 
                                                 
283 Ibid, paragraph 227.  
284 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 2, Chapter 2: Findings,” paragraphs 468-9. Document accessed 
17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v2c2.shtml?page=45.   
285 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 
paragraph 229. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-
c4.shtml?page=1. 
286 Ibid, paragraph 209. 
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The Report goes on to note how commanders use drugs to control child soldiers.287 Not 
only do the drugs make children more malleable to their command; it makes it easier for 
them to carry out especially violent offensives. Drugs are cited as a major influence on 
the behavior of child soldiers, allowing them to carry out the most heinous of crimes:  
“Most of the testimonies made to the Commission confirmed that children 
carried out the most atrocious violations while under the influence of 
these drugs. The capacity of children to take responsibility for their acts 
remains open to debate.”288 
 
In this passage, the Report alludes to the possible responsibility of child soldiers for their 
serious human rights violations and atrocities. It is one of the few places in the over-
5,000 page document where agency on the part of child soldiers is held as even 
possible; the rest of the Report focused on how children were exploited and manipulated 
to do things they would not have done of their own initiative. Throughout the Report, 
there is no definitive attribution of any definite responsibility of child soldiers for the 
crimes they committed. Rather than attempting to pursue their accountability, the 
Commission establishes what it concludes is a main priority facing Sierra Leone – 
psychosocial rehabilitation of all Sierra Leonean children affected by war including the 
extreme example of child soldiers:  
“The psychosocial effects of the conflict have had a definitive impact on 
the children of Sierra Leone. The repercussions of their experiences are 
far-reaching and long-term and will require careful psychosocial support 
in order to help heal them. The overall development of the children of 
Sierra Leone has been affected and will need major intervention if they 
are to take their rightful place in the world.”289 
 
Beyond direct exposure to war and violence, the Commission alludes to the profound 
psychosocial factors that produced such pervasive effects on children around the 
country and which needed to be addressed in order to substantially improve conditions 
for children: 
“In the end, the war not only affected marginalized youth; it also affected 
mainstream youth. This was largely due to the breakdown of the family, 
the collapse of educational institutions, the lack of jobs and the fact that 
the fighting occurred in almost every part of the country.”290  
 
                                                 
287 Ibid, paragraph 195. 
288 Ibid, paragraph 197.  
289 Ibid, paragraph 363.  
290 SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 2, Chapter 2: Findings,” paragraph 458. Document accessed 17th 
September 2008 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v2c2.shtml?page=45. 
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This psychosocial outlook on the negative effects of war on children in Sierra Leone – 
focusing broadly on the effects of altered relationships from violence and death, the 
breakdown of family along with local values and belief systems, and the further 
educational and economic devastation incurred by many years of war – is the lens 
through which Sierra Leone’s TRC viewed the necessary steps forward in proposing to 
address its findings. In doing so the initial concerns with the accountability of child 
soldiers as perpetrators of gross violations of human rights were effectively displaced.  
 
As outlined in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Sierra Leone’s TRC 
was required to make recommendations regarding the “reforms and measures…needed 
to achieve the object of the Commission; namely, providing an impartial historical record, 
preventing the repetition of violations or abuses suffered, addressing impunity, 
responding to the needs of victims and promoting healing and reconciliation.”291 None of 
these recommendations make reference to pursuing accountability for the actions of 
child soldiers. Presumably this is because it was accepted either that child soldier 
accountability had already been adequately addressed during the course of the 
Commission’s work, or that, in line with the findings of the TRC itself, child soldiers were 
not to be held accountable due to a lack of agency in the crimes they had committed.  
 
In the “imperative” recommendations of the Final Report, i.e. those that were deemed 
necessary “to be implemented immediately or as soon as possible,”292 strong emphasis 
is placed on addressing abuses suffered by Sierra Leonean children as a whole, child 
soldiers included, rather than moving towards child soldier accountability. The worst 
abuses experienced by children generally are combined with those experienced 
specifically by child soldiers, implying that the document’s approach to redress for 
children equally applies to child soldiers.  
 
In setting out its imperative recommendations, the Commission restated its sense of 
mission regarding the necessary future protection of Sierra Leone’s children, the part of 
the population most dramatically affected by war:  
“The Commission found it most disturbing that children were the main 
victims in the following violations: drugging; forced recruitment; rape; and 
                                                 
291SLTRC Final Report. 2004. “Volume 2, Chapter 3: Recommendations,” paragraph 1. Document accessed 
12th January 2009 at http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v2c3.shtml.  
292 Ibid, paragraph 17. 
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sexual assault. The Commission also noted that children were compelled 
to participate in the war as child soldiers and were forced to commit a 
range of atrocities. Never again should the children of Sierra Leone be 
subjected to brutality.”293  
 
 
The Commission also took note of the needs of “youth”, defined as those between age 
18 and 35294, in its recommendations. As 14 years had elapsed between the start of the 
war in Sierra Leone and the publication of the TRC’s Final Report, many of those 
affected as children and/or child soldiers now fit into this category. In addressing their 
case the Commission states  
“civil war has aggravated matters for youth…[who] have been denied a 
normal education and indeed a normal life…These young people 
constitute Sierra Leone’s lost generation. The Commission recommends 
that the youth question be viewed as a national emergency that demands 
national mobilisation.”295 
 
 
 
The imperative recommendations that follow are the Commission’s attempt to create a 
framework for the improvement of the conditions facing Sierra Leonean children and 
youth, recognizing that in order to achieve them children must be protected and 
educated while the progress of youth must be monitored and their interests represented 
in government. Towards creating and/or strengthening legislative protections for the 
children of Sierra Leone, the Report prioritized the passing of the Child Rights Bill that 
was to incorporate the requirements of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.296 All 
Sierra Leonean legislation was to be reviewed by the Law Commission “with a view to 
determining whether the rights of children have been taken into account and, in 
particular, whether such legislation is in accord with the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.”297 The 
Commission also stated that primary education should be compulsory for all children.298 
Furthermore, it recommended that Sierra Leone’s Parliament create legislation that 
brings the age of majority to 18 in line with the current voting age.299  
                                                 
293 Ibid, paragraph 378-9.  
294 Ibid, page 166. 
295 Ibid, paragraph 306. 
296 Ibid, paragraph 381. 
297 Ibid, paragraph 382.  
298 Ibid, paragraph 384. 
299 Ibid, paragraph 387.  
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 With an eye towards integrating the country’s youth into civil society and the national 
economy, a National Youth Commission is to be created and tasked with identifying and 
creating a framework for the realization of youth needs. The goal is not only to develop 
public-private partnerships that would lead to employment but eventually to involve youth 
as co-owners and investors in relevant companies.300 A yearly “State of Youth” report by 
the National Youth Commission will assess the necessary and existing programs 
working for this end.301  
 
The Report also highlights the importance of giving youth “a meaningful political voice [in 
order to] express themselves and to realize their potential,” the lack of which is held as 
largely responsible for the “devastating consequences” endured by youth during war.302 
The Commission put forward as imperative that all political parties should ensure that at 
least 10% of their candidates at all elections are youths: “[A]ll political parties [are] to 
nurture and develop meaningful participation of youth.”303 Taken together, the imperative 
recommendations laid out by Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission show 
a clear prioritization of the protection and advancement of children and youth as they 
were perceived to be the groups most negatively affected by war in Sierra Leone. Far 
from pursuing accountability for child soldiers, the SLTRC recognized that in fact they 
were grossly victimized and deserved the same attention as did all children and youth 
affected by war.  
 
 
3.8 Conclusion: The Marginalization of Accountability in the Victim- 
          Centered SLTRC Process 
 
If one of the goals of Sierra Leone’s TRC had been to achieve the accountability of child 
soldiers for the serious crimes they committed during war, investigation of the TRC’s 
work in this regard gives one good reason to question to what extent this had been 
accomplished or, for that matter, how seriously it had been pursued in the first place. 
The first mention of child soldiers by the SLTRC stressed that they should be held on par 
with victims of sexual abuse and afforded special procedures that respect the traumas 
                                                 
300 Ibid, paragraph 310.  
301 Ibid, paragraph 311.  
302 Ibid, paragraph 312. 
303 Ibid, paragraph 313.  
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they had endured.304 There was no further discussion in any Commission document, 
from the outset until the publishing of its Final Report, of holding child soldiers to account 
for their crimes, not to mention by what means. Rather, throughout the TRC process the 
focus remained on protecting children, including child soldiers, while trying to solicit their 
involvement at every stage of its work.  
 
UNICEF’s Siegrist notes that when, at its inception, there was a dearth of children 
scheduled to testify before the TRC it was emphasized that there would be no sharing of 
information with the Special Court and that all children would be considered only as 
victims of the war. Thereafter more children came forward to testify.305 The child-friendly 
measures put in place by the Commission with support of UNICEF, while serving to 
protect child soldiers through their emphasis on voluntary participation of child soldiers-
as-witnesses, effectively prevented any serious investigation of their human rights 
abuses during the civil war. In this sense the concern with the need to protect child 
soldiers as victims can be seen as working counter to ending the culture of impunity that 
Kofi Annan had noted as unacceptable to a significant part of Sierra Leonean civil 
society.  
 
The commitment to ending the culture of impunity had given impetus for the UN to 
empower the Special Court with a mandate that would allow it to prosecute child 
soldiers. Subsequently the responsibility for holding child soldiers accountable for their 
war crimes was passed on to the SLTRC. In 2002 Zarifis argued that the collaborative 
effort of Sierra Leone’s Special Court and TRC would effectively address “[t]he moral 
dilemma of holding juvenile offenders accountable for war crimes” as the Special Court 
would prosecute war criminals with the greatest responsibility while the TRC focused on 
“fostering national peace and reconciliation.”306  
 
But how can the Special Court and the SLTRC be considered effective in dealing with 
child soldier accountability if the former declined to prosecute them while the latter 
focused exclusively on national goals of peace and reconciliation while all but ignoring 
                                                 
304 Sierra Leone. 2000. “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000,” Article 7(4). 
305 Siegrist, S. 2006. “Child Participation in International Criminal Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). 2006. International 
Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 62. 
306 Zarifis, I. 2002. “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers,” Human Rights 
Brief, 9 (3), accessed 10th September 2008 at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3sierra.cfm. 
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accountability? Zarifis had emphasized that truth-telling is in fact the best means to 
address the victim-first-then-perpetrator status of child soldiers, though not for its 
strength in establishing their responsibility and addressing accountability, but rather 
because of its ability to “facilitate effective social rehabilitation and reintegration.”307 
Duthie likewise argued that some of the benefits of truth commissions in the post-conflict 
period – in working to address impunity and towards redressing the grievances of victims 
as an important step towards reconciliation – are their ability “to individualize guilt [and] 
provide ex-combatants who are guilty of committing abuses the opportunity to 
acknowledge their guilt and apologize to victims and communities.”308 Given the 
approach of the SLTRC to child soldiers, however, the extent to which these benefits 
were realized was negligible.  
 
In practice voluntary participation of child soldiers in the SLTRC’s victim hearings was 
not conducive to holding them accountable as perpetrators of war crimes. For one, fewer 
than 200 child soldiers testified before the Commission – under 4% of those involved in 
war using the lowest estimates and under 2% using the highest. The large majority did 
not even discuss their actions much less acknowledge their guilt or apologize to victims. 
Secondly, due to the SLTRC’s definition of child soldiers as witnesses rather than as 
perpetrators there was no emphasis on assuming responsibility for the serious crimes 
committed by those who did testify. Furthermore, the Commission’s definition of 
“personal and narrative truth” as being the witness’ personal account of events that must 
be respected by the Commission no matter how much or how little they chose to 
disclose did not guarantee accountability. As the best interests of child soldiers were 
prioritized over and above their accountability – by the voluntary participation and 
victims-witnesses-only approach – it may be inferred that the SLTRC in effect serves to 
ensure the impunity of child soldiers.  
 
In the end, the SLTRC did not achieve accountability for child soldiers either due to its 
approach or to the shortcomings of its actual practice. In any case, it later became 
evident that the Commission’s main priority was instead on their rehabilitation and 
reintegration. In its conclusions the Commission recognized child soldiers above all as 
victims of war’s atrocities; it followed that child soldiers could have little or no agency for 
                                                 
307 Ibid. 
308 Duthie, R. 2005. “Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration.” Paper for Stockholm Initiative on 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinegration(SIDDR), Working Group 3, 10. 
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the serious crimes they committed. Examination of views beyond the Commission 
indicate that its recovery focus for child soldiers reflected the concerns of the Sierra 
Leonean government and society. In its Report the SLTRC noted that there was 
widespread recognition of the importance of normalizing lives as quickly as possible in 
working towards consolidating peace in the country. The swift moves to pursue the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers represented the newly 
democratically-elected Kabbah government’s priorities in this process: “There was 
widespread recognition at the end of such a tumultuous period of the conflict that a need 
existed to put structures in place to begin the transition to peace.”309  
 
Kabbah himself headed the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration that managed the DDR process as set out in the Lomé Accord of 1999310 
and consolidated the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of 2000. Dougherty explains that DDR 
for child soldiers was likewise supported by the majority of Sierra Leoneans who 
welcomed their return, not only because of what he deems their “forgiving nature” but 
because it was an essential component of recovering from war: “A pragmatic calculation 
that the children had to be reintegrated to ensure peace and stability undoubtedly 
contributed to the acceptance of ex-child soldiers.”311 The fact that almost 7,000 child 
soldiers had already gone through the DDR processes by the inception of the TRC 
foreshadowed that indeed accountability of child soldiers was not the main emphasis of 
transitional justice processes in Sierra Leone. 
 
Realizing the importance of reintegrating child soldiers in establishing peace, the 
emphasis of justice processes and the fight against impunity turned to prosecuting those 
who recruited and utilized child soldiers. This was compounded by the questionable 
extent of the agency of child soldiers. The founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special 
Court David Crane noted that in fact all of the SLSC’s indictees were charged at least in 
                                                 
309 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. 2004. “Volume 3b, Chapter 4: Children and 
Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” paragraph 392. Document accessed 17th September 2008 at 
http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3b-c4.shtml?page=1.  
310 Malan, M., P. Rakate, and A. McIntyre. 2002. “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home 
Straight,” Chapter 7, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, accessed 12th February 2009 at 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chap7.html.  
311 Dougherty, B. 2004. “Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in 
African Studies Quarterly, 8(1), 50.  
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part with the use of child soldiers, several also for their recruitment.312 Fallah 
emphasizes that the Sierra Leone case is significant for its attention to the concerns of 
recovering from war and establishing peace while maintaining a focus on issues of 
justice and accountability: “The Sierra Leonean model presents a useful starting point for 
balancing two, sometimes competing, imperatives: the fight against impunity and the 
struggle to heal wounds and nation-build in the aftermath of conflict.” 313 In the case of 
child soldiers however this was certainly not the case. In effect the SLTRC failed to hold 
them accountable for their war crimes in any meaningful sense. In the end it is apparent 
that the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers, towards healing and rebuilding 
Sierra Leone, was prioritized over their accountability.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
312 Crane, D. 2006. “Strike Terror No More: Prosecuting the Use of Children in Times of Conflict – the West 
African Extreme,” in K. Arts and V. Popovski(eds). 2006. International Criminal Accountability and the Rights 
of Children. The Hague, Netherlands: Hague Academic Press, 126.  
313 Fallah, K. 2006. “Perpetrators and Victims: Prosecuting Children for the Commission of International 
Crimes,” in The African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 14(1), 103.  
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Chapter 4.  THE CASE OF UGANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
AND TRADITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
 
This chapter will provide an investigation of the conflict in Uganda and the processes 
that led to the adoption of traditional justice mechanisms to address the case of child 
soldiers. I begin by giving a brief background to the Ugandan civil war and its effects on 
society and politics. I next highlight the peace-versus-justice debate that has challenged 
both the resolution of conflict as well as the issue of addressing child soldier 
accountability in Uganda. Subsequently I turn to the specific impact of war on child 
soldiers in this case. I then review the official and unofficial approaches to child soldiers 
throughout the conflict followed by the political processes that have led to the application 
of traditional justice mechanisms to child soldiers. In this chapter my conclusions as to 
how and to what extent traditional justice mechanisms are meant to address the 
accountability of child soldiers are based on the provisions of the Agreement of 
Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure that established their role in this 
regard. However the preceding account of the pursuit to end conflict along with the 
related thrust of concerns related to accountability further motivate my conclusions.  
 
4.1 Historical Background: Child Soldiers and the Unresolved War in Northern 
Uganda 
 
The as yet unresolved conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the government’s Uganda People’s Democratic Forces (UPDF) has deep 
historical foundations. Colonial marginalization of the north, unequal access to resources 
including land and the means of economic development, and ethnic strife between local 
groups contributed to a history of violence and militarism in dealing with regional and 
national problems. It is argued in related literature that contemporary violence in Uganda 
amounts to a “profound crisis of legitimacy of the state”314 rooted in Uganda’s colonial 
and post-colonial history.  Otunnu argues that during the colonial period “the state was 
constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing 
differences, administrative policies of divide-and-rule and economic policies that further 
fractured the colonial identity.”315 British colonial powers created different economic 
zones wherein major infrastructural investment went to the south while the north was 
                                                 
314 Otunnu, O. 2002. “Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland,” Conciliation Resources 
website, accessed 1st March 2009 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/causes-
dynamics.php. 
315 Ibid. 
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utilized largely as a labor reserve thus solidifying economic disparities between the two 
parts of the country.316  
 
Post-independence Uganda was characterized by serious political challenges. At first 
this was based on the varying interests of different political parties that were organized 
on ethnic lines and all sought to secure benefits for their constituencies. Indicating the 
growing importance of the military in Ugandan affairs President Obote selected Idi Amin 
Dada as his personal protégé and promoted him rapidly through the army ranks. When it 
was found that Amin had provided military support in a crisis in neighboring Congo, 
Obote’s political rivals claimed that he and his closest associates were corrupt and had 
conducted secret foreign policy for personal gain. This resulted in a “no confidence” vote 
against him.317 In 1966, only 4 years after independence, Obote declared a state of 
emergency and suspended the constitution.318 Successive violent power struggles 
resulted in an increasing militarization of Uganda’s political landscape, demonstrating 
the general inadequacy of state institutions to provide for participation, while more 
particularly exacerbating the north’s unequal economic position and accompanying 
discontent.319  
 
The northern Acholi were at first well-represented in the military but became the target of 
persecution by Idi Amin after his bloody coup in 1971. As Amin was from the West Nile 
sub-region he feared the army’s Acholi elements. As a result he ordered the murder of or 
forced into exile many Acholi soldiers and “an entire generation of Acholi leaders” 
including the Acholi Anglican Archbishop of Uganda who was assassinated in 1977.320 
Anti-government forces including Yoweri Museveni began training in Tanzania during the 
late 1970s with plans to overthrow Amin. According to some northerners, many Acholis 
were recruited for this purpose. In 1981 Museveni established the National Resistance 
Movement/Army(NRM/A) as a politically motivated armed anti-government 
                                                 
316 Ibid.  
317 Global Security. No date. “Uganda Independence,” accessed 20th January 2010 at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/uganda1.htm.  
318 Clark, J. 2002. “Uganda,” International Relations Center website, accessed 14th March 2009 at 
http://presentdanger.irc-online.org/conflicts/uganda.html.    
319 Graduate Institute of International and Developmental Studies. 2008. “Lord’s Resistsance Army: 
Origins,” accessed 15th March 2009 at http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=28.  
320 ReliefWeb. 1997. “The Anguish of Northern Uganda,” accessed 15th March 2009 at 
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/4233a0bf811d7767c1256525002b8e44.   
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insurgency.321 In a sign of what would come to characterize the war in northern Uganda, 
the NRM/A recruited 3,000 child soldiers, all of whom were under age 16, in support of 
its fight for power.322  
 
After much political vacillation accompanied by extreme violence, peace talks were 
arranged in 1985 that resulted in the Nairobi Peace Agreement. The Agreement 
committed all competing factions, including Museveni’s NRM/A, to a ceasefire, the 
demilitarization of armed forces, and power-sharing in a constitutional democracy.323 
Despite the Nairobi Peace Agreement, however, Museveni led his army to Kampala and 
seized power on the 25th of January 1986, consolidating all socio-economic, political, 
and military power in southern Uganda.324  
 
Motivated by his betrayal of the Nairobi Peace Agreement, rebel groups solidified 
against Museveni as Acholi soldiers of the deposed government returned to their 
northern birthplaces325. More generally there was a growing perception among the 
Acholi that official government policy would further “exclude, discriminate against, 
neglect and/or exploit certain groups with regard to political participation.”326 Mu
responded by sending the NRA to thwart rebellion. In the process they committed 
significant human rights abuses including rapes, abductions, and the killing of unarmed 
civilians in addition to the destruction of granaries, schools, hospitals and boreholes.
seveni 
                                                
327 
Conscripted child soldiers were also involved in these atrocities. Later the Government 
of Uganda (GoU) would admit that it had used child soldiers extensively during the 
1980s, justifying it as “dictated by the circumstances of the day.”328 During this time, 
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many Acholi considered that their homeland was under violent occupation leaving little 
alternative but to fight for their survival.329 
 
 
In August 1986, Alice Auma formed the quasi-political Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and 
the militant Holy Spirit Mobile Forces(HSMF) in northern Uganda, in opposition to the 
continuing threat presented to northern populations by Museveni’s new regime. These 
groups would in time become the foundation for Joseph Kony’s similarly cult-like Lord’s 
Resistance Army. Auma had been practicing as a spirit medium and healer in Gulu 
where she declared herself a prophet. The main spirit she claimed to channel was that of 
a dead Italian army officer named “Lakwena,” or messenger, which the Acholi believe to 
be a manifestation of the Christian Holy Spirit.330 She espoused the revival of Acholi 
militarism grounded in a fusion of Christian and traditional beliefs in defense against 
oppression and possible extinction.331 As one account puts it, “she offered hope for 
worldly as well as spiritual redemption in a dark hour of despair.”332 In attempting to 
revive and strengthen Acholi culture, Auma emphasized the use of cleansing rituals and 
strict moral rules implying a vision of war as a purifying process.333 Within the HSM and 
the HSMF looting, rape and adultery were prohibited, as was smoking and drinking.334 
Auma’s charismatic figure electrified Acholi youth335 and gathered many followers, 
extending beyond Acholiland and initially including many ex-UPDA forces that refused to 
enter into peace talks with Museveni.336 The HSMF was surprisingly effective and, 
underestimated by Museveni, for a short time managed to take over large parts of 
Uganda.337 In a quest for more manpower the HSMF, before its 1987 campaign into 
southern Uganda, coerced many young men from local villages into joining their forces. 
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Many of the recruits’ families were killed before their abduction, indicating the brutality 
that would soon become the hallmark of the LRA.338 A short time later, having suffered 
defeat at the hands of the Museveni government’s United People’s Democratic Forces 
(UPDF), Auma went into exile in Kenya.339  
 
In April of 1987, Joseph Kony, who claimed to have inherited his cousin Alice Auma’s 
spiritual powers, founded the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).340 Drawing initially from 
Acholi UPDA deserters341, the LRA filled the “power vacuum among fractured northern 
resistance movements.”342 Kony’s “charismatic leadership” was at first accepted by local 
populations.343 Akin to Auma’s symbolism and message of saving the Acholi from 
genocide through moral rejuvenation and providing them with a renewed identity, Kony 
reportedly also advocated creating a new Acholi nation, “one that had been punished, 
cleansed and purged by violence.”344 In the LRA’s original manifesto, Kony spoke of his 
desire to overthrow Museveni’s regime and replace it with one that adheres to the Bible’s 
Ten Commandments.345 Despite this quasi-political-cum-spiritual message at the outset, 
however, Kony did little to address traditional Acholi grievances. Instead the LRA used 
fear and violence coupled with “apocalyptic spiritualism” to maintain the insurgency 
against Museveni.346 As a result, Acholiland became a battlefield between the LRA and 
government forces and Kony gradually lost local support. The majority of Acholi were 
tired of living in constant terror, some so much so that they even took up bows and 
arrows against Kony.347 Large numbers also moved to protected camps set up by 
Museveni. In return, the LRA intensified its violent campaign against the Acholi 
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population that was seen as allied to the government.348 The abduction of children 
became a main tactic of the LRA as they were seen to be “the nucleus of a new Acholi 
identity.”349 Eventually child soldiers would make up 90% of the LRA’s fighting forces.350 
By 2008, it was reported that about 25,000 children had been forcibly abducted by the 
LRA since the beginning of the conflict.351  
 
The GoU also utilized child soldiers throughout the northern conflict although not nearly 
to the extent of the LRA. Children were involved as part of Local Defense Units or “home 
guards” in providing security for villages and camps.352 The UPDF also reportedly 
pressured former LRA child soldiers to join them in fighting against the LRA.353 One 
UPDF commander defended the use of ex-LRA child soldiers saying, “between two 
evils, you choose the lesser – they have no alternative employment, where can they 
go?”354 Officially, however, the Ugandan government claimed that it never intentionally 
recruited children while also admitting that some under-18s could have been recruited 
due to difficulties related to age verification.355   
 
In November 2003, the United Nations’ Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland described 
the conflict in northern Uganda as “the world’s worst neglected humanitarian crisis.”356 
Human Rights Watch considered the LRA’s violent campaign, targeting northern 
populations as it sought the accumulation of child soldiers by whatever means 
necessary, “a prime factor in the destruction of the economy of northern Uganda and the 
resultant impoverishment of its inhabitants.”357 The indigenous non-governmental 
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organization Gulu Save the Children Organization (GUSCO) detailed the devastation of 
more than 20 years of civil war complicating its efforts of LRA child soldier reintegration: 
“Poor living conditions are prevalent among the internally displaced 
persons and people returning to their ancestral homes in villages, who 
are highly impoverished, displaced from their traditional land, suffered 
illness like cholera, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. The region has witnessed 
interrupted education; families have had to endure severe social 
breakdowns as evidenced by the big numbers of orphans, child mothers, 
and child-headed families. Communities are faced by shortages of food 
due to inaccessibility of their farmlands and inadequate agricultural input 
availability, hence left to survive on the food rations provided monthly by 
[the] World Food Program.”358 
 
 
By the middle of 2005 between 90 and 95% of northerners, or more than 1.9 million 
people, had been moved to towns or camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs).  The 
UN characterized most of these IDP camps as “squalid” and “overcrowded” with acute 
shortages of housing, medical care, sanitation, water, and provisions for adequate 
nutrition.359  The majority of the displaced, over 1.1 million, came from the three main 
ethnically Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader. Until recently, IDP camps 
experienced human rights violations by the LRA, including, killings, raids, abductions, 
sexual abuse and general violence.360 During a 6-month period in 2005 almost 1,000 
deaths were reported each week in these camps with the top causes being 
malaria/fever, AIDS, two lango (a local sickness comprising of oral thrush, malnutrition, 
and diarrhea), and violence.361 By the end of 2006, 98% of the population of the Acholi 
sub-region had been displaced.362  
 
In 2007 the Juba peace process and the departure of the LRA from Uganda, following 
the signing of a cessation-of-hostilities accord, brought considerable stability to the 
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country with the displaced slowly returning to their home areas.363 On the 29th of July 
2009 UNHCR reported that “some 80% of the more than 1.8 million people in camps for 
the internally displaced have returned home.”364 Nonetheless, a final peace settlement 
has yet to be signed between the LRA and Museveni’s UPDF despite several attempts 
at further peace talks and such already-signed agreements as the 2007 Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation and its 2008 Annexure on how to approach issues of 
justice and social re-building in the post-conflict period.   
 
4.2    Re-integration and/or Accountability of Child Soldiers as an element of the 
Peace-versus-Justice Dilemma in the Resolution of Conflict in Northern 
Uganda 
 
From a transitional justice perspective the complex moral and political difficulties 
involved in the re-integration and/or accountability of child soldiers in the northern 
Ugandan conflict may be seen as an instance of the more general “peace-versus-justice 
dilemma”. Typically the demands of justice, i.e. that the perpetrators of past political 
atrocities and gross human rights violations be prosecuted and punished, may be 
countermanded by the requirements of conflict-resolution and peace-making, i.e. that the 
inclusion and collaboration of warlords, mass murderers and torturers have to be 
secured for the political pacts that can bring an end to ongoing civil war and political 
violence. Both peace and justice are desirable objectives but in the context of transitional 
justice one or the other has to be prioritized; they cannot both be pursued at the same 
time.  As Nielson explains, “It is commonly argued that there is a trade-off between the 
two where peace has to be sacrificed in favor of justice or vice versa.”365  
 
In Uganda, this dilemma has taken a notably high-profile form with regard to whether the 
leaders of the LRA should be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
their many gross human rights violations or be granted amnesty as part of a political deal 
to secure a peace pact that might bring the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda to an 
end.  The cause of justice and accountability is represented by Museveni’s referral of the 
case of the LRA to the International Criminal Court for punishment in 2003. As against 
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this the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) has notably advocated the 
cause of amnesty for the LRA leaders, prioritizing peace and forgiveness for the sake of 
reconciliation. Amnesty advocates argue that the prospect of ICC prosecutions of the 
LRA leaders is a hindrance to the peace process, noting that the LRA has demanded 
that ICC indictments be dropped as a precondition for engaging in full peace talks. Many 
northerners would rather want to achieve accountability of the LRA through the use of 
traditional reconciliation rituals “that involve the offending party accepting responsibility 
for his actions and asking forgiveness.”366 These rituals seek to address the underlying 
causes of conflict, something ICC prosecutions of perpetrators are not seen to do.367 
Supporting the peace-first approach, Okello argues that “the simultaneous pursuit of 
peace and justice only delays a peaceful resolution of the conflict and contributes in a 
very real and visible sense to the continued internment of people in squalid camps for 
the internally displaced.”368 On the other hand, advocates of the justice-first approach 
argue that ICC arrest warrants, delivered in October 2005, were the decisive impetus for 
the LRA’s ceasefire compliance in August 2006 and the reason they are even 
considering final peace talks.369 It is further contended that prosecutions of LRA leaders 
actually will assist in peace-building efforts and that the involvement of the ICC will help 
to “isolate and eliminate the handful of top LRA leaders, while allowing for the 
reintegration of others into Ugandan society through an amnesty policy.”370  
 
The peace-versus-justice dilemma is particularly acute in dealing with the future of child 
soldiers: local and international ‘peace’ advocates have prioritized their rehabilitation and 
reintegration with an eye on community reconciliation while  ‘justice’ advocates – notably 
President Museveni and the Ugandan administration – have intermittently continued to 
seek punishment of rebel child soldiers for the crimes they perpetrated. This 
manifestation of the peace-versus-justice debate characterizes the priorities of northern 
communities and their leaders, supported by international ‘peace’ advocates, in 
opposition to those of Museveni and the Ugandan administration as they sought to try 
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and punish Kony and LRA leaders by invoking the ICC supported by international 
‘justice’ supporters. Both perspectives have long-term peace as the ultimate aim, the first 
by recovering from conflict as quickly as possible by addressing community healing and 
the latter by attempting to end impunity for crimes against international law so as to 
avoid their recurrence.  But in the short term they have different implications and 
consequences for the treatment of LRA child soldiers: they can be held accountable for 
their part in the atrocities during the war or they can be re-integrated in local 
communities.   
 
In practice these alternative approaches have not been pursued consistently. 
Museveni’s ‘justice-first’ stance on the topic has actually been fluctuating: although firm 
at first, it later softened as the reality of the stance’s implications for resolving the conflict 
became more apparent. However this was not without deviations. In June of 2007 
Museveni signed the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation with 
representatives of the LRA, committing the GoU to avoid the use of criminal justice 
procedures for child soldiers in favor of reconciliation processes such as Mato Oput. 
Only one month later Museveni threatened to detain and charge with treason a child 
soldier who was 15 years old when the crime was allegedly committed.371  
 
Moreover the choices between justice and peace may be less clear-cut. Mabasi argues 
that the ICC, in seeking the accountability of LRA leaders, in fact complements local 
reconciliation processes that are directed at the reintegration of low-rank LRA 
combatants and child soldiers, who make up a majority of the LRA’s fighting forces.372 
Raising a different though related issue, Okello contends that the ICC, in its focus on the 
atrocities of the LRA, effectively condones impunity for the GoU in ignoring their own 
serious human rights violations.373  Meanwhile the safety and security of LRA child 
soldiers remains a serious concern the longer these issues remain unresolved and the 
hostilities are extended.374 Finding a way to deal with the LRA child soldiers remains a 
key challenge of transitional justice in the Ugandan context. 
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4.3 Child Soldiers in Uganda 
 
While the conflict in northern Uganda has been characterized by major attacks on 
civilian populations, one of its most disturbing aspects has been that “this is a war fought 
by children on children.”375 By systematically abducting children to bolster its forces, the 
LRA produced large numbers of child soldiers who victimize children through violent 
attacks on other LRA child soldiers and as themselves abductors of civilian children.376 
The use of child soldiers by government forces adds to the child-on-child nature of 
conflict in northern Uganda.  
 
Still, the LRA and its brutal and widespread strategy of forced abduction and service 
under the threat of severe violence and death remains by far the most dramatic and 
problematic aspect of the war. Children as young as 8 were abducted from their homes, 
schools, and IDP camps.377 Most were typically taken at night when the LRA enacted 
raids on villages and camps while looting food and supplies, razing settlements and 
infrastructure, and capturing both children and adults.378 Often the children were 
“initiated” by being forced to kill their relatives, including younger siblings.379 They were 
then beaten, supposedly to “harden them to life as soldiers.”380 One child recalled being 
hit with a cane 150 times and with the blunt side of a machete 8 times on the back.381 
Children were next covered in shea nut oil – forehead, chest, back, hands, and feet – 
applied on each area in the sign of the cross. To instill fear, they were told the oil would 
help the LRA find them if they tried to escape.  One child recounted, “[T]hen you are no 
longer with your mother and father, but with the LRA. If you leave they will kill you.”382 In 
fact many LRA child soldiers were punished by death for attempting to leave the fighting, 
thus providing others a vivid lesson as to what would happen if they also tried to escape. 
Child soldiers were many times made to punish and kill recaptured escapees, so as to 
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experience firsthand why they should stay with the LRA. Another LRA child soldier 
recounted: 
“One boy tried to escape and was caught, tied up, and marched back to 
camp. All the recruits from the various companies were told that we were 
never going home, that we were fighting now with the LRA so as a 
symbol of our pledge to fight on, this boy would be killed and we would 
help. Soldiers then laid the boy on the ground and stabbed him three 
times with a bayonet until blood began seeping from the wounds. Then 
the new recruits approached the boy and beat him on the chest. Each 
one had a turn and could only stop once the blood from the body 
splashed up on you. This boy was sixteen years old. We were beating 
him with sticks, each recruit was given a stick.”383 
 
 
Escapees were not the only ones brutalized and killed after their initiation into the LRA. 
Child soldiers were frequently caned even for minor mistakes in following orders.384 
Some were trampled to death, beaten, or mutilated either as punishment or if they were 
incapable of keeping up with their units.385 One boy, just abducted, was made to carry 
the goods stolen from his village. When he fell down and broke his ankle, the unit 
commander shot him in the head.386 Abductees were likewise made to perform 
gruesome acts, apparently senseless but effectively serving to further dehumanize them 
and inculcate the LRA’s extreme culture of violence. One child was made to mutilate the 
dead body of a boy who had been beaten to death by other abductees: “I was ordered to 
cut up a dead body with a knife. I was then forced to pick up the pieces of flesh and 
throw them on the ground to show my loyalty.”387 The children were also given drugs 
that decreased their inhibitions in committing acts of violence; in the words of one, the 
drugs “make you lose your memory, and you don’t think about whether it’s a human 
being.”388 Female child soldiers were often enslaved and made “wives” of LRA 
commanders, subject to rape, unwanted pregnancies, and the high risk of sexuall
transmitted di
y 
seases.389  
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Although fear of punishment and death was the main driving force behind the atrocities 
committed by LRA child soldiers, there are reports that some participated willingly. Stella 
Laloyo, a social worker in Gulu working with LRA child soldiers, reported that “[s]ome 
kids enjoyed it and want to go back.”390 Among children she interviewed, some 
explained that although they did not miss the hardship of living with hunger and fear, 
they did miss the sense of power they had as soldiers and preferred that to becomi
“children” again.
ng 
nditions 
ren 
ts 
oting of camp settlements.”395 
                                                
391 A UNICEF Uganda report published in 2006 found that 44% of 
interviewed abductees even admitted feeling “allegiance” towards the LRA at some point 
during their tenure regardless of the forced nature of their recruitment and the conditions 
they were exposed to.392 Maina argues that life in the LRA “could have had more to 
offer” for child soldiers in terms of privileges and relative advantages than the co
they experienced in IDP camps. As a result she says reintegration attempts are 
potentially challenged by the eagerness of some child soldiers to return to rebel 
service.393 On the other hand Human Rights Watch posits that, although some child
“volunteer” to participate in the LRA, many nonetheless soon learn that “they are at the 
mercy of their commanders, and do what they believe they must in order to 
survive…Children who engage in violence have no choice but to follow orders.”394 
Whether willing participants or not, child soldiers, who made up the vast majority of the 
LRA’s fighting forces during its brutal campaign, were certainly complicit in, if not outright 
guilty of, some of the war’s worst crimes. These included, in the words of the ICC’s 
characterization of the crimes of the LRA,  “a pattern of brutalization of civilians by ac
including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings 
of houses and lo
 
In short, the question of how to deal with LRA child soldiers as both victims and 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations during the still ongoing war in northern 
Uganda constitutes an especially acute form of the peace-versus-justice dilemma for 
 
390 Nolen, S. 2003. “Uganda’s Child Soldiers,” The Globe and Mail, 25 January 2003. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Annan, J., C. Blattman, and R. Horton. 2006. “The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern 
Uganda: Findings from the Survey of War-Affected Youth,” UNICEF Uganda, 60.  
393 Maina, G. 2009. “Questioning Reintegration Processes in Northern Uganda,” in Conflict Trends, 1, 
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 53.   
394 Human Rights Watch. 2008. “Coercion and Intimidation of Child Soldiers to Participate in Violence,” 
accessed 18th March 2009 at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/16/coercion-and-intimidation-child-
soldiers-participate-violence#_Uganda.  
395 ICC. 2005. “Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders,” press release accessed 19th 
March 2009 at www.icc.cpi.int.  
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transitional justice.  Should priority be given to holding them accountable for the 
atrocities in which they participated, or should they in the first place be re-integrated in 
local communities with a view to reconciliation and peace-building? Or can ways be 
found to combine the demands of justice with the requirements of peace and 
reconciliation in dealing with the plight of these child soldiers?  
 
4.4   Official and Unofficial Approaches to dealing with Child Soldiers in 
            Uganda  
 
Addressing the issue of child soldiers in Uganda has a history as long as the war itself.  
The evolving public positions, policies and actions of President Museveni and the GoU, 
as these moved towards ending the overall conflict, have been inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory. The official approaches have also been complicated by the 
international condemnation of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in Uganda in 
dynamic coexistence with local and international initiatives working to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate child soldiers as part of the broader goals of social reconstruction and peace-
building towards recovery from the devastating effects of more than 20 years of war.  
 
From their assumption of power in 1986, Museveni and his administration were first and 
foremost engaged with ending the LRA insurgency through a militaristic approach and 
by whatever means available including the use of child soldiers. Although momentarily 
heeding the international community’s stance against child soldiering by 
decommissioning a token number of children in 1986396, the UPDF continued recruiting 
child soldiers until 2000 both locally into Ugandan Local Defense Units and to support 
opposition groups in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.397  
 
In 1992, during a lull in the fighting, the GoU demobilized 36,358 of roughly 90,000 state 
soldiers in an attempt to shift public spending from defense and security to social and 
economic development. Despite extensive provisions for all other veterans however, the 
World Bank noted that the position of child soldiers was left completely unaddressed: 
                                                 
396 Museveni responded to international criticism for his use of child soldiers by decommissioning 300 
children from NRA/UPDF service in late 1986. Along with state child soldiers, 200 LRA child soldiers were 
also enrolled in army-founded schools beginning in 1988. Despite the gesture at moving children from 
armed service, those who under-performed academically were sent back to military training and redeployed. 
Muhumuza, R. 1995. “A Case Study on the Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers in Uganda,” 
Kampala: World Vision Uganda. 
397 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2002. “Child Soldiers: 1379 Report,” London, 99-100.  
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“[T]he program does not contain any specific component for this otherwise vulnerable 
subgroup.”398 As fighting continued the child soldier issue was repeatedly subsumed to 
other objectives in Museveni’s attempts to end conflict with the LRA.  
 
With no official program in place for child soldiers it was left to local and international 
non-governmental organizations – coming from a ‘peace’ perspective – to establish 
concrete programs in northern Uganda. These unofficial initiatives, established in 1994, 
had to provide some of the much-needed rehabilitation and reintegration services to the 
numerous children exposed to the extreme brutality and violence of the LRA. The broad 
focus of recovery efforts developed by the local Gulu Save the Children Organization 
(GUSCO) and the U.S.-based World Vision reflected and reinforced the Acholi’s “culture 
of peace.”399 As opposed to the ‘justice’ perspective, these initiatives prioritized peace-
building and social reconciliation in a quest for an expedient end to the suffering brought 
on by civil war. Veale and Stavrou characterize the community sentiment underlying 
non-governmental reintegration and peace-building initiatives:  
“In Northern Uganda, communities’ traditional means of survival have 
been massively impacted upon by the conflict, yet at the level of civil 
society, resistance to the destructive impact of violence is expressed in 
the community push for strategies of peace, a discourse of forgiveness, 
and local, community based strategies to promote the reintegration of 
returnees from the rebel forces…Rather than being a top down process 
taken by religious leaders, mobilising reintegration and reconciliation 
seems to stem from individuals and communities themselves. Its roots lie 
in a Christian doctrine of forgiveness, in traditional Acholi cultural beliefs 
around spirituality, cleansing and social healing and in a political will to 
move beyond the personal and cultural destruction caused by the 
conflict.”400 
 
 
GUSCO and World Vision initially opened reception centers in Gulu to provide medical 
examinations and basic counseling for escaped or released child returnees.401 Muggah 
                                                 
398 Colletta, N., M. Kostner, and I. Wiederhofer. 1996. “Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda,“ Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, 219, 330.   
399 Pain, D. 1997. “’The Bending of Spears’: Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in Northern 
Uganda,” report commissioned by International Alert and Kacoke Madit, London: International Alert, 19.   
400 Veal, A. and A. Stavrou. 2003. “Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord’s 
Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda,” Monograph 92, November 2003. Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies, 43-4. 
401 Borzello, A. 2009. “The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army,” in  
M. Berdal(ed). 2009 Transforming Armed Groups After Conflict: War-to-Peace Transitions. London: Taylor 
and Francis, 153. 
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suggests that the counseling services provided at reception centers were in fact only 
“group discussions and advice – led by local social workers.”402 Nonetheless they 
attempted, in however piecemeal a fashion, to address the long-neglected and dire 
psychosocial needs of LRA child soldiers. Available evidence has since suggested that 
children who spent time in these or similar receptions centers had better mental health 
and psychosocial well-being compared to children that returned directly to their 
communities.403 In addition to the physical and psychosocial components of the GUSCO 
and World Vision programs, skills-training was made available in some cases. In the 
interests of facilitating reintegration, family reunification was pursued for all.404 
Furthermore GUSCO employed traditional cleansing ceremonies in the process of 
reintegration while World Vision followed Christian forgiveness practices.405 These 
reintegration initiatives represent a grassroots effort to address the issue of child soldiers 
that has so severely impacted northern communities. 
 
As armed conflict continued between the LRA and the GoU, community-based peace-
focused groups led by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) increasingly 
pushed a ‘peace’ agenda of amnesty for all conflict participants, leaders included, 
founded on the Acholi belief in forgiveness. As much as the Acholi had grown to resent 
the LRA’s violent onslaught on local life and community, there was similar resentment 
against the Ugandan government for its one-dimensional advocacy of a military solution 
to the war in northern Uganda that was perceived to be a no-win strategy. Underlying 
local disapproval for the GoU’s military tack was a growing belief that it paid “little regard 
to the effects of this strategy on the population or to the wider factors that underlie the 
conflict.”406 From the outset, the ARLPI advocated an amnesty aimed at enticing Kony 
and the LRA to end their insurgency without punishment. This was viewed as part of the 
need to explore alternatives towards the resolution of conflict and the rebuilding of 
northern Uganda – namely the necessity for dialogue and negotiations between the GoU 
                                                 
402 Muggah, R. 2008. Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of 
War. London: Taylor and Francis, 109.   
403 MacMullin, C. and M. Loughry. 2002. “An Investigation into the psychosocial adjustment of formerly 
abducted soldiers in Northern Uganda,” Field Report: International Rescue Committee. 
404 Borzello, A. 2009. “The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army,” in  
M. Berdal(ed). 2009 Transforming Armed Groups After Conflict: War-to-Peace Transitions. London: Taylor 
and Francis, 153.  
405 Akello, G., A. Richters and R. Reis. 2006. “Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: 
Coming to Terms with Children’s Agency and Accountability,” Intervention, 4(3), 230, 233.  
406 International Crisis Group. 2004. “Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict.” ICG Africa 
Report, Number 77, 1.  
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and the LRA along with the implementation of traditional rituals as a means of working 
towards societal reconciliation.407 The reintegration of child soldiers is seen to be an 
integral part of these processes.408  
 
In a memorandum to the government, the ARLPI, reflecting the aspirations of the Acholi 
people at home and in the diaspora, rejected partial amnesty offers and instead strongly 
advocated a general amnesty. Their draft was in fact to form the basis of the GoU’s 
subsequent Amnesty Act. The Amnesty Act of 2000 was considered at the time as the 
appropriate means to secure an end to conflict with the LRA and to “establish peace, 
security and tranquility throughout the whole country.”409 According to the Act, amnesty 
was to be granted to “any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January 
1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the 
Republic of Uganda.”410 Participants and collaborators were not to be prosecuted or 
punished in any way so long as he or she “renounces and abandons involvement in the 
war or armed rebellion” and “surrenders…any weapons in his or her possession.”411 The 
Act had no specific provisions for child soldiers412 but they were included in its blanket 
amnesty. However, despite the overwhelming support of northerners for amnesty as the 
greatest hope for resolving the conflict,413 few high-level LRA commanders agreed to 
give up their insurgency and warring continued.414 With this failure of the Amnesty Act 
Museveni and the GoU was to return to a ‘justice’ approach to the problem.  
 
At the same time international pressure regarding child soldiers resurged in January 
2000 when the UN introduced its ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict’ with a view to ending the use 
of child soldiers globally. Finally succumbing to international pressure, Uganda ratified 
                                                 
407 Rodrigues, C. 2002. “The Role of Religious Leaders,” accessed 18th March 2009 at http://www.c-
r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/religious-leaders.php.   
408 UgandaNet. 2004. “ARPLI Receives Prize from the World Parliament of Religions,” accessed 20th March 
2009 at http://www.mail-archive.com/ugandanet@kym.net/msg14796.html.   
409 Uganda. 2000. “The Amnesty Act, 2000,” Preamble, accessed 18th March 2009 at www.c-
r.org/accord/northern-uganda/documents/2000_Jan_The_Amnesty_Act.doc. 
410 Ibid, Operative clause 3. 
411 Ibid, Operative clause 4(1)(c). 
412 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. 2004. “Uganda,” in Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004. 
Accessed 24th March at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,CSCOAL,,UGA,456d621e2,49880620c,0.html.  
413 Refugee Law Project. 2005. “Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential 
for Conflict Resolution and Long-term Reconciliation,” Kampala, 9.  
414 Human Rights Watch. 2003. “Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda,” 15 (7), 
5. 
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the Optional Protocol in May of 2002415 thereby committing itself to end the use of all 
child soldiers. This dramatic shift from using child soldiers to backing its end in all forms 
can be seen as a relative success of concerted global attention to the child soldier 
problem while at the same time potentially foreshadowing Museveni’s subsequent move 
to solicit international support in the form of the International Criminal Court.  
     
In December 2003 President Museveni moved away from his previous offers of amnesty 
and, in an attempt to bring LRA leaders to justice and thus end the LRA insurgency, 
became the first head of state to refer a case in his country to the ICC citing the abuses 
of Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. In opting for justice and prosecution of the LRA 
leadership, he also emphasized the need for the reintegration of LRA members as a key 
to the future stability of northern Uganda. Museveni also noted in particular that many 
child soldiers had been abducted and brutalized.416 Accountability for child soldiers did 
not enter into the discussions.  
 
Before proceeding with its investigation, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo took note 
of “some local initiatives under way to find negotiated solutions to the situation.”417 In 
establishing the working relationship between the GoU and the ICC however, most 
importance was placed on finding and arresting the leadership of the LRA for future 
prosecution.418 Revoking its previous blanket amnesty, the GoU vowed to assist the ICC 
in “ensuring that those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes against 
humanity committed in northern Uganda are brought to justice.”419 Towards this end, the 
ICC in Uganda would serve a function similar to Sierra Leone’s Special Court in its focus 
on top leaders while other accountability processes were to be put in place to address 
                                                 
415 UN. 2009. “Status of Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict,” accessed 14th June 2009 at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&chapter=4&lang=en.    
416 ICC. 2004. “Press Release: President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army(LRA) to the ICC,” accessed 19th March 2009 at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%
20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc?lan=en
-GB. 
417 ICC. 2004. “Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 12 February,” 5.  
418 ICC. 2004. “Press Release: President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army(LRA) to the ICC,” accessed 19th March 2009 at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%
20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc?lan=en
-GB. 
419 Ibid. 
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impunity for lower-level perpetrators. Based on its mandate, on the 13th of October 2005 
the ICC issued arrest warrants against the top 5 commanders of the LRA citing foremost 
“acts of murder and enslavement, both constituting war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.”420 Three of the 5 were charged with the forced enlistment of children.421 
 
The ICC’s concerns with accountability in Uganda extended only as far as the 
prosecution of the LRA’s top leaders. For their part Museveni and the GoU, focused on 
ending the conflict with the LRA, likewise neglected the accountability of child soldiers. 
Issues of child soldier agency that arose during the course of the Sierra Leone TRC 
process concerning the dual nature of child soldiers as both victims and perpetrators 
were therefore for all practical purposes left unaddressed in the Ugandan political 
context. This is not to say there were no perspectives on the topic. Even within the 
northern communities there was significant division as to how accountability for child 
soldiers should be approached. On the one hand there existed a benevolent view of 
child soldiers as primarily victims reflecting the Acholi “culture of peace”:    
“[W]hen many Northerners talk about their desire to forgive the LRA, they 
are often speaking of their own children or those from their communities, 
many of whom had no choice but to fight.”422 
 
Recognizing child soldiers at least partially as victims casts significant doubt on the need 
for holding them fully accountable for their actions. Far from this perspective, however, 
were the sentiments of some communities that diverged greatly from the supposed 
Acholi ‘peace’ approach. Akello et al noted resistance to child soldier reintegration based 
on severe stigmatization of returnees. Some communities pointed to the voluntary nature 
of some children’s participation, and the perception that they were infected by “cen,” or 
evil spirits, that could negatively impact the rest of the community.423 These stigmas 
motivated putting more emphasis on child soldier accountability in reintegration efforts:   
“The unwillingness of communities to welcome formerly abducted child 
soldiers is based on the refusal to accept the idea that such children are 
not accountable for the crimes they committed. The fact that communities 
                                                 
420 ICC. 2005. “Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 14 October 2005,” 2. 
421 ICC. 2005. “Press Release: Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders,” 14th October, 
accessed 20th March 2009 at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%20
0204%200105/press%20releases/warrant%20of%20arrest%20unsealed%20against%20five%20lra%20com
manders.   
422 Worden, S. 2008. “The Justice Dilemma in Uganda,” USIPeace Briefing, United States Institute of 
Peace, Washington, D.C., 6-7. 
423 Akello, G., A. Richters and R. Reis. 2006. “Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: 
Coming to Terms with Children’s Agency and Accountability,” Intervention, 4(3), 234-5.  
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will insist on traditional cleansing rituals for child returnees also points to 
this issue.”424 
 
 
In a matter of speaking, this conflict of perspectives – at once recognizing the victimhood 
of child soldiers while at the same time calling for accountability based on the needs of 
the communities from which child soldiers had come – could be seen as another 
incarnation of the peace-versus-justice dilemma. It must be recognized that northern 
communities, who sustained injury by the LRA’s systematic large-scale plunder of its 
people and resources including the forced recruitment of its children, were thereafter 
once again the victims of those same children’s lethal attacks once they were within the 
ranks for the LRA. In terms of the victim-focused nature of transitional justice processes, 
the needs of victimized communities should presumably be taken into account on par 
with those of the child soldiers who were both victims and perpetrators.    
 
 
4.5  The Juba Peace Talks, the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation, and the Approach to Child Soldiers  
 
International pressure again mounted against Museveni from 2005 as the British 
government cancelled funding to Uganda citing that too little had been done in moving 
towards multi-party politics.425 In 2006 the UN launched the multi-million-dollar Juba 
Initiative Fund to support peace talks426 while the Security Council unanimously called 
on both the GoU and the LRA “to commit themselves fully to further a long-term an
peaceful solution to the conflict.”
d 
                                                
427 On the 4th of July 2006, in order to bring the LRA to 
the negotiating table, President Museveni reversed his previous position by offering 
Kony total amnesty if he “renounced terrorism and accepted peace.”428 Again reflecting 
the peace-versus-justice debate, the ICC’s Moreno-Ocampo expressed his concern over 
the amnesty offer by saying that Kony would eventually have to face trial: “[Ugandan 
authorities] have a duty to execute the arrest warrants because they are a member of 
 
424 Ibid, 235. 
425 BBC News. 2005. “UK Aid Cut Pressures Uganda,” 29th April, accessed 15th June 2009 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4498381.stm.  
426 UN. 2006. “Press Release: United Nations Launches Juba Initiative Fund to Aid Peace in Northern 
Uganda,” accessed 15th June 2009 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/afr1439.doc.htm.   
427 ReliefWeb. 2006. “Uganda: Security Council Presidential Statement Demands Release of Women, 
Children by Lord’s Resistance Army, Expeditious Conclusion of Peace Process,” accessed 24th June 2009 
at http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/HMYT-6VLR9H?OpenDocument.   
428 IRIN. 2006. “Uganda: Kony will eventually face trial, says ICC prosecutor,” accessed 15th September 
2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/07/mil-060707-irin01.htm.  
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the ICC.”429 Nevertheless, negotiations began shortly thereafter in Juba, Sudan, and 
were considered to be another good chance of ending the conflict.430 Within a short time 
two truces were signed in August431 and November 2006432 with the LRA moving to 
specified safe havens separate from the IDP camps.  However, hostilities resumed 
swiftly as both sides violated the terms of peace.433  
 
By May 2007 the Juba Initiative Project, with the support of the United Nations, resumed 
facilitating discussions between the LRA and the GoU. For security reasons, the LRA 
leadership did not go to Juba but sent representatives in their stead.434 Although no 
peace plan had yet been agreed to, discussions moved forward to considerations of how 
justice issues would be approached in the post-conflict period. In June the parties 
agreed to the terms of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (AAR). The 
AAR set out a commitment “to preventing impunity and promoting redress” while 
recognizing both the Ugandan Constitution and international obligations, namely the 
requirements of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.435 It further 
stressed that any pursuit of accountability should seek also to address national healing: 
“[A]ny meaningful accountability proceedings should, in the context of recovery from the 
conflict, promote reconciliation and encourage individuals to take personal responsibility 
for their conduct.”436 Furthermore the AAR made a strong commitment to taking into 
                                                 
429 Ibid.  
430 BBC. 2006. “Uganda Rebels Drop Truce Demands,” 14 August, accessed 24th March 2009 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4790049.stm.   
431 IRIN. 2006. “Uganda: Key Events in the Northern Conflict Since May,” 30 August, accessed 24th March 
at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=60756.  
432 BBC. 2006. “Ugandan LRA Rebels Sign New Truce,” 1 November, accessed 15th September 2008 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6105800.stm.  
433 In August, the LRA noted that its forces were being threatened by unsanctioned UPDF movements near 
assembly camps leaving them no choice but to vacate one of them. Both sides admitted their violations. 
There was further suspicion that the LRA had been complicit in the killing of innocent civilians in Sudan in 
violation of the terms of negotiations. Fighting also resumed, this time in Southern Sudan, between the LRA 
and the UPDF. After the November truce, the LRA claimed its troops had been attacked by UPDF forces, 
killing several soldiers. As a result, the LRA withdrew from the peace talks.  
BBC. 2006. “Ugandan Army Breaking Peace Deal,” 28 September, accessed 15th September 2009 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5388026.stm; IRIN. 2006. “Sudan: Armed Group Kills 42 Civilians,” 20 
October, accessed 25th March 2009 at http://irinnews.org.report.aspx?reportid=61376; IRIN. 2006. “Talks Hit 
Fresh Snag Amid Rebel Protest,” 30 November, accessed 24th March 2009 at  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/11/mil-061130-irin04.htm.; UN Security Council. 
2009. “Northern Uganda/LRA Historical Chronology,” accessed 25th March 2009 at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2880391/. 
434 IRIN. 2006. “Sudan-Uganda: LRA Talks, Pencils and Helicopters,” 31 May, accessed 25th March 2009 at 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72489.   
435Uganda. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan,” Introduction. 
436 Ibid, Article 3.2. 
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account the needs of victims: “The Parties agree that it is essential to acknowledge and 
address the suffering of victims, paying attention to the most vulnerable groups, and to 
promote and facilitate their right to contribute to society.”437 At the same time, a child-
rights focus emphasized the need to “[r]ecognise and address the special needs of 
children and adopt child-sensitive approaches.”438 To ensure accountability for atrocities 
committed during the war the GoU committed to adapting and developing national courts 
into “formal courts and tribunals”439 in order to enable the prosecution of “individuals who 
are alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes 
amounting to international crimes, during the conflict.”440  
 
Significantly justice processes would not be limited to the top leadership only. In pursuit 
of accountability for lower-level perpetrators while also recognizing the sensitivity of the 
situation, and so balancing the needs of peace and justice, the AAR committed the 
parties to adopting “appropriate justice mechanisms, including customary processes of 
accountability, that would resolve the conflict while promoting reconciliation.”441 In effect 
the AAR was proposing that recourse to customary processes of accountability, rather 
than criminal prosecutions, could provide a way of resolving the peace-versus-justice 
dilemma. Acholi religious leaders maintained that the use of traditional justice and 
reconciliation rituals “does not imply impunity, but holds perpetrators and their clans 
responsible for their crimes and helps prevent further crimes by restoring relationships 
between victims and perpetrators.”442 In pursuing its goal “to ensure the widest national 
ownership of the accountability and reconciliation processes”443 the AAR thus prioritized 
the use of local traditional justice processes: 
“Traditional justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo 
Cuk, Ai Luc and Tonu ci Koka and others as practiced in communities 
affected by the conflict, shall be promoted, with necessary modifications, 
as a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation.”444 
 
                                                 
437 Ibid, Article 8.1. 
438 Ibid, Article 12(i).   
439 Ibid, Articles 6.1-2. 
440 Ibid, Article 6.1. 
441 Ibid, Introduction. 
442 Baines, E. 2007. “The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern 
Uganda,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 102. 
443Uganda. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan,” Article 2.2. 
444 Ibid, Article 3.1.  
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Of these accountability processes the Mato Oput ritual was highlighted as it is the 
customary practice of the Acholi who were most affected by the war.445 It was not made 
clear by the AAR in which cases traditional justice mechanisms would be used, but the 
Agreement stated that “alternative penalties and sanctions shall…reflect the gravity of 
the crimes or violations [of the individual].”446 Since special courts were to be charged 
with the prosecution of LRA leaders it could be assumed that traditional justice 
processes would be applied to lower-level perpetrators including child soldiers.  
 
4.6 Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Approaches as Transitional Justice  
Mechanisms for dealing with Child Soldiers 
 
The AAR’s proposal for recourse to customary justice and reconciliation processes as 
transitional justice mechanisms is by no means unique. Significantly there has been a 
growing awareness of the relevance and appropriateness of such traditional justice 
approaches in the African context. Thus the 2007 Paris Principles’ emphasized that 
indigenous methods of dispute settlement and reconciliation based on an African view of 
restorative justice and social rehabilitation take a very different approach than Western 
justice systems. Desmond Tutu, the chairperson of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, posits that traditional African jurisprudence, rather than 
seeking “retribution or punishment”, prioritized “the healing of breaches, the redressing 
of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to 
rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to 
be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence.”447 Kofi 
Annan, then UN Secretary-General, wrote in his 2004 report The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 
“due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for 
administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their 
often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards 
and local tradition. Where these are ignored or overridden, the result can 
be the exclusion of large sectors of society from accessible justice. 
Particularly in post-conflict settings, vulnerable, excluded, victimized and 
marginalized groups must also be engaged in the development of the 
sector and benefit from its emerging institutions.”448 
                                                 
445 IRIN. 2007. “Uganda: LRA Talks Reach Agreement on Accountability,” 30 June, accessed 24th March 
2009 at http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73010.   
446Uganda. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan,” Article 6.4.  
447 Tutu, D. 1999. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday, 55. 
448 UN. 2004. “Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies.” Report S/2004/616, Article 11(36). 
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The community-focused orientation of traditional justice is particularly applicable in Africa 
as large sectors of the continent affected severely by war and its related atrocities have 
no recourse but to indigenous accountability processes at the local level.449 Moreover, 
post-conflict scenarios often pose severe challenges to the formal criminal justice 
system due to the sheer volumes of perpetrators involved in crimes of civil conflict in 
which case customary processes may offer the only feasible alternative. To take the 
extreme example of Rwanda, about 8,000 traditional gacaca courts were employed to try 
more than 80,000 perpetrators who for years had been awaiting trial for their 
participation in massacres around the country.450 
 
In this context it should not be surprising that the AAR recommended recourse to 
traditional justice mechanisms for their appropriateness in addressing child soldiers as 
both victims and perpetrators of serious breeches of international law. Indeed, according 
to Huyse, traditional ceremonies including cleansing rituals employed in Uganda “seem 
to be successful in reintegrating and reconciling surviving victims and ex-combatants, 
particularly former child soldiers.”451 In particular, the Mato Oput ceremony has been 
employed as the main traditional justice mechanism to address accountability for 
wartime atrocities. Recognizing the importance of mending relationships in establishing 
sustainable peace, its central aim is the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators.452 The 
ceremony is presided over by traditional leaders and community members. It includes 
the perpetrators’ acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the offering of reparations to the 
victim and their family, followed by a symbolic ritual where both parties drink the “bitter 
root” for which the ceremony is named.453 “In Acholi jurisprudence,” according to Latigo, 
                                                 
449 UN Peacebuilding Commission – Working Group on Lessons Learned. 2008. “Justice in Times of 
Transition,” accessed 24th December 2008 at 
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:2C9tAfuZilgJ:www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%2520Group
%2520on%2520Lessons%2520Learned/Justice%2520in%2520Times%2520of%2520Transition%2520(26.0
2.2008)/26.02.2008%2520Chair%2520Summary.pdf+traditional+justice+processes+ICTJ&hl=en&ct=clnk&c
d=5&gl=us&client=safari.   
450 IRIN. 2004. “Rwanda: Traditional Courts Inaugurated,” accessed 26th December 2008 at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=50380.  
451 Huyse, L. 2008. “Presentation of Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning 
from African Experiences.” Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1. 
452 Huyse, L. 2008. ”Introduction: tradition-based approaches in peacemaking, transitional justice and 
reconciliation policies,” in Huyse, L. and M. Salter(eds). 2008. Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after 
Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 12. 
453 Afako, B. 2002. “Reconciliation and Justice: ‘Mato oput’ and the Amnesty Act,” accessed 26th December 
2008 at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/reconciliation-justice.php.  
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“there is no contradiction between accountability and reconciliation – indeed, the two are 
aligned. Above all, impunity is never accepted. The Acholi traditional justice and 
reconciliation system is a practical reflection and application of the nascent concept of 
transitional justice, namely counter-factual investigations into the past and present in 
order to forge the future.”454 The goals of achieving accountability for the criminal actions 
of perpetrators while restoring normal relations between victim and perpetrator are thus 
to be addressed simultaneously in line with other tools of transitional justice such as 
truth-telling.  Huyse contends that the use of such traditional justice processes may even 
in some respects be superior to the standard criminal justice system in African post-
conflict contexts: 
“Courtrooms are not usually capable of the subtlety needed to deal with 
such complexities. A combination of palavers, the African way of 
prolonging discussions, and ritual events creates in principle more 
opportunities for exploring the issues of accountability, innocence and 
guilt that are integral to the legacy of violent conflict.”455 
 
 
It should be noted, however, that in the contemporary Ugandan context the application 
of traditional justice practices such as Mato Oput towards ensuring accountability has 
been a contested matter. Some observers point out that, precisely due to the impact of 
the war, key customary practices had fallen in abeyance: the “constant fear” facing local 
communities “undermined traditional customs around which the rural Acholis built their 
value, ethical and normative base and are no longer followed.”456 If traditional rituals are 
no longer practiced in local communities due to the ravages of war, how can they be 
applied in post-conflict settings to ensure accountability? The Liu Institute adds that 
traditional rituals had previously been applied to crimes very different from those seen 
during the course of the northern Ugandan conflict and would thus have to be 
significantly adapted to that situation: 
“LRA massacres, mass rape, abduction, arson and mutilation are not 
crimes Acholi elders are familiar with in the history of the region. Although 
                                                 
454 Latigo, J. 2008. “Northern Uganda: tradition-based practices in the Acholi region,” in Traditional Justice 
and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, Huyse, L. and M. Salter(eds). 
2008. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 110. 
455 Huyse, L. 2008. “Introduction,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning 
from African Experiences, L. Huyse and M. Salter(eds). 2008. Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 15. 
456 Veale, A. and A. Stavrou. 2003. Violence, Reconciliation, and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord’s 
Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda. A. Veale and A. Stavrou(eds). Pretoria, South Africa: 
Institute for Security Studies, 41. 
 89
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
wn
 
variants of such crimes have existed in Acholi history…the modern scale 
and devastation on the population have not been witnessed before.”457  
 
Furthermore, the Acholi are not the only group affected by war, raising the question how 
multiple rituals stemming from distinct cultural traditions can be used in the same 
transitional justice application. It has been suggested that it might be necessary to 
harmonize the different customary justice and reconciliation practices mentioned in the 
AAR in order to accommodate all parties.458 The Refugee Law Project sums up some of 
the challenges facing the use of traditional justice in Uganda: 
“[I]t remains unclear to what extent these practices could address abuses 
perpetrated in the course of conflict, how (if at all) they could be adapted 
for contemporary application, whether or not formal codification of 
traditional principles into national law is desirable, and to what extent 
such practices must be allowed to remain flexible.”459 
 
Baines adds that in the international context the appropriate use of traditional justice 
practices is still being formulated. Many nascent issues confront the use of customary 
practices  
“in the field of transitional justice, where local approaches to justice and 
reconciliation are increasingly recognized as a vital element of transitional 
justice strategies, but where theorists are only beginning to understand 
such approaches, let alone reflect on their potential role and impact.”460 
 
In light of so many unresolved questions as to how traditional justice could be applied in 
transitional settings, Baines argues that the Juba Talks provided “a unique opportunity to 
begin to resolve how local approaches to justice and reconciliation can better inform and 
shape international approaches.”461 Evidently the many challenges and questions 
surrounding the use of traditional justice mechanisms also apply to proposals to use 
them in dealing with child soldier accountability in Uganda. 
 
                                                 
457 Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Gulu District NGO Forum. 2005. Roco Wat I Acoli / Restoring 
Relationships in Acholiland: Traditional Approaches to Justice and Reintegration. Gulu, Uganda: Liu 
Institute, 4. 
458 Ocen, J. 2007. “Can Traditional Rituals Bring Justice to Northern Uganda?” Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting, accessed 20th September 2008 at 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=337405&apc_state=henpacr.  
459 Refugee Law Project. 2009. “Building Consensus on Sustainable Peace in Uganda – Tradition in 
Transition: Working Paper No. 1,” accessed 20th August 2009 at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MUMA-7V353Y?OpenDocument.  
460 Baines, E. 2007. “The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern 
Uganda,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 98. 
461 Ibid, 114. My emphasis.  
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4.7 Conclusion:  The Marginalization of Accountability in Traditional Justice 
           Mechanisms 
 
After ignoring the plight of LRA child soldiers for nearly 20 years, the AAR as outcome of 
negotiations between the GoU and the LRA, in the end prioritized accountability for LRA 
leaders while leaving accountability for lower-level perpetrators to be addressed by 
traditional justice mechanisms. The AAR stated that the parties agreed to “[e]nsure that 
children are not subjected to criminal justice proceedings, but may participate, as 
appropriate, in reconciliation processes.”462 However, given the challenges facing the 
implementation of traditional justice in Uganda, it was not clear to what extent these 
would be capable of addressing issues of child soldier accountability. Worden argues 
that, due to the prioritization of justice measures for LRA leaders, the issue of 
accountability for lower-level perpetrators, including child soldiers, was actually ignored 
further: 
“So far, the focus has been on how to hold the top LRA leadership 
accountable – including its head, Joseph Kony, and two others463 whom 
the International Criminal Court has indicted for crimes against humanity. 
Less attention has been paid to the greater problems associated with the 
thousands of perpetrators who have committed terrible crimes for which 
prosecution is not envisioned.”464 
 
Significantly, the AAR made no mention of holding child soldiers responsible for the 
serious crimes they had committed. This raises the question, in what ways were 
traditional justice processes then intended to deal with this issue? Underlying this is the 
basic question of what indeed was to be the goal of child soldier participation in 
reconciliation processes – their accountability, their healing, addressing the needs of 
communities affected by their actions, or perhaps all of these together given the reputed 
utility of traditional justice mechanisms for addressing issues of both accountability and 
reconciliation. Regarding the traditional purposes of Mato Oput, Tom claims that “[i]t 
doesn’t aim at establishing whether an individual is guilty or not, rather it seeks to restore 
                                                 
462 Uganda. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the 
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan,” Article 10.4.  
463 Two of the original ICC indictees, Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti, have been reported deceased since 
the unsealing of the ICC indictments against them in 2005. BBC News. 2007. “Otti ‘Executed by Uganda 
Rebels,” 21st December, accessed 12th July 2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7156284.stm; ICC. 
2007. “Uganda,” accessed 12th July 2009 at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/. 
464 Worden, S. 2008. “The Justice Dilemma in Uganda,” USIPeace Briefing, Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1.  
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marred social harmony in the affected community.”465 The question follows, if the 
establishment of guilt was not the objective of traditional tools to be applied in Uganda, 
then how were child soldiers to be held responsible for their actions? Duthie suggests 
that “the community-based nature” of traditional justice processes could add to the 
legitimacy of holding child soldiers accountable in part by “draw[ing] upon existing local 
structures, customs, and values and philosophies.”466 But what if the most affected 
Ugandan communities, and with it their traditional belief systems, had been severely 
disrupted and damaged by more than two decades of war? In short, the AAR left many 
questions open as to how traditional justice was to be applied to address child soldier 
accountability, what potential adaptations in the contemporary context might be needed, 
and how issues of the criminal responsibility of child soldiers were to be dealt with. 
 
In June 2007 the GoU and LRA signed the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability 
and Reconciliation which added that participation in traditional justice mechanisms, for 
adult and child lower-level perpetrators alike, was to be only on a voluntary basis: “A 
person shall not be compelled to undergo any traditional ritual.”467 Accordingly, it was up 
to child soldiers themselves to decide whether or not they would participate in the 
traditional justice and reconciliation processes. As in the case of the SLTRC, this meant 
that child soldier accountability was to be addressed only to the extent that child soldiers 
were willing to come forward and confess their crimes. In line with the child-rights focus 
of the AAR it followed that they could not be compelled to disclose more than they were 
willing to do during the course of traditional rituals. This did not necessarily mean that 
there would, or could, be no disclosures by child soldiers of their involvement in war 
crimes. If they chose to do so, then child soldiers could recount their crimes in order to 
clear their consciences or acknowledge their mistakes to facilitate being welcomed back 
into their communities. McConnan and Uppard suggest, for example, that through 
traditional tools child soldiers can “benefit from acknowledging their previous actions, as 
part of the process of coming to terms with the past and preparing for civilian life.”468 
                                                 
465 Tom, P. 2006. “The Acholi Traditional Approach to Justice and the War in Northern Uganda,” accessed 
7th July 2009 at http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/acholi_traditional_approach.jsp?nid=6792.  
466 Duthie, R. 2005. “Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration.” Paper for Stockholm Initiative on 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration(SIDDR), Working Group 3, 15.  
467 Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. 2008. “Annexure to the Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation,” Article 22.  
468 McConnan, I. and S. Uppard. 2002. “Children Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers 
Associated with Fighting Forces,” Save the Children Fund, 198. 
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Duthie adds that traditional justice mechanisms “can promote trust between ex-
combatants and society in many of the same ways as more formal measures.”469  
Still, it must be concluded that the relegation of child soldiers to traditional justice tools 
like Mato Oput, taken together with the prioritization of reconciliation over establishing 
guilt in these traditional approaches, in practice meant that the challenge of child soldier 
accountability was deflected rather than faced. Essentially child soldiers were given the 
option to take no more responsibility for their actions than they did during NGO 
reintegration processes, maybe less as either traditional or Christian forgiveness rituals 
were a part of those processes.  
 
If the goals of traditional justice processes were merely those of healing and 
reconciliation, then perhaps this emphasis would be acceptable. However, if one of the 
aims of traditional processes is accountability, as stated in the AAR, then voluntary 
participation actually precludes holding child soldiers responsible for the serious crimes 
they committed. Any child that fears judgement or stigmatization for their actions could 
simply opt out of these processes. Similarly to the SLTRC – by its standard of voluntary 
participation – the impunity of child soldiers complicit in war crimes was actually 
facilitated by the AAR’s application of traditional justice mechanisms.    
 
Despite the AAR’s stated commitment to addressing child soldier accountability, its 
application of traditional justice mechanisms on a voluntary basis showed that indeed 
this was not its main goal. When combined with the work of Uganda’s Amnesty 
Commission it becomes apparent that the main priority of national processes in Uganda 
concerning child soldiers was that of their rehabilitation and reintegration. As previously 
discussed, according to the 2000 Amnesty Act child soldiers who renounced war and 
armed rebellion, deemed “reporters,” were to be granted amnesty for their actions. The 
amnesty program, in addition to providing DDR for former child soldiers, focused on the 
importance of dialogue between adversaries as a means towards reconciliation.470 Hovil 
and Lomo note the overwhelming public support for this Act and its resulting Amnesty 
Law based on several motivations:   
                                                 
469 Duthie, R. 2005. “Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration.” Paper for Stockholm Initiative on 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration(SIDDR), Working Group 3, 14. 
470 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program. 2009. “Uganda,” accessed 20th January 2010 
at http://www.mdrp.org/uganda_main.htm.  
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“[T]he Amnesty Law is perceived to be not only an effective tool for 
ending conflict, but also to have the potential for reconciling communities 
with ex-combatants, ex-combatants with government, and communities 
with other communities. Most importantly, it is a process that is clearly 
accepted by the victims of the conflict: indeed, the resilience of the people 
and their willingness to forgive is tangible.”471 
 
As child soldiers made up the vast majority of LRA forces, their reintegration into 
and reconciliation with local communities, was considered paramount compared 
to holding them accountable for their actions. By the time of the 2007 Juba Talks, 
the Amnesty Commission detailed that over 12,000 former LRA combatants had 
been granted amnesty.472 Of these Blattman and Annan report that almost all 
were formerly abducted child soldiers.473 As in the case of Sierra Leone, the 
reintegration needs of child soldiers were prioritized over their accountability. 
 
 
                                                 
471 Hovil, L. and Z. Lomo. 2005. “Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The  
Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-term Reconciliation,” Kampala: Refugee Law Project, 28. 
472 Uganda Ministry of Internal Affairs. 2007. “Reporters Granted Amnesty,” accessed 27th July 2009 at 
http://www.mia.go.ug/page.php?1=reporters&&2=Reporters%20Granted%20Amnesty.  
473 Blattman, C. and J. Annan. 2008. “Child Combatants in Northern Uganda: Reintegration Myths and 
Realities,” in R. Muggah(ed.). 2008. Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with the Fighters in 
the Aftermath of War. New York, NY: Routledge, 104.  
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Chapter 5. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES AND PROSPECTS OF  
   CHILD SOLDIER ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
5.1 The Dilemma of dealing with Child Soldier Accountability in Sierra Leone  
and Uganda 
 
The growing problem of child soldiering in Africa poses the stark dilemma of child 
soldiers as both victims and perpetrators in armed conflict. Child soldiers are victims of 
war, more often than not forced into service, with warlords taking advantage of their 
emotional immaturity and initiating them into extreme cultures of violence. Nonetheless 
child soldiers have also been responsible for some of the most serious war crimes. As 
victims of human rights violations child soldiers require protection, but as perpetrators of 
human rights violations some of the same child soldiers also need to be held 
accountable for their actions.  
 
In the cases of Sierra Leone and Uganda, various transitional justice mechanisms were 
chosen to deal with the dilemma of holding child soldiers accountable. In Sierra Leone, 
the responsibility for child soldiers was referred to the SLTRC which had been set up 
according to the Lomé Peace Accord “to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, 
provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell 
their story, [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation.”474 In Uganda, traditional justice mechanisms such as Mato Oput were to 
be applied to lower-level perpetrators to “resolve the conflict while promoting 
reconciliation”475 and “to ensure the widest national ownership of the accountability and 
reconciliation processes.”476  
 
This study has attempted to investigate how these two transitional justice mechanisms, 
reputed to have the ability to address issues of both accountability and reconciliation, 
have dealt with the challenge of child soldier accountability. As such my primary 
research question has been, how and to what extent has child soldier accountability, 
along with recognition of the need of child soldiers to be protected as victims of human 
                                                 
474 Lomé Agreement. 1999. “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,” Article 26. 
475 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. 2007. “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, 
Sudan,” Introduction. 
476 Ibid, Article 2.2. 
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rights violations, been addressed by the SLTRC in Sierra Leone and traditional justice in 
Uganda? Recognizing the possibility that the needs of child soldiers for protections might 
preclude effectively holding them accountable for their actions my secondary research 
question is, could a coherent and effective approach in principle be devised to address 
both of these concerns? 
 
In both Sierra Leone and Uganda efforts to address child soldier accountability has 
proven to be questionable at best. Despite the decision that the child soldier issue would 
best be taken up by transitional justice mechanisms, in both cases no further significant 
efforts have been made to hold child soldiers accountable for their human rights abuses. 
In Sierra Leone, the child-friendly measures put in place by the SLTRC with the backing 
of UNICEF, served to protect child soldiers through their emphasis on voluntary 
participation and child soldiers-as-witnesses, but worked counter to addressing their 
accountability. The participation of less that 200 child soldiers in the hearings of the 
SLTRC meant that the vast majority did not have to account for their actions much less 
acknowledge their guilt or apologize to victims. Furthermore, due to the SLTRC’s 
conception of child soldiers as witnesses rather than perpetrators, there was also no 
emphasis on holding those that did testify responsible for their actions. In a related 
matter the SLTRC’s notion of “personal and narrative truth” as the witness’ personal 
account of events that were to be respected by the Commission no matter how much or 
how little they chose to divulge did not guarantee full disclosure.  
 
In Uganda, when the AAR finally tasked traditional justice mechanisms with the 
processes of accountability and reconciliation, it did so with an emphasis on the latter 
component. The problem of addressing child soldier accountability was further 
complicated by the many challenges facing the application of traditional processes that 
made those processes less than viable, namely the destruction of the 
community/traditional basis for these customary tools and the lack of a unified 
mechanism fit for the designated purpose as laid out in the AAR. The Annexure to the 
AAR thereafter decreed that participation in traditional justice mechanisms was also to 
be on a voluntary basis only. While the cases of Sierra Leone and Uganda were specific 
to local histories and politics, the effect of their approaches to the dilemma of child 
soldier accountability was much the same. In both cases child soldiers were effectively 
allowed to have impunity for their actions. 
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5.2 Reflections on Child Soldier Accountability in the Context of the 
International Consensus on Protecting Child Soldiers 
 
The role and limitations of transitional justice in addressing the dilemma of child soldier 
accountability, as seen in the cases of Sierra Leone and Uganda, has been framed by 
two major developments highlighted during the course of this investigation. The first 
major development is the emerging international consensus against child soldiering that 
has come to prevail in the development of international humanitarian and human rights 
law as well as influencing the domestic post-conflict dealings concerning child soldiers. 
The second major development is the emergence of the new sub-field of transitional 
justice whose tools have been deemed appropriate for application in the case of child 
soldiers as well. To the extent that both of these developments come together in 
addressing the dilemma of child soldier accountability we need to consider how they 
have interacted in the actual cases of Sierra Leone and Uganda but we also need to 
reflect more generally whether or not the goals of the international consensus and the 
principles of transitional justice are compatible. 
 
The first issue to examine concerns the degree to which the international consensus 
against child soldiering compromises the pursuit of child soldier accountability. The 
recent statement of the Paris Principles characterizing child soldiers as “primarily 
victims, not just perpetrators” articulates a protection agenda that has exacerbated the 
dilemma of addressing accountability for child soldiers as both victims and perpetrators 
in armed conflict. More specifically this dilemma has come to be concretized around the 
issue of setting age-limits for child soldiers meant to extend the provisions for protecting 
them as victims that simultaneously serves to prevent efforts to hold them accountable 
as perpetrators. The logic of the international consensus, primarily concerned with 
expanding the protections needed by child soldiers as victims, functions to extend the 
age-limit of acceptable recruitment and use of child soldiers upwards as far as possible. 
Thus it is generally assumed and argued that if the limit is set at 18 instead of 15 then 
many more child soldiers will be protected as victims. In the abstract this might make 
logical sense – if child soldiers were victims only and not also perpetrators. But if they 
are considered as both victims and perpetrators, then extending the age-limit upwards 
means that increasing numbers of perpetrators will have effective impunity. From a 
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justice perspective concerned with holding child soldiers accountable for their war 
crimes, the relevant question should be not only whether 16 and 17 year-olds need 
protection, but at what age young people should begin to be held accountable for their 
actions and crimes. Arguably this should be in line with the age limits set in criminal 
justice systems generally. However, given the age of criminal responsibility of children in 
Sierra Leone of 14 and in Uganda of 12, it is apparent that protections for child soldiers 
are over and above that of other children, even by the age 15 standard. The age 18 
standard extends these child soldier protections dramatically above all other children.   
 
Besides stating that child soldiers were indeed perpetrators as well as victims, the only 
allusion to the issue of accountability in the Sierra Leone and Uganda case studies has 
been in creating the parameters within which the cases of child soldiers are to be 
pursued – namely without resorting to criminal justice proceedings and in a framework of 
restorative justice. The application of transitional justice mechanisms in the cases of 
Sierra Leone and Uganda, as well as their non-judicial nature and restorative objectives, 
thus leads back to my primary research question: How and to what extent was child 
soldier accountability, along with recognition of the need of child soldiers to be protected 
as victims of human rights violations, addressed in the transitional justice applications of 
the SLTRC in Sierra Leone and traditional justice in Uganda?  
 
A simple answer to this question is that, in effect, accountability for child soldiers was not 
pursued, at least not in any systematic way. Given the voluntary nature of the respective 
applications of transitional justice in Sierra Leone and Uganda it proved not possible to 
ensure that children responsible for, or complicit in, serious human rights abuse would 
participate in these processes, much less assume responsibility for the crimes they 
committed. The more complicated answer to the question of how and to what extent 
these processes dealt with child soldier accountability is that in fact this happened only 
as far as child soldiers were willing to participate in them. This was based first on 
whether or not child soldiers chose even to be involved and, if they were, by how much 
or how little they chose to disclose of the serious crimes they took part in. Although 
specific to the transitional justice applications in Sierra Leone and Uganda, it reflects the 
victim-focused work of international consensus that has set forth the standard of 
voluntary participation in future child soldier cases within the Paris Principles. As such, 
the implications of the Sierra Leone and Uganda situations are far-reaching. This much 
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is clear: without any further development of international consensus as to the degree 
child soldiers can also be considered as perpetrators, that considers their accountability 
rather than only their protection needs, how and to what extent they are held 
accountable will continue to be determined by child soldiers themselves based on their 
voluntary participation in justice mechanisms. 
 
 
This leads back to my secondary research question: with the opposing considerations of 
providing child soldiers necessary protections while pursuing their accountability, could a 
coherent and effective approach be devised that in fact addresses both of these 
concerns? Existing literature on truth commissions highlights their potential inadequacy 
in addressing accountability without resorting to judicial courts and punitive measures. 
Challenges to traditional justice mechanisms are two-fold: first, adapting customary 
processes that are no longer in use to markedly different present realities, and second, 
finding a unified system to accommodate all parties in a multiethnic society. Given this 
established acknowledgement of the weaknesses of the transitional justice mechanisms 
under investigation, and keeping in mind the previous discussion on the role of 
international consensus in the pursuit of child soldier accountability, my secondary 
question can be reformulated as follows: would the transitional justice processes applied 
in Sierra Leone and Uganda have addressed the dilemma of child soldier accountability 
more effectively had it not been for the mandate developed by international consensus 
to treat child soldiers foremost as victims of serious crimes?  
 
During the course of the SLTRC’s investigation into the nature and effects of war the 
Commission found conclusively, and in line with the international consensus, that child 
soldiers were in fact above all victims in armed conflict. As such they were in need of 
attention on par with all other children who were negatively impacted by war. This 
included the protection of their rights and the importance of their education and 
economic integration in the post-conflict period. In Uganda, the unresolved nature of the 
conflict has precluded similar conclusions. However, due to an even more extensive 
targeting of children and comparable methods of forced recruitment and initiation into 
extreme violence by the LRA, presumably the outcome will be much the same. 
According to this formulation then the applications of transitional justice mechanisms in 
Sierra Leone and Uganda were not in fact effective means to address the dilemma of 
child soldier accountability. Based on the conclusions of the SLTRC it can further be said 
 99
U
ive
r i
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
that transitional justice mechanisms are indeed incompatible with the victim focus of 
international consensus concerning child soldiers.  
 
Nonetheless, as these mechanisms were chosen for their ability to simultaneously 
address the needs of both accountability and reconciliation, it should be asked to what 
degree reconciliation needs could be considered in relation to the pursuit of child soldier 
accountability. While it is important to recognize the protection needs of child soldiers as 
victims, the needs of the communities into which they will return cannot be neglected. In 
so far as transitional justice tools are victim-focused, the question is whether the needs 
of communities victimized by the serious crimes perpetrated by child soldiers are to be 
considered at the same level as the needs of child soldiers themselves. Or does the 
child rights focus developed by international consensus put the rights of child soldiers 
above those of the communities they victimized?  
 
Underlying these questions is still the issue of child soldier accountability. Applied to 
victimized communities and recognizing the need to address their concerns in the 
pursuit of reconciliation and the grounds for a durable peace a last question is 
appropriate: are victimized communities themselves satisfied with the extent to which 
child soldier accountability has been addressed through the application of transitional 
justice mechanisms? In the context of attempting to achieve reconciliation, surely 
affected communities must play a role in deciding what adequately constitutes 
accountability. It is possible that in fact those communities are content without pursuing 
child soldiers further seeing as though, given the vast number of child soldiers in 
situations of internal conflict, there is a good chance one of those children is somehow 
related to them or someone they know. All of these questions will need to be addressed 
in pursuit of what will be a continuing challenge to both international consensus and the 
field of transitional justice. 
 
In conclusion we should also consider the implications of this outcome of the two case 
studies highlighted here for the limitations to the application of transitional justice 
principles more generally both in theory and practice. That the SLTRC and traditional 
justice mechanisms in Uganda proved ineffective in dealing with the accountability of 
child soldiers could imply that transitional justice tools, at least truth commissions and 
traditional justice and reconciliation processes, are inappropriate for this purpose. At a 
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theoretical level it could further imply that, while the restorative and victim-focused 
nature of such transitional justice mechanisms are perhaps a proper means to address 
their reintegration and reconciliation, they fall short on the issue of holding child soldiers 
accountable. In practice this is closely associated with the requirement of voluntary 
participation by victims, and thus also by child soldiers, in such transitional justice 
processes. In effectively precluding the pursuit of child soldier accountability, as 
demonstrated in both Sierra Leone and Uganda, this in practice absolutizes the victim 
status of child soldiers while allowing them impunity as perpetrators of war crimes and 
human rights abuses. By this formulation the dilemma of child soldier accountability is 
not a dilemma at all. Child soldiers are effectively to be regarded only as victims.  
Paradoxically, though, protecting child soldiers as victims in this way also serves to 
foster and sustain the prevailing culture of impunity. 
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